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

**MODERNIZED CAVALRY**

Wide World

# Supply of a Mechanized Cavalry Brigade on a March

By MAJOR R. F. PERRY, 13th Cavalry

A march of the Seventh Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) to Fort Riley, Kansas, with participation in demonstrations and maneuvers at the Cavalry School was authorized by the War Department from early October until November (1938). It was my lot to have the supply of this movement. The work necessary to supply this command and the logistical problems that presented themselves I am setting forth herewith.

The routes from Fort Knox to Fort Riley offered two possibilities. The more desirable one seemed to be via Louisville—Vincennes, Indiana, then on National Highway No. 50 to Scott Field or Jefferson Barracks—Columbia, Missouri—Kansas City or Fort Leavenworth—Fort Riley. An alternate route was to the south by Evansville, Indiana—Scott Field or Jefferson Barracks—Jefferson City, Missouri on National Highway No. 50—Kansas City or Fort Leavenworth—Fort Riley.

Both routes were on good highways and through cities near which we might camp and have supply facilities readily accessible. These proposed camp sites were approximately 150 miles apart, a most important factor in planning since that distance constitutes a practical day's march for mechanized cavalry, moving by easy stages.

With preliminary plans decided upon and with the data as to supplies required (which were based on experience of a march to Fort Oglethorpe in May and numerous other shorter practice marches) a reconnaissance was made by Lieutenant Colonel J. F. Davis, Brigade S-3, and myself.

On this reconnaissance we were chiefly concerned with road conditions, camp sites, gasoline supplies, and local supply facilities for provisions, water, wood, straw, coal, etc. Among these, the road conditions and camp sites were predominant and the remaining supply facilities would have to be made to conform to the best roads and camp sites we could find. We had no particular worry as to the road conditions as all routes were on state or national highways and all bridges were constructed for heavy traffic and would stand our maximum load. The matter of adequate camp sites did present a real problem, for to put the brigade with attached troops (100 officers, 2,000 enlisted men and 638 vehicles) into camp required a minimum of 35 acres of well drained ground with good approaches and available water. We had gone through this experience in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia in May and had found considerable difficulty which had necessitated splitting the command in some instances to get adequate camp facilities. In the flat country of Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri, we expected less difficulty but it developed that 35 acres are difficult to find anywhere if they are to have all the desired requirements and are to be had at a minimum cost to the government.

The idea of marching the command in two columns was considered but was discarded because the two best routes were at some points over 100 miles apart and would thus increase unnecessarily the difficulties of the maintenance and supply problem.

With these objectives in mind and a good estimate as to the supplies of gasoline, provisions, wood, straw, etc., necessary we left Fort Knox August 8th in a government car planning to spend ten days on reconnaissance and at Fort Riley where Colonel Davis was to make arrangements for demonstrations and maneuvers and I was to take care of the supply situation. Our normal procedure in reconnoitering a town was as follows:

Being supplied with T.P.S. schedules for V-75 gasoline procurement, we knew (or thought we did) the bulk dealer of gasoline in each city who would have to supply us with a greater part of our gasoline. We went directly to this dealer in each place, and, upon acquainting him with our wants of from 8,000 to 11,000 gallons of gasoline delivered by him on both of our proposed stops in his city, we had an ally who was more than eager to have us come there. Each dealer devoted his entire time to showing us around and was largely responsible for getting a good camp site for us.

With the bulk dealer's help (and he invariably seemed to know everyone) we would spend at least half a day visiting every possible camp site and eventually reached the point where we talked knowingly of clover crops and the state of Lespedeza in growth or why last year's circus grounds were not suitable. As a result of these rather long camp site reconnaissances we were able to secure excellent camp sites adjacent to main highways on the more desirable route, i.e. at Vincennes—Scott Field—Columbia—and Kansas City.

During this reconnaissance we built up a large acquaintance in each locality and were able to make contacts with vendors and to make preliminary arrangements for provisions and camp site supplies subject to definite confirmation by correspondence upon our return to Knox. We also contacted the city officials and Chambers of Commerce and arrangements were made through them for local police escorts over the best routes through each city to the camp site, and, through their influence we arranged for water to be supplied to us from the city water works. In our rather large contact with civilians, I would like to say that we were received with the utmost courtesy everywhere and a very friendly and interested attitude

*Gasoline trucks and transports awaiting arrival of the brigade at Columbia, Missouri.*

was shown by them all to the Army in general and to the mechanized cavalry brigade in particular.

At this point I want to stress the fuel problem that confronts a mechanized brigade and the plans that have to be made locally to gas efficiently this command.

The Seventh Cavalry Brigade with attached Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal and Air Corps units totals 638 vehicles and requires 107 gallons of gasoline per mile traveled. This gasoline is divided into 38.1 gallons of V-92 (aviation) gasoline for combat cars and 68.9 V-75 (ethyl) gasoline for all other vehicles. Figuring on this basis will give a total requirement for both types gasoline for an average 150 mile day march of 5,715 gallons of V-92 and 10,335 gallons of V-75. The V-92 gasoline is not available in such quantities in any city and the V-75, while a commercial product, is usually not carried by bulk dealers in quantities larger than our daily requirements. This makes it very apparent that all gasoline for our use had to be especially assembled for us.

Both types of gasoline, together with Diesel oil and engine oil, had to be delivered to our camp site *simultaneously* upon the arrival of the brigade in camp. And with such simultaneous delivery it took from 2½ to 4 hours to gas all vehicles. To get a visual picture of the amount of gasoline required, it took 17 tank wagons of from 300 to 1,200 gallons capacity all working at once to gas the command efficiently. The dealers had to get three extra railroad tank cars to meet this demand.

To have dealers deliver this gasoline as we desired it was necessary to impress and insist upon this simultaneous delivery. To a bulk dealer who operates from one to four tank wagons, this was a big order. In a small locality this meant drawing in all tank wagons from a wide radius (in some cases over 100 miles) and assembling ten or more wagons with drivers. If this were not done, the gassing continued on after dark. (The physical gassing of vehicles was done by the soldiers and in the majority of cases with buckets and funnels. Where power pump tank wagons were supplied the time required to gas was cut in half.)

All necessary requirements were impressed on the bulk dealers, and as far as could be foreseen, we had laid the ground for our supplies and all further details would have to be arranged by correspondence upon our return to Fort Knox. This referred to our V-75 gasoline requirements only and we worked on the assumption that all government contracts expiring on October 1st would be renewed as they usually were.

We knew the government contracts on V-75 gasoline expired on October 1st. We were able to get advance copies of the October 1st-December 31st contract by September 12th and found that every one had been changed and we had to make new contracts throughout. For the four camp sites en route and the one at Fort Riley, we had to deal with five oil companies (i.e., Ohio, Standard, Shell, Sinclair and Texaco). This necessitated considerable correspondence as their chains of correspondence seem to be as complicated as the Army's. We wrote to their main offices in Chicago, St. Louis, or New York, and then, in turn contacted their district officer who dealt with the local bulk dealers. Then, in some cases, the bulk dealers had to act through the local distributors.

In addition to the gasoline and Diesel oil, we required a supply of engine oil at each camp site. This was arranged for delivery on government contract through the Texaco Company.

We spent five days at Fort Riley. Colonel Davis made plans as far as could be determined definitely for demonstrations and maneuvers while I made arrangements for our camp at Camp Whiteside and the supply of the brigade while at Fort Riley. The supply facilities of Fort Riley were made available and any extra tentage, stoves, cots and mattresses needed were borrowed by Fort Riley from CCC and National Guard sources. This gave us an excellent camp. Some of the installations were made by Fort Riley prior to our arrival and the canvas was put up by the 2nd Cavalry.

Upon our return to Fort Knox we had definitely settled upon our route of march, camp sites, and had made sufficient contacts to enable us to complete all arrangements by correspondence.

Bids were at once let by the Post Quartermaster for the supply of V-92 gasoline and Diesel oil for delivery at all our camp sites on specific days. These bids were consummated within 20 days. Upon the Shell Petroleum Corporation getting the V-92 contract and Standard the Diesel contract, steps were taken immediately to have this gasoline laid down and the type of delivery we required assured. The Shell Company upon receiving our order sent a representative with the brigade who stayed during the entire march and gave us excellent service. The matter of Diesel oil required no particular plan as to the type of delivery as it came in 55-gallon drums to be delivered on the field.

The matter of supply rations for a command of this size (24 messes) with the available supply facilities left only one practicable solution and that was "to live off the

country" on a reimbursement ration. To facilitate this a standard menu was published and the number of items standardized and limited. This menu met with the general approval of troop commanders. It is believed that it greatly simplified the procurement of supplies in that we bought only items specified on the menu and were able to centralize our purchases and thereby cut down the number of bills that had to be settled by each mess daily.

On the return trip it was possible by our previous experience to deal with only one or two vendors at each camp and to contract the entire supply of meats, eggs, butter, etc., with one packing company through their "hotel service."

This system of feeding twenty-four messes, while the only practical one at the time, is not satisfactory. It is a financial hardship on troop messes as the reimbursement on rations is about 5% of the total deficit to the mess. It entails a large amount of clerical work on the troops both in the field and upon their return to settle up the reimbursements. These details should be borne by the staff. The daily purchase of rations in this manner with a command moving 150 miles per day can be arranged only by personal contact with vendors in advance and the final arrangements made by very voluminous correspondence.

The ideal solution would have been to have had sufficient trains to carry 2 or 3 days' rations and to have fed the entire command on a modified field ration, the Quartermaster agencies, by purchase and contract, arranging in advance the necessary distributing points. This was impossible as neither the truck space nor the Quartermaster agencies were available.

All the necessary details were completed when, late in September, the route had to be changed from via Louisville—Vincennes and Highway No. 50 to a southern route via Evansville—New Harmony—McLeansboro. This was due to construction which was begun on the road from Fort Knox to Louisville. This necessitated a complete re-arrangement of supply from Vincennes to Evansville. These changes completed, I felt we were ready to march as far as supplies were concerned. In all these arrangements it was necessary to keep up a continual correspondence with all five points of supply through the entire month of September and to resort to telegraph and telephone to straighten out certain last minute points. I even had to fly to St. Louis to settle gasoline difficulties just before we were ready to take off. It looked at times as if it were not possible to get all the people I was dealing with to get exactly what I wanted when I wanted it delivered. A final highlight came when I was expecting an urgent message about gasoline from St. Louis and a baker called me up by long distance from there late in the evening to discuss the width of layer cakes. I doubt if he will ever mention cake to me again!

This preliminary work paid us good dividends for when we went into the field the dealers in all cases were prepared to give us exactly what we expected. This cooperation on the part of the dealers, together with the fact that everyone is eager to sell where the quantity is large and the payment sure, leads me to believe that we could have shortened the time of our reconnaissance by notifying the Chambers of Commerce well in advance of our arrival and ask them to have the dealers come to us rather than to have searched them out ourselves.

On the march to and from Fort Riley the routine supply procedure was to have an advance party precede the main body. This consisted of all regimental and separate battalion supply officers, regimental supply sergeants, clerks, and gasoline NCO's and an NCO from each separate unit. In addition to these were Major Gaffey, who had charge of laying out the camp and myself with a clerk and the brigade supply sergeant.

This advance detail made minute arrangements for the forthcoming troops and was familiar with every possible supply contingency so that when the heads of each unit arrived there was no delay in supplying them. An armored car with radio also accompanied this advance detail and by keeping in constant communication with the main body we were able to inform them of last minute changes and to know the exact time of their arrival.

The advance detail left each morning fifteen minutes ahead of the others and traveling at a higher rate of speed arrived at the camp sites two to three hours ahead. Upon arriving at a camp site, the approaches were first settled upon the camp areas allotted and laid out by markers carried by each unit. While this was going on, I was able to contact all dealers, make any last minute changes, and inform them of the exact time of the arrival so different articles could be brought when needed and spotted in the right localities. Final arrangements had to be made for the water supply and disposal of garbage. Entrances had to be fixed in some cases, and traffic control planned. With all these things to do the time available was not too much.

The gasoline trucks were lined up at the vehicular lines and when the first troops came into line the gassing started at once and continued with from 8 to 18 trucks pouring gasoline into the vehicles until every tank and drum was full. It was usually essential to keep one tank truck on the field until 8 or 9 PM to catch any stragglers that had been delayed on the road.

After the command was all in camp and the gassing completed, all gasoline and oil bills were receipted and all locally purchased supplies paid for in cash. This took a good bit of time as it was necessary to reconcile all troops' receipts for gasoline and oil against our checks on the tank wagons before a final settlement could be made with both the gasoline companies. This was usually done well after dark and if everything were settled by 11:00 PM we were doing very well.

At Fort Riley, during the three weeks of demonstrations and maneuvers, the supply problem as to gasoline and oil was entirely unpredictable and gave us an indication of what we would be up against in an emergency move. The supply of rations and routine camp supplies were normal and procured from the Post Quartermaster as no marches were made over 24 hours in duration.

*Vehicular line of the 7th Cavalry Brigade in camp at Swope Park, Kansas City.*

When planning the gasoline supply at Fort Riley, I allowed for 250 miles of marching there and 150 miles returning to Kansas City. To cover this we had 14,000 gallons each of V-92 and V-75 gasoline in government tank cars equipped with hose connections on the sidings at Camp Whitside. Also, we had notified government contracting companies that we would call upon them for both V-92 and V-75 gasoline as needed and that we would give them ample notice as to our wants. A large supply of engine oil, grease, kerosene, and Diesel oil had been ordered purchased and was awaiting our arrival at Fort Riley.

These amounts seemed ample and it was thought would take care of any extra needs. The actual mileage to be covered or the type of mileage was undeterminable before we arrived. I might state here that a marching mile and a maneuvering mile is about in a ratio of 1 to 2 as to gasoline consumption. As soon as the brigade started demonstrating and maneuvering at Fort Riley the gasoline consumption took a tremendous jump. By checking all gasoline on hand daily, I realized that we would have nowhere near the amount needed and that our tank car supplies were being rapidly depleted.

This meant calling upon contracting gasoline companies for large quantities of gasoline and they were at once informed of the approximate quantities we would need. They began delivery about five days after our arrival at Fort Riley.

This worked very well for the V-75 gasoline as there were storage tanks in Manhattan. The company immediately having gasoline shipped in. The bulk dealer made daily deliveries to two 500-gallon tanks which were equipped with electric pumps. On days the brigade maneuvered or marched he employed four tank wagons to refuel the brigade. To do this he hauled from Manhattan all day.

During the last two weeks we were at Riley, we had to anticipate our local deliveries and keep the bulk dealer informed in order that he could have tank cars moved from the refineries at Shreveport, Louisiana, in sufficient quantities to keep up with our needs. This we kept to a minimum as we did not want to stock up this dealer with large quantities of V-75 gasoline which he would have to keep on hand for several months before disposing of it. For our last deliveries he had to get the V-75 hauled from Topeka and Lawrence. In explanation of this, it might be stated that the average bulk dealer will normally keep on hand from 3,000 to 8,000 gallons of V-75 gasoline. With our wants running as high as 10,000 gallons per day, it became a major problem for him to get a sufficient amount for us and still not be overstocked.

We had more difficulty getting the V-92 (aviation) gasoline. We started off with 14,000 gallons in government tank cars at Camp Whitside and a tentative agreement for from 5,000 to 10,000 gallons to be delivered from Kansas

City. It soon became apparent that the combat cars were using far more gasoline in maneuvering and going much longer distances than had been anticipated. We called on Kansas City for the gasoline. It developed that the entire supply available in Kansas City was only 4,000 gallons and further difficulties arose as to clearing this gasoline out of the Port of Kansas City. To protect our anticipated needs we wired to the refineries in Houston, Texas, to have a car moved to Fort Riley at once. Before it started we had to order another one to cover further needs. In the interim, while these cars were en route, we operated on the 4,000 gallons we finally got from Kansas City and on our small remaining reserve in the government tank cars. We even had to supplement this on one occasion by using V-100 gasoline from the Air Corps.

The problem of supplying V-92 gasoline was always pressing. Although we had an ace in the hole by having V-100 gasoline available at a very excessive cost from the Air Corps and in further emergency we could have gone to V-75, it was most desirable and economical to use V-92 procured at contract prices. However, we managed to keep abreast of our gasoline requirements until the two cars came in from Houston. I went down to the yards in Junction City on Sunday, October 22nd, and had them moved out to Fort Riley for our Monday's gassing.

The gasoline situation seemed well in hand for the remainder of the stay at Fort Riley. We thought we would get back to Kansas City with what we had and with some left over. Therefore I began to look around for a place to dispose of the anticipated excess of V-92. This proved to be a useless worry as our gasoline consumption continued to be high throughout the week and upon leaving for Kansas City we had less than 50 gallons of V-92 gasoline on hand in tanks out of a total of 33,500 gallons we had acquired at Fort Riley. This was plain good luck as no one could figure any gasoline that close.

The problem of keeping a mechanized command gassed as we did in peace time and in a community where there were numerous supply agencies close at hand made us visualize what a major item this would be in a move of any size in the theatre of operations.

The best solution for a single operation for a mechanized brigade is to have the gasoline in an easily handled container (10-gallon non-returnable) and to have this supply moved as far forward as possible. The command would then be gassed and combat trains filled at an advanced D.P. With this type of container the vehicles could be filled very expeditiously wherever the cans are dumped. With this forward refueling, the radius of operation could be 150 miles out and 150 miles back. The extreme limit could be obtained by cutting supplies to a minimum and carrying gasoline in forty-six trucks of the combat train. This would permit a total operation of 450 miles. Beyond this point supplies and gasoline could not be stretched without the assistance of a division train.

One other set of difficulties was met on our return trip. On three occasions we had our supplies held up in the company's yards by truck drivers' strikes. This seemed pretty serious at the time as the gasoline supply for the entire command was held in the company's yard at one point; in another the provision truck drivers were on strike; and at a third point the oil supply was tied up by strikers. Even in peace time this presented a rather trying situation but by some rapid action on the companies' part these obstacles were overcome in two cases and in the other we had to do without for the day.

# SPAIN

Again, I salute Spanish bravery. The superiority of fire power, equipment and training of the Nationalists were the main factors, but in the final operation the success rested with the Cavalry Division. *It is hardly fashionable to mention it in this country just now*, but the fact remains that cavalry have been *the* successful arm of the current war in Spain. One does not see many tanks there; nor are they highly thought of. The final recapture of Teruel was based on an outflanking movement to the North, in the Sierra, by a cavalry division.—By WING-COMMANDER A. W. H. JAMES, M.C., M.P., from a lecture entitled "The Spanish Civil War," as printed in *Journal, Royal United Service Institution*, London, February, 1939.

(Preface to above article: The Chairman, on introducing the Lecturer, said that probably there was no one better fitted to speak on this subject. Wing-Commander James had made a great many visits to Spain since the outbreak of the Civil War, and had probably been given more favourable opportunities than anyone else for actually seeing the battle front and observing the course of the operations: in fact, he could truthfully be described as an eye-witness.)

# Neglected Mobility

## The Corps Conneau at the Marne, September, 1914

By Lieutenant Colonel E. E. Schwien, Cavalry

INTRODUCTION: Whether a large cavalry force is assigned a proper or an improper mission in war depends primarily on the conception of cavalry of the commander of the theater of operations, army, or other force to which this cavalry force is attached. If this individual lacks comprehension of the potentialities of this ideal weapon of opportunity, the results attained by its employment will fall far short of its maximum capabilities. Although these statements may appear pure platitudes, the fact remains that, while perhaps well understood in theory, they are still incomprehensible to many higher commanders in practice. For substantiation of this, one has only to study recent maneuvers both in this country and abroad. If further proof is desired, turn back to the history of any war.

Where possible, cavalry should be employed in mass *and in a decisive direction*. There is nothing startling or new in this doctrine. Cavalry history for centuries past is a continuous testimonial to its soundness. Its enunciation is found in all of our texts. In spite of all this, however, a study of any war reveals situations in which there existed magnificent opportunities for a strategical *coup de grâce*—opportunities which passed unexploited because of the ignorance of the commander of the combined arms as to the proper employment of his cavalry. In most of these instances, the cavalry commander was too timid to deviate from the faulty mission assigned him and exploit upon his own initiative. We find many such situations in the World War, *and we are going to find just as many in the next war*. Unfortunately, some of these opportunities will, and for the very same reasons as in the past, again be permitted to vanish.

Shortly after 1870, the French established their Ecole Superieure de Guerre—unquestionably the finest and *most practical* school of war in the world today. No small part of its course was devoted to a study of our Civil War and in particular to cavalry operations in the Civil War. The very fact that the French Army of 1914 included ten cavalry divisions in addition to corps and divisional cavalry is sufficient attestation to the importance attached to the action of large cavalry masses in the French pre-war doctrine. We also know that the Ecole de Guerre *at least taught* sound cavalry theory.

Although properly indoctrinated and with sufficient cavalry available to carry out this doctrine, the commanders of 1914, when vis-à-vis with the actualities of war, permitted many fleeting opportunities for decisive action to elude them simply because of a fundamental lack of *practical* knowledge of the strategic capabilities of a cavalry mass.

Will American cavalry suffer this same indirection in the next war? Very possibly it will.

* * * * *

In order to emphasize *primarily* the vital importance of a thorough *practical* knowledge on the part of all higher commanders of the true rôle of massed cavalry, we shall devote this article to a study of the Corps Conneau at the Marne in 1914. This operation illustrates in striking fashion the point in question.

The Corps Conneau was attached to the French Fifth Army, commanded by General Franchet d'Esperey. A brilliant leader, d'Esperey had shown his sterling qualities at Guise, where he saved the day with his I Corps. In the cold light of post-war criticism he is still classified as one of the outstanding officers of the war. A man of strong character, possessing power of decision and great courage both moral and physical, his qualities were immediately recognized at the beginning of the war, and within two months he was given an army.

An ideal army commander? Yes, but—his direction of the Corps Conneau on the 8th of September, 1914, will always remain a classic example of ignorance of the strategic employment of cavalry. There can be only one conclusion. He was unable to grasp mentally the decisive exploitation potentialities of the cavalry mass.

We shall divide our study into two principal parts. In the first part, we shall endeavor to portray the operation as it actually took place. Then having described the events of the 8th and 9th of September, 1914, in as accurate a

## The Cavalry Mass in Strategic Exploitation




*Map 1: General map (without situation)*

fashion as possible, we shall, as the second part of our study, reconstruct the operation as it should have been executed. In so doing, we will not deviate in any way from the historical basic situation except to assign a different mission to the Corps Conneau and to replace its commander with a cavalry leader. We shall also retain the exact composition and armament of the Corps.

There is sufficient justification for a change in the Corps mission, for although *systematic* reconnaissance was almost totally lacking, the army commander was in possession of sufficient information to enable him to formulate a sound exploitation decision.

## PART I

### Historical Narrative of the Period 6-9 September, 1914

### General Situation on the Marne

The events leading up to the battle of the Marne are generally understood by most military students. However, as they form a very important background to our present study, they should be reviewed briefly.

GERMAN FORCES.—In the early part of September, 1914, Von Kluck, the Commander of the German First Army, decided to change direction and move to the southeast of Paris in order to seize and attack the Allied left (west) flank. By so doing, however, he exposed his right flank and rear to the possibility of a French sortie from the fortified area of Paris. German GHQ, recognizing a situation fraught with danger, ordered the First Army to flankguard the area between the Marne and the Oise against this threat. In like manner, the German Second Army was ordered to protect its west flank in the region to the south of the Marne. Upon the receipt of this order, however, the First Army was already almost entirely far to the south of the Marne. In his eagerness to locate and envelop the Allied west flank, Von Kluck temporarily ignored the instructions given him. He was soon to receive a rude awakening. The IV Reserve Corps was echeloned to the right rear of the First Army and was the only unit of this army north of the Marne. Advancing south from the region of Nanteuil, it collided with the advance detachments of the French Sixth Army. The latter was just completing its concentration in the Paris area. Von Gronau, the Corps Commander, made an energetic reconnaissance in force and quickly discovered that he was




*Map 2: General map—German situation, evening 7 September, 1914*

opposed by a greatly superior force. It was only upon the receipt of this information that Von Kluck, alarmed, began his conversion movement to the north of the Marne. The II and IV Corps, which had advanced far to the south of Meaux, were immediately rushed northward to the Ourcq front. The III and IX Corps, which were engaged in a joint offensive operation with the right wing of the German Second Army in the region to the southwest of Esternay, were permitted to be attached to the Second Army for the time being.

As the situation on the Ourcq daily and hourly became more and more critical, Von Kluck finally decided to concentrate the whole of the First Army in that region and deliver a decisive blow against the French Sixth Army. Consequently, without previous consultation with the Second Army commander, Von Bulow, he ordered the immediate movement of the III and IX Corps to the Ourcq front.

To further complicate the desperate plight of the Second Army, it was itself very heavily engaged with the French Fifth Army and parts of Foch's newly created Ninth Army.

The withdrawal of the four active corps of the First Army from the south of the Marne exposed the west flank of the German Second Army and created a gap of approximately fifty kilometers between the two armies. Naturally, Von Bulow was unable to carry out the orders he had received from GHQ to flankguard the area south of the Marne, as he was already engaged with almost all of his force in frontal action to the southeast of Montmirail.

In order to close the gap between the two armies of the right wing, two cavalry corps were given this mission. On the 7th of September, the Marwitz Corps was ordered to hold the line of the Marne west of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, while the Richthofen Corps was directed to defend the Petit Morin between La Ferte-sous-Jouarre and Villeneuve.

The situation of the German armies of the right wing on the evening of September 7th was as shown on Map No. 2.

The First Army was completely engaged along a north-south line west of the Ourcq. The Kraewel brigade of the IX Corps, however, had been detached with a mission of holding the crossings of the Marne between La Ferté-sous-

Jouarre and Nogent l'Artaud. Actually, in the execution of this mission, the brigade commander made no effort to defend the bridges on this front, nor were any of them prepared for destruction. The brigade simply moved to the heights about five kilometers northwest of Nanteuil and entrenched itself in a defensive position.

Evening of the 7th found the II Cavalry Corps (von Marwitz) holding the line of the Marne west of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre. The I Corps (Richthofen) was bivouacked in the area between Bussières and Sablonnières. The Corps Commander had completed the issuance of orders prescribing a night movement to the line of the Petit Morin between La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Villeneuve.

On the front of the Second Army, the situation was as follows:

The 13th Division of the VII Corps occupied a defensive position extending between Fontenelle and Montmirail. This was in the nature of a "crochu-defensive" for the purpose of protecting the west flank of the Army. The right flank of the division itself, however, was exposed tactically to a possible French thrust in the gap between Fontenelle and Villeneuve.

To the east of the 13th Division, the X Reserve Corps was committed to the defense of the north slopes of the Petit Morin east of Montmirail. Its right flank was hinged on the Forêt de Beaumont while its left rested on the heights northwest of Le Thoult. The Corps Command Post was established at Vauchamps.

To the east of the X Reserve Corps was the X Corps. During the day of the 7th, its two divisions had formed a salient to the south of the Petit Morin. The Army Commander ordered it to withdraw during the night to a position in rear of the stream. In compliance with this order, the 19th Division retired to the north and occupied a position between Le Thoult and Talus-St. Prix. The 20th Division likewise withdrew and took over a line from the heights west of Villevénard extending to the east as far as Courjeonnet.

On the extreme left of the Second Army, the Guard Corps held the line Aulnizeux—Normée. It had its two divisions in line.

*During the day of the 7th, the threat of a French penetration* between the Guard and the X Corps caused the Army Commander to move the 14th Division of the VII Corps to the vicinity of Champaubert in army reserve. Obviously this action further weakened the right flank of the Army, already susceptible to a potential envelopment in the region of Fontenelle.

ALLIED FORCES.—Let us now examine the Allied situation. By a gradual shifting of forces from his right and center, Joffre succeeded in constituting the new Sixth Army in the vicinity of Paris. By the 6th of September, it had almost completed its concentration. To the southeast of the Sixth Army was the British Expeditionary Force along the upper Seine. It had retreated far to the south of the French Fifth Army on its right, maintaining its safe echelonment since Mons. To quote von Kuhl, ". . . the British, in their ardent desire to retreat to the south of the Seine, were left so far in rear that when the battle began, they could not reach the line of departure assigned them!"

The French Fifth Army, on the right of the British, had retired to a line extending east from Esternay. During the day of the 5th of September, the left flank of this army, exposed by the defection of the B.E.F., was seriously threatened by the enveloping action of the German III and IX Corps.

French GHQ was in possession of sufficient information to determine, generally, the composition of the German First and Second Armies. During the days of the 6th and 7th of September, the majority of the divisions of these armies were identified. Consequently, a summation of the information available would have revealed the fact that neither the German First or Second Armies possessed strong reserves.

On the evening of the 4th of September, Joffre's famous order for the counteroffensive of the 6th appeared. We shall quote it verbatim:

"It is advisable to take advantage of the precarious situation of the German First Army by attacking it with our armies of the left wing.

All measures will be taken during the day of the 5th to initiate this attack on the 6th.

The following dispositions will be made on the 5th:

The entire mass of the Sixth Army, now concentrated northeast of Meaux, will be prepared to cross the Ourcq between Lizy-sur-Ourcq and May-en-Multien. Direction of attack: Château-Thierry. Neighboring elements of the I Cavalry Corps (Sordet) will be placed under the orders of General Manoury for this operation.

The British Expeditionary Force will take position on the front: Changis—Coulommiers prepared to attack in the direction of Montmirail.

The French Fifth Army will launch its attack due north from the line: Courtacon—Esternay—Sézanne. *The II Cavalry Corps will assure liaison between the British Army and the Fifth Army.*

The Ninth Army will cover the right of the Fifth Army by holding the southern exits of the passage of the Marais de St. Gond and advancing a part of its forces to the plateau north of Sézanne.

The offensive will begin the morning of the 6th.

Joffre."

### Events of September 6th

In compliance with the foregoing order, the French Sixth Army advanced to the attack on September 6th. By evening, it had reached the line: Chambry—Marcilly—Puisieux.

The British Army, on the other hand, made practically no advance on this day. Although rested and resupplied with armament and matériel, its attitude reflected the exaggerated prudence of its commander. By evening, it was still cautiously feeling its way toward the Grand Morin, out of contact with the enemy and incredulous of the fact that a *determined* counter-offensive was in preparation.




*Map 3: General map—Allied situation, evening 7 September, 1914*

The French II Cavalry Corps (Conneau) reached Cour-tacon.

To the east of the Conneau Corps, the French Fifth Army, after violent combats, arrived on the line: La Villeneuve—Esternay—Courtacon.

### Events of September 7th

On this date, the French Sixth Army received reinforcements. It advanced to the attack early in the morning endeavoring to envelop the right flank of the German First Army. The arrival of the German II and IV Corps on the Ourcq stalemated this effort, and the end of the day found the Sixth Army in almost precisely the same situation as on the evening of the 6th.

The British continued their cautious advance on the 7th. Although encountering but very little opposition, they did little more than cross the Grand Morin on this day. The morning of the 8th found them advancing from the line: Jouy-sur-Morin—Aulnoye—La haute Maison.

The Conneau Cavalry Corps reached and passed La Ferté Gaucher and by evening had its reconnaissance detachments close to the Petit Morin.

The situation on the right of the Cavalry Corps, however, was not developing too favorably. The Fifth Army had encountered extremely stubborn resistance from the German Second Army. Late in the afternoon of the 7th, the Fifth Army had the bulk of its forces on the line: Le Recoude—Morsains—La Ferté Gaucher.

Such was the situation on the Marne front, when, early on the morning of the 8th, the reconnaissance detachments of the Conneau Corps began to attempt a crossing of the Petit Morin.

### The Actual Operations of the Corps Conneau (8-9 September, 1914)

During the morning of the 8th, reports from the reconnaissance detachments of the Conneau Corps indicated that the enemy west of Montmirail were in full retreat. To quote:

"Enemy columns of all arms moved during the night and early morning from the regions of Verdalot and Montdauphin on Nogent and Château-Thierry. Other columns retreated from Montmirail toward the northeast."

Upon the receipt of this information, the Corps Com-




*Map 4: Special map (without situation)*

mander ordered the pursuit continued (?) on the following axes:

10th Division: Villiers les Maillets—Montdauphin—Epine-aux-Bois.

8th Division: Saint Martin—Saint Barthelemy—Verdalot—Montfaucon.

4th Division: La Ferté Gaucher—Bellot—Chezy.

At 10:00 AM, at his command post at Villiers les Maillets, the Corps Commander received a report that an enemy column of all arms was retiring from Fontenelle on Château-Thierry and that other smaller columns were marching on Chezy and Nogent-l'Artaud. He issued orders to his divisions to attack at once the column moving on Château-Thierry. Unfortunately, however, enemy rear guards along the Petit Morin prevented the divisions from striking this column.

The 10th Division proceeded to halt north of Montdauphin preparatory to forcing a crossing. The 4th did likewise south of Bellot, while the 8th moved up into the region of Verdalot. The 4th and 10th Divisions wasted several hours in preparing to cross the stream. During the afternoon, however, the 8th Division forced a passage at Verdalot. A little later the 4th crossed at Bellot. The 10th Division then changed direction and followed the 8th through Verdalot.

Late in the day, the two leading divisions reached the Montmirail-Bussières highway in the region of Viels-Maisons.

At 4:00 PM, the 36th Division, the left division of the XVIII Corps (Fifth Army), which was advancing in the direction of Marchais-en-Brie; was held up in the Bois de Courmont by fire from Marchais-en-Brie. The division commander asked for support from the Cavalry Corps.

General Conneau ordered the 10th Cavalry Division, which was concentrated near Epine-aux-Bois, *to attack in the direction of Viels-Maisons—Montmirail so as to outflank the heights of Marchais-en-Brie and thereby assist the advance of the 36th Division.*

Assisted by the 10th Cavalry Division, the 36th finally was able to take Marchais-en-Brie.

Following this operation, *the cavalry corps bivouacked for the rest of the night in the area between the Petit Morin and the east-west highway through Viels-Maisons. It continued to maintain liaison between the French XVIII Corps and the British Army.*

During the night 8-9 September, the corps zone of action was changed. The left corps (XVIII) of the French Fifth Army was given a left (west) boundary to include the Fontenelle-Château-Thierry highway. The right boundary of the British was also side-slipped so as to include the bridge at Nogent l'Artaud.

Late on the evening of the 8th, the Corps received the Fifth Army order prescribing the operations for the following day. The Conneau Corps was assigned a mission of crossing the Marne at Azy and of pursuing the retreating

German columns in what was apparently intended as a direct pressure pursuit. It was also directed to cover the British right flank and to assist the French XVIII Corps in its crossing of the Marne at Château-Thierry. There has never been a more glaring example of two definitely conflicting missions. Ordered to pursue, the Corps is held back at the same time as a liaison detachment!

Pursuant to the foregoing order, General Conneau issued his instructions to his corps, the principal provisions of which were as follows:

"The 10th Division will advance on Château-Thierry in order to clear the way for the XVIII Corps.

The 4th Division will cross the Marne at Azy and take the plateau of Le Thiolet-Etrépilly. It will then advance a portion of the division to the southeast from Etrépilly and capture the heights overlooking Château-Thierry, thereby assisting the 10th Division in its crossing. The 4th Division will also maintain liaison with the British.

The 8th Division will follow the 4th across the Marne at Azy. The crossing completed it will then push up on the left and abreast of the 4th Division *so as to extend the pursuit front of the latter to the west.*"

The morning of the 9th found the corps in process of executing this order. No undue haste was manifested. This tardiness was *attributed* to the condition of the animals and to the fact that both the French XVIII Corps and the British overlapped the corps zone of advance and retarded the cavalry. However, the 4th Division, which had a leading rôle to play in the corps scheme of maneuver, was actually the principal cause of the delay. Having crossed the Marne at Azy, it received information that some German cavalry had been located in the vicinity of Bouresches. This terrifying news caused the division to halt for several hours pending reconnaissance of this area.

In the meanwhile, the 10th Division had reached the southern exits of Château-Thierry, where it was held up for a considerable period of time by about a troop of German cavalry. As no elements of the 4th Division appeared on the heights to the north of the city, as prescribed by the corps order, the division commander of the 10th Division made no energetic effort to force a crossing by the means at his own disposal.

Late in the afternoon, enemy rear guards were discovered along the line: Bézu—Etrépilly. The advance elements of the corps reached the plateau to the south of this line in contact with these enemy detachments. As darkness was falling, it was too late to attack them, *required too much marching to go around them*, so the corps bivouacked its main bodies for the night along the Marne between Château-Thierry and Azy.

* * * * *

Thus ends two days of active operations of a cavalry corps in exploitation!

Paralyzed by impossible conflicting and contradictory missions, as well as rendered impotent by ineffectual leadership, it is quite remarkable that the corps ever crossed the Marne! The rôle assigned it could have well been played by an infantry regiment. Of one thing we are certain, it surely did not require the employment of a cavalry corps. There appeared to be a complete lack of objectivity on the part of General Franchet d'Esperey. It is quite apparent that the Commander of the Fifth Army did not possess the faintest conception either of the potentialities of the situation or of the strategic possibilities of the cavalry mass as a weapon of exploitation.

The Cavalry Corps Commander displayed an amazing lack of initiative in accepting without protest and in attempting to execute a mission which was not only faulty but failed to utilize the principal characteristics of cavalry.

* * * * *

In order to complete our picture of the ensemble, let us now sketch briefly the operations of the *German* forces which had the mission of closing the gap so tantalizingly inviting to exploitation.

On the evening of the 7th, we left the Richthofen Cavalry Corps bivouacked in the region west of Boitron. The Corps Commander had issued his orders for the occupation of the line of the Petit Morin. The following defense sectors were assigned:

*5th Cavalry Division:* The Petit Morin between La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Orly.

*Guard Cavalry Division:* The Petit Morin between Orly and Villeneuve.

At 8:45 AM, the morning of the 8th, Richthofen reported that the French had penetrated his defensive screen at Orly and at Villeneuve and that he had issued orders to his divisions to retire to the Dollau. Apparently, however, this order was not carried out, for at 11:30 AM, he reported having repulsed an attempted penetration between St. Cyr (Map No. 1) and Vardaloc.

At 1:15 PM, becoming somewhat alarmed by the British advance toward the Marne, Von Kluck ordered the II Cavalry Corps (Marwitz) to hold this stream *west* of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre. At the same time, he directed the Kraewel Brigade (infantry) to extend this defense to the east as far as Chezy. Specific instructions were also given that the Marne bridges be destroyed in the event of an enemy attack.

At noon, the French did execute a successful penetration at Boitron and Sablonnières on the front of the Guard Cavalry Division. This time, the corps withdrawal order actually was issued. The 5th Division was directed to fall back to the Dollau and defend this stream between its confluence with the Marne and the village of Essises. The Guard Division was ordered to take over the sector between Essises and Rozoy.

As far as can be ascertained, the 5th Division failed to receive the order. Eventually, it withdrew right through the prescribed position to the north of the Marne, abandoning all the crossings east of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and making no effort to destroy or block the bridges. (See map 2.)

In the meantime on the right of the Second Army, the 13th Infantry Division was still clinging to the line: Mont-

mirail—Fontenelle in a desperate effort to cover the west flank. Portions of the 14th Division, which had been held in Second Army reserve near Champaubert, were engaged during the day of the 8th on the flank of the X Corps to the south.

Consequently, the Army Commander had committed practically all of his reserves.

The Kraewel Brigade, which had been detached from the IX Corps for the purpose of defending the Marne between La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Chezy, simply moved to the heights five kilometers northwest of Nanteuil and established itself in a defensive position! No detachments were sent to the bridges in its assigned sector, nor were any of these bridges prepared for destruction!

The Guard Cavalry Division withdrew during the afternoon of the 8th to its assigned sector on the Dollau. Late in the evening, with its right threatened because of the withdrawal of the 5th Division, it again retired to the region of Condé-en-Brie.

## PART II

### Assumed Operations of the Corps Conneau, 7-8 September, 1914

In part two of our study we will relive the period of the 7th and 8th of September, 1914, first by placing ourselves in the exalted position of the Commander of the French Fifth Army and then finally adapting ourselves to the rôle of the Cavalry Corps commander. In the echelon of Army Commander we shall endeavor to assign the Cavalry Corps a mission commensurate with its capabilities. In the echelon of Corps Commander we shall endeavor to execute this mission as it should have been carried out by a real cavalry leader. In neither of these rôles will we deviate the actual historical situation. The strength and dispositions of the enemy will remain actually those of September, 1914. *Nor will we augment or modernize the means available to the Corps Commander.*

We shall therefore begin with a description of the composition of the Corps Conneau as it was constituted on the 7th of September, 1914.

#### 1. Corps Headquarters and Staff

The Corps General Staff was composed of five officers detailed from the various divisional staffs. The Headquarters included a number of mounted messengers, clerks, cyclists, four automobiles and two automobile-transported radios.

#### 2. Aviation

Several aeroplanes.

#### 3. Transfort

A small truck train.

#### 4. Divisions

Three divisions (4th, 8th and 10th), all of the same composition except the 10th, which had only two brigades.

Each division consisted of:

*a.* A general staff.

*b.* Three brigades of cavalry (two regiments each).

*c.* One battalion of 75-mm artillery (three batteries).

*d.* One cyclist battalion (400 men).

*e.* Quartermaster, medical, signal, finance, etc., services.

*f.* Three sections of machine guns (two guns each).

#### 5. Attached Cavalry

One regiment of Spahis (Moroccan cavalry).

#### 6. Attached Infantry

One regiment of infantry (45th) in trucks (three battalions).

All troopers in the divisions were armed with the carbine, lance and saber. Troops had an average strength of approximately eighty men. Animals were exhausted and shoeing was said to have been in a deplorable state.

To summarize, we find that the combat troops of the corps consisted of:

Seventeen regiments of cavalry,
Three battalions of artillery,
Three battalions of cyclists.
Sixteen machine guns,
One regiment (three battalions) of motorized infantry.

Late in the afternoon of the 7th of September, G-2, Fifth Army, presents the following intelligence estimate of the situation to the Army Commander:

"German cavalry forces hold the line of the Petit Morin west of Sablonnières. These forces may extend their defense to the east during the night.

The German 13th Division (VII Corps) has been identified in the region of Marchais-en-Brie and to the west of Montmirail.

The two divisions of the X Reserve Corps have also been identified along the front south of the Petit Morin. These two divisions apparently extend from a point south of Bergères to the Bois de Boitrait.

The 19th Division of the X Corps has been found in the area northwest of Soizy-aux-Bois, while the 20th Division of the same corps has been located in the Marais de Saint Gond between Courjeonnet and Villevénard.

The 1st Guard Division of the Guard Corps has been identified at Aulnizeux and Aulney. Our Ninth Army reports the 2d Guard Division in the region of Normée.

Our enemy army organization and order of battle tables which we have formulated in the past two weeks indicate only one other division in the German Second Army. The division, the 14th, has not yet been identified on our immediate front. Aviation, however, reports a concentration in the region of Champaubert. Consequently this division may be in that area.

Apparently, most administrative establishments and all command posts are considerably south of the Marne.

Our aviation has found the bridges over the Marne intact and in use at the following places:

Azy, Château-Thierry, Mezy, Jaulgonne, Passy, Dormans, Verneuil, Port-à-Binson, Damery, Cunneres and Epernay.




*Map 5: Special map (attack dispositions on the morning of 8 September)*

No concentrations of enemy combat troops have been discovered in enemy rear areas either north or immediately south of the Marne.

*Conclusions:*

There is apparently little possibility that the German Second Army can be reinforced in the near future.

This force has three capabilities:

(1) It may attack.

(2) It may defend along the Petit Morin and take the counter-offensive later.

(3) It may begin a withdrawal to the north of the Marne. At present there are no indications that such a withdrawal will take place before tomorrow night.

With the exception of a comparatively weak cavalry screen along the Petit Morin west of Sablonnières, the right flank and rear of the German Second Army appear to be unprotected and susceptible to a rapid envelopment."

At 6:00 PM, the Commander of the Fifth Army issues orders for an attack on the 8th.

In substance, the Fifth Army will make a frontal attack due north, while the II Cavalry Corps is assigned the mission of:

(1) Breaking through a possible enemy screen on the front La Celle—Villeneuve.

(2) Advancing rapidly to the northeast for the purpose of seizing the crossings of the Marne in rear of the German Second Army, thereby preventing the withdrawal of the latter to the north of the river.

The Army Attack Order arrives at La Ferté Gaucher, II Cavalry Corps Headquarters, at 7:00 PM. During the late afternoon, our patrols along the Petit Morin have reported enemy cavalry located as far east as Villeneuve and that enemy infantry has been seen in Vendières. No information was available on enemy dispositions between these two places.

The intelligence estimate prepared by G-2, II Cavalry Corps, substantiated the conclusions of the Army Intelligence Estimate.

At 7:30 PM, the Corps Commander announces his decision:

"To penetrate the enemy screen in the region of Touraille by an infantry attack heavily supported by artillery. To move the Corps rapidly through the gap created and advance along the axis: Viels-Maisons—Viffort—Crezancy to the Marne for the purpose of seizing and holding the bridges between Epernay and Mezy, both inclusive.

Essential Elements of Enemy Information:

Will any enemy forces be found in the rear areas of the German Second Army?

Will these forces attempt to block the II Cavalry Corps in its march to the Marne bridges?"

The detailed Plan based on the foregoing decision was




*Map 6: Special map (zones of action of reconnaissance detachments)*

prepared and ready for issue in the form of an order by 8:30 PM.

Its principal features included the following:

An attack at dawn by the 45th Infantry supported by all three battalions of divisional artillery.[1]

Zone of attack: The terrain compartment immediately east of Touraille.[2]

Infantry objective: Woods southeast of Viels-Maisons.

The infantry is then to reorganize on this objective, have their trucks advanced to Viels-Maisons, where the regiment will entruck and follow the cavalry to Crezancy.

When the infantry has reached a line east of Touraille, the remainder of the corps is to begin its advance across the Petit Morin and move rapidly up the Touraille compartment passing through the infantry.

Formation: 10th and 4th Divisions abreast in first echelon (10th on the right), each in column of squadrons in a suitable approach formation.

8th Division to follow the 4th.

Spahi regiment to follow the 10th.

Objectives:

(1) *The Dollau between Viffort and Essises.* Heads of main bodies of leading divisions are to reach this objective not later than 8:00 AM.

(2) *The Surmelin River northwest of Condé-en-Brie.* Head of the main body of the 10th Division is ordered to reach this objective between Condé-en-Brie and St. Eugene at 9:15 AM. The head of the main body of the 4th Division, in echelon to the left rear, is to arrive thereon at 9:45 AM.

(3) *The crossings of the Marne between Epernay and Mezy.*

The 10th Division is to seize the bridges over the Marne at Epernay, Cunnères, Damery and Port-à-Binson not later than 3:00 PM.

The 4th Division to take the bridges over the Marne at Verneuil, Dormans and Passy not later than 1:00 PM.

The Spahi regiment to take the bridges over the Marne at Jaulgonne and Mezy not later than 1:00 PM.

The 10th Division is to move rapidly from the Surmelin to its final objective. All routes south of the Marne and east of the Surmelin, with the exception of the route Crezancy—Courtemont—Dormans, are to be made available to this division. The division is to defend the sector of the Marne between Epernay and Port-à-Binson, both inclusive.

The 4th Division is to move by the shortest routes from the Surmelin directly to its final objective. It is to use no routes south of the Marne and east of the Surmelin except the road Crezancy—Courtemont—Dormans. The division is to defend the sector of the Marne between Verneuil and Passy, both inclusive.

The 8th Division in second echelon is instructed to reach the route east of Viels-Maisons by 8:00 AM. It is

[1] The enemy cavalry may extend still further to the east during the night. Consequently, an attack must be planned in order to secure a penetration.

[2] This compartment averages only 1,000 meters in width.

## INTELLIGENCE PLAN

| *Phase or Periods of the Operation* | *Essential Elements of Enemy Information* | *Indications: (Analysis of Essential Elements of Enemy Information)* | *Reconnaissance Agency or other source* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dawn 8 September<br><br>to<br><br>Dark 8 September | Will any enemy forces be found in the rear areas of the German Second Army?<br><br>Will these forces attempt to block the II Cavalry Corps in its march to the Marne bridges?<br>*Indications:* | At the present time, there are apparently no forces in the area between the Marne and the front of the German Second Army, with the exception of the 14th Division. However, some elements of the German Second Army may be regrouped and rushed north or northwest to meet our threat. Consequently, during our advance we must constantly reconnoiter the right flank and rear of the German Second Army for the purpose of determining such a movement.<br><br>There may be some Line of Communications troops north of the Marne which can move south on our objectives. Consequently, the area north of the Marne and east of Château-Thierry must be reconnoitered.<br><br>The rear areas of the German First Army must be watched, as some elements of this force may attempt to flank guard along the Marne.<br><br>Cavalry units already identified along the Petit Morin must be kept under continuous surveillance, as they may be able to regroup after our penetration and interpose themselves between the II Corps and its objectives. | Air Observation<br><br>Corps Reconnaissance Det. No. 1 (to be furnished by 10th Div.)<br>1 squadron cavalry<br>1 cyclist troop.<br><br>Corps Reconnaissance Det. No. 2 (to be furnished by 4th Div.)<br>1 squadron cavalry<br>1 cyclist troop.<br><br>Corps Reconnaissance Det. No. 3 (to be furnished by 4th Div.)<br>1 squadron cavalry<br>1 cyclist troop. |

then to advance behind the 4th Division via Montfaucon, Blesmes, Fossoy and Mezy to the vicinity of Le Charmel. Further instructions placing it in corps reserve are to reach it at this place.

The Spahi regiment in second echelon is ordered to cross the route east of Viels-Maisons by 8:00 AM. It is then to advance behind the 10th Division via Viffort to Courboin, where it is to change direction and march to Crezancy. It will then follow the 4th and 8th Divisions across the Marne at Mezy and Varennes and defend the sector of the Marne between Jaulgonne and Mezy, both inclusive.

At Crezancy, one battalion of the 45th Infantry is to be attached to the 10th Division and one battalion to the 4th Division. The regiment (less two battalions) will proceed to Le Charmel for attachment to the 8th Division in corps reserve.

*The Marne is ordered to be held at all costs.*

Reconnaissance instructions are to be issued in an Intelligence Annex.

* * * * *

While the order for the 8th of September was in course of preparation, G-2, II Cavalry Corps, prepared an Intelligence Plan which was later transformed into an Annex to the Operations Order and issued with the latter.

The Plan itself was prepared as follows:

## II CAVALRY CORPS

| *Specific Orders, or Requests* | *Hour and Destination of Information* / REMARKS |
|---|---|
| 1. Observe the crossings of the Surmelin River between Le Baizil and Celles for any enemy movement from the south toward the Marne, also the crossings of the Verdonnette between Margny and Condé-en-Brie for any movement to the northeast. Report strength and composition of any forces noted as well as their direction of movement. Reconnoiter the stream crossings between Artonges and Condé-en-Brie for any enemy forces moving into the area to the northwest. (Last mission to cease at 9:00 AM.) (All missions to begin at dawn.)<br>2. Reconnoiter the area north of the Marne and east of Château-Thierry. Determine the strength, composition, and direction of movement of any enemy forces advancing on the line of the Marne. Particular attention to the following roads:<br>a. Main highway from the north into Château-Thierry.<br>b. Route north from Mezy.<br>c. Main route north from Jaulgonne (through Le Charmel).<br>d. Two routes leading south into Treloup and Dormans.<br>e. Main north-south highway into Verneuil.<br>f. Routes to the north from Chatillon, Damery, and Epernay.<br>3. Reconnoiter the route Torcy—Château-Thierry. | Report positive information when obtained.<br><br>Negative information every hour beginning at 7:00 AM. To Corps C.P. at:<br>(1) St. Barthelemy, until 7:00 AM.<br>(2) Viels-Maisons, between 7:00 AM and 8:00 AM.<br>(3) Montfaucon, between 8:00 AM. and 9:00 AM.<br>(4) Courboin, between 9:00 AM and 10:30 AM.<br>(5) Dormans, after 10:30 AM.<br><br>All by dropped message. (No radio available.) |
| Zone:<br>Right boundary: Fontenelle—Artonges.<br>Left boundary: Viffort—Condé-en-Brie—Orbais.<br>Report any movement to the northeast, north, or northwest in your zone. (Strength, composition, and direction of movement.)<br>Detachment to reach the stream between Artonges and Condé-en-Brie by 7:30 AM; the line Artonges—Orbais by 9:15 AM. | Report positive information when obtained to Corps advance message center along axis: Viels-Maisons—Viffort—Courboin — St. Eugene—Dormans.<br>Negative information at:<br>8:00 AM to Viffort.<br>9:20 AM to St. Eugene.<br>10:30 AM to Dormans.<br>(Cyclists or mounted messengers.) |
| Zone:<br>Right boundary: Viffort—Condé-en-Brie—Orbais (all exclusive.)<br>Left boundary: The line of the Dollau and the Marne to Epernay.<br>Report:<br>(1) Any movement to the west or northwest in your zone. (Strength, composition, and direction of movement.)<br>(2) Condition of bridges over Surmelin north of Condé-en-Brie.<br>(3) Condition of bridges over Marne between Mezy and Epernay.<br>(4) Presence of any enemy forces at these crossings of the Surmelin or of the Marne.<br>Detachment to reach:<br>(1) The Surmelin by 7:30 AM.<br>(2) The line Le Breuil—Igny—Port-à-Binson by 9:30 AM.<br>(3) The line Orbais—Epernay by 12:00 noon. | Report positive information when obtained to Corps advance message center along axis: Viels-Maisons—Viffort—Courboin — St. Eugene—Dormans.<br><br>Negative information at:<br>8:00 AM to Viffort.<br>9:30 AM to St. Eugene.<br>10:30 AM to Dormans.<br>12:00 noon to Dormans.<br>(Cyclists or mounted messengers.) (Use local telephones if possible.) |
| Zone:<br>Right boundary: The Marne.<br>Left boundary: Line parallel to the Marne and approximately 10 kilometers to the north thereof.<br>Report:<br>(1) Any enemy detachments encountered in your zone. (Strength, composition, and direction of movement.)<br>(2) Condition of bridges over Marne.<br>(3) Presence of any forces at the Marne bridges.<br>Detachment to reach:<br>(1) Azy-sur-Marne by 7:00 AM.<br>(2) Jaulgonne—Le Charmel route by 8:30 AM.<br>(3) Main highway north from Verneuil by 9:30 AM.<br>(4) Epernay by 1:00 PM. | Report positive information when obtained to Corps advance message center along axis: Viels-Maisons—Viffort—Courboin — St Eugene—Dormans.<br><br>Negative information at:<br>7:45 AM to Viffort.<br>9:30 AM to St. Eugene.<br>10:30 AM, 12:00 noon, 1:30 PM } to Dormans.<br>(Cyclists or mounted messengers.) (Use local telephones if possible.) |

### Execution of the Attack and Exploitation

#### The Attack

On the 8th of September at 5:30 AM, the 45th Infantry launches its attack in the terrain compartment to the east of Touraille. As the compartment is scarcely a kilometer in width, the regiment attacks in column of battalions.

One battalion of the supporting artillery is assigned the mission of placing protective fires on the eastern edges of the village of Touraille and of the woods to the south thereof. Another battalion of artillery blocks off with protective fires the ridge marking the east boundary of the compartment. The third battalion places close supporting fires in front of the attacking infantry. The initial breakthrough accomplished, the artillery battalions will join their respective divisions as the latter pass through their positions.

The remainder of the corps is massed with its leading elements close behind the artillery positions. The reconnaissance detachments designated in the Intelligence Plan are at the head of the Corps.

At 6:30 AM, the assault battalion reaches a line east of the northern exits of Touraille. It has encountered some very slight resistance from small enemy cavalry detachments.

The support battalion is engaged in mopping up Touraille and in solidifying the west shoulder of the penetration. There is apparently no enemy immediately to the east of the compartment.

At this hour, the Corps Commander is in personal contact with the infantry regimental commander and is familiar with the situation. He therefore promptly orders the three reconnaissance detachments to pass through the infantry and to proceed on their respective missions.

#### The Exploitation (First Phase)

At 6:40 AM, the leading squadrons of the divisions of the first echelon pass through the infantry. The infantry battalions begin to assemble and reorganize. The trucks which were grouped in the vicinity of Montdauphin are having some difficulty in negotiating the crossing of the Petit Morin.

The leading squadrons of the main bodies of the 4th and 10th Divisions reach the Montmirail—Viels-Maisons highway at 7:15 AM. The security elements of these divisions have reached the line: Rozoy—Mont-Cel-Anger.

At this hour, the following information is available to the Corps:

*Reports of Observation Aviation.*—

"Between 6:30 and 7:00 AM, small mounted groups of the enemy have been observed retiring north from the line of the Petit Morin in the region of Verdalot and to the east thereof. These withdrawing elements are disappearing into the large wooded area northwest of Mont-Cel-Anger.

Considerable activity observed along the plateau between Montmirail and Fontenelle. A number of trenches have been constructed in this area. Enemy troops have been observed in Marchais-en-Brie.

North of the Marne, no movements or concentrations have been noted.

South of the Marne, the entire rear area of the German Second Army north of the line Viffort—Orbais seems to be free of the enemy."

*Actions of the Corps Commander.*—The Corps Commander issues instructions to the 4th Division to protect the left flank of the corps in its advance to the first objective against any possible interference from enemy elements reported in the large wooded area northwest of Mont-Cel-Anger.

The 4th Division details a flank guard for this purpose.

#### Exploitation (Second Phase)

Shortly after 8:00 AM, the leading squadrons of the main bodies of the first echelon reach the first objective.[8] During the march to this objective, several attempts were made by enemy cavalry to debouch from the eastern edge of the wooded region on the left flank of the Corps. These efforts were effectively blocked by the action of the flank guard of the 4th Division. At this time the Corps Commander orders the 8th Division, which has reached the Viels-Maisons—Montmirail highway, to relieve the 4th Division flank guard and take over the task of protecting the Corps left flank until the troops in the second echelon have cleared the wooded region. The 8th Division is ordered then to protect the rear of the corps by the detail of a suitable rear guard.

At 8:10 AM, the Corps Commander is at the Corps Advance Message Center at Viffort. A message is received from the XVIII Corps (left corps of the Fifth Army) to the effect that its 36th Division on the west flank is held up in the Bois de Courmont by enemy forces in Marchais-en-Brie. The Cavalry Corps is requested to attack this village in flank. The Cavalry Commander refuses to become involved in this purely local operation and lends no immediate assistance to the 36th Division. He is fully cognizant of the fact that the wide turning movement of the Cavalry Corps will eventually cause a complete breakdown of the enemy frontal resistance to the Fifth Army.

Upon his arrival at Viffort, the following information is available to the Corps Commander:

*Observation Aviation:*

"Numerous small cavalry columns have been observed in the area north of the Petit Morin on the west flank of the Corps. These columns moving northeast from the line Verdalot—Orly have not yet appeared north of the covered valley southeast of Nogent l'Artaud.

North of the Marne, no positive information has been obtained.

The situation on the west flank of the German Second Army remains unchanged."

[8] It is contemplated that divisions would march cross country, each division on a squadron front of approximately four or five hundred yards. Squadrons would be in a suitable approach march formation.




*Map 7: Special map (situation at 8:00 a.m.)*

*Reconnaissance Detachment No. 1:*

"The woods two kilometers northeast of Fontenelle is occupied by enemy infantry. The detachment has reached its first objective without encountering any other enemy forces and is now proceeding to its final objective."

*Reconnaissance Detachment No. 2:*

"Detachment No. 2 has reached its first objective. Some enemy trucks and animal-drawn supply vehicles, encountered on the Crezancy—Condé-en-Brie road, were destroyed. No other enemy detachments located. Bridges over the Surmelin are intact. Am now continuing the advance to the second objective."

*Reconnaissance Detachment No. 3:*

"Detachment No. 3 reached Azy at 7:15 AM. Experienced some difficulty in crossing the Marne due to interference by small groups of enemy stragglers. Outskirts of Château-Thierry reached by our leading elements at 7:45 AM. Two stragglers belonging to the German IX Corps were taken at Essomes."

*Actions of the Corps Commander.*—The Corps Commander orders an advance to the second objective.

EXPLOITATION (THIRD PHASE)

At 9:30 AM, the 10th Division reaches the second objective (the Surmelin River).

At this hour, the 4th Division, in echelon to the left rear, is still approximately two kilometers west of this objective.

The 8th Division has arrived on the line: Viffort—Essises and is continuing its movement to the north on Blesmes.

The leading elements of the Spahi regiment are about a kilometer northeast of Viffort.

Both the 10th Division and the Spahis have strong flank protection to the south.

The 45th Infantry has just completed entrucking at Epine-aux-Bois and is beginning its movement to Crezancy.

At 9:30 AM, the Corps Commander arrives at his advance message center at St. Eugene. The following information has arrived:

*Observation Aviation:*

"Large concentration of troops of all arms observed in the region of Champaubert. A few small columns moving out of Champaubert in a northwesterly direction.

A number of small enemy columns beginning to move north from the vicinity of Boissy and Montmirail. Some movement of small detachments to the northeast noted from the line: Montmirail—Marchais-en-Brie.

Small detachments of cavalry are moving north across the Marne at Nogent and Azy.




*Map 8: Special map (situation at 9:30 a.m.)*

What appears to be at least a regiment of infantry has been observed entrenching on the heights about six kilometers northwest of Nanteuil."

*Reconnaissance Detachment No. 1:*

"One of our patrols driven out of Artonges by enemy infantry advancing from the large woods to the south thereof. This infantry is apparently attempting to organize a position on the heights east of Artonges. Our patrols have not yet reached Orbais and Margny. However, the woods east of Pargny and the woods northwest of Orbais have been reported free of the enemy."

*Reconnaissance Detachment No. 2:*

"Detachment No. 2 has patrols approximately within three kilometers of its second objective. No enemy combat troops encountered. The bridges over the Marne at Jaulgonne, Passy, Dormans and Verneuil are being used by vehicular traffic. In order to prevent their destruction, recommend their immediate seizure. Detachment No. 2 is unable to do this and still continue on its mission."

*Reconnaissance Detachment No. 3:*

"No enemy troops have been observed in the zone of Reconnaissance Detachment No. 3 as far east as the eastern edge of the Forêt de Ris. The Marne bridges at Mezy, Jaulgonne, Passy and Dormans are being used by vehicles. Our observers have been unable to see any bridge guards."

*Actions of the Corps Commander.*—Upon the receipt of this information, the Corps Commander issues the following instructions:

(1) *To the 10th Division:*

"Protect your advance to the third objective by a strong flank guard along the heights to the south of the Marne. When east of Dormans, move the bulk of your division to the east astride the Marne, utilizing the two main routes available to you. Detachments will be posted at the various bridges to be held in your sector."

(2) *To his Chief of Staff:*

"Send a staff officer to Crezancy for the purpose of directing the three battalions of the 45th Infantry upon their arrival at that place. They will be moved via routes to the north of the Marne to the command posts of the divisions to which they are to be attached."

## Exploitation (Fourth Phase)

The movement of the corps is continued without incidents of importance. There are no enemy troops capable of interfering with the occupation of the defense sectors assigned on the Marne. Later in the morning, enemy cavalry in considerable force but apparently highly disorganized was observed along the Dollau and crossing to the north of the Marne at Azy and Nogent.




*Map 9: Special map (situation at 3:00 p.m.)*

By 3:00 PM, all elements of the Corps are in position for the defense of the Marne. The dispositions for this defense are in general such that strong detachments are maintained to cover the actual crossings while the bulk of the 10th and 4th Divisions and the Spahi regiment are held in local reserve in their respective sectors.

The 8th Division, with the 45th Infantry less two battalions attached, is kept in corps reserve in the vicinity of Anthenay (six kilometers northwest of Chatillon).

## Conclusion

Two articles appearing in the American *Cavalry Journal* on the mass employment of cavalry in 1914 by the Germans and French have recently been reviewed by the British *Cavalry Journal*. The reviewer was quite caustic in his criticism, principally for the reason that these articles were predicated on what he termed quite theoretical hypotheses which might or might not have been capable of execution.

This criticism was partially justified.

The portrayal of all the details of execution of the suggested plans for the massed employment of the French and German cavalry was done only for the purpose of vivifying the theses. The author frankly admits that many of these details would unquestionably have had to be modified or changed because of logistical, supply, and other reasons.

We must not, however, lose sight of the forest because of the trees.

The author still maintains that had Germany massed the bulk of her cavalry behind her enveloping wing and reserved it for strategic exploitation at or after the battle of the Sambre, there would have been no "miracle of the Marne."

There was only one way in which the Allies might have countered such a plan. *The French cavalry should likewise have been massed on this same flank but assigned a totally different strategic rôle—a defensive one.*

The reviewer requested "Case III, in which both belligerents place their entire cavalry masses facing one another on that flank," and demands a solution!

At this point, the author agrees heartily with the reviewer that "speculative theorizing" is apt to produce sterile results. If, however, the latter is fully aware of the *defensive* power of modern cavalry with its great fire power, he might draw his own conclusions as to the theoretical outcome.

In this present article devoted to the operations of the Corps Conneau, there is *nothing* speculative or theoretical or which might be attacked as unsound on logistical, tactical, or supply grounds.

The German situation, as portrayed, is historically correct. *There was nothing to oppose an uninterrupted march of the French cavalry to the bridges of the Marne in rear*

*of the German Second Army!** It is true that men and animals were fatigued. It is true that shoeing was in a lamentable state. Assuming even that only half of the animals could have made the march, this alone would have placed eight or nine regiments in addition to the infantry and cyclists on the final objective in less than eight hours! If the animals failed, then units should have been dismounted and marched on foot. There are no limits to the endurance of men when there is a will in the leader. To the Marne they should have been pushed, even had their weary feet marked with a trail of blood their "via dolorosa"!

What an opportunity for cavalry!

The situation presented:

1. An open door to the rear of an army which is on the verge of retiring.

2. A wide unfordable river behind which the cavalry could effectively block this retirement.

3. Crossings intact for the passage of the cavalry over this river.

4. Time available for the subsequent destruction of these crossings.

All of these ideal conditions existed, yet—

Nothing was done!

Why?

The answer can be found in the Fifth Army Commander. In spite of his brilliance, he failed to realize the strategic capabilities of cavalry. Nor is Joffre free from blame. In his General Instructions No. 5, the order which launched the Marne counteroffensive, he displayed this identical lack of comprehension when he appended to the Fifth Army paragraph the sentence:

"The II Cavalry Corps will assure liaison between the British Army and the French Fifth Army."

*EDITOR'S NOTE: Unfortunately for the French, the true situation, as usual, was probably wrapped in the fog of war.

In spite of the faulty directives of both GHQ and Fifth Army, the situation might still have been exploited had the Corps been commanded by a real cavalry leader. What an opportunity for the display of initiative! A single squadron might have been detached to play the prescribed liaison rôle, while the remainder of the Corps was pushed to the Marne in exploitation.

As for the British,—with a little more temerity, they might have advanced rapidly to and across the Marne in the region between Château-Thierry and Nogent. The bridges along this reach of the river would have been found unoccupied or inadequately defended, and the B.E.F. could then have advanced unopposed toward the Ourcq—*actually on the rear of the German First Army.* This is *not* "speculative theorizing." Such a maneuver might have doomed the German First Army.

The Corps Conneau could have accomplished its exploitation mission with the means it actually had available. A much smaller *modern* cavalry force with its greatly increased fire power, could certainly have performed the same mission with equal facility.

As conditions actually existed, modern mechanization supported by a portée infantry could also have quickly and effectively moved to and defended the passages of the Marne. Had the Germans destroyed the bridges over the Surmelin as well as those over the Marne west of Mezy, however, nothing but horse cavalry could have accomplished the mission in the prescribed time.

The conclusion is obvious.

A mobile force consisting of both horse cavalry and mechanization with some motorized infantry attached must be available to the high command for exploitation opportunities which present themselves during a decisive engagement.

And what is of equal importance, all higher commanders must realize the powerful weapon of opportunity they have at their disposal when they possess such a force.

## Significance*

Over his road Chiang Kai-shek cannot obtain sufficient munitions to carry on extensive field operations against the Japanese, but can import enough for large-scale guerrilla warfare. And last week it was announced that henceforth one-third of all China's armies will be organized as guerillas. At the same time Japan received evidence of the effectiveness of these new tactics. Five hundred well-drilled Chinese cavalrymen waylaid a freight train on the Peiping-Tientsin railway—chief Japanese communication line in North China—burned it, and tore up a mile of track, paralyzing traffic for 24 hours.

**News Week*, January 23, 1939.

## PART X

My host in Plauzat, M. le Comte De Seray, had about three hundred acres of vineyard. He also had three well-trained Blue Auvergne pointers, a black and white or blue-ticked breed of pointer, much taller than the English pointer and with long ears like a hound. In hunting partridge in the vineyards they rapped their tails against the vines and got them bloody, so the practical count had amputated their tails! However, they were steady to shot and wing and excellent retrievers and covered their ground well; the count loaned me an old muzzle-loading shotgun and many a delightful shoot I had with him on Saturdays and Sundays. The first time we shot, however, the count horrified me by ground-sluicing a partridge. He was out for meat. I walked my birds up and killed them in the air and the count thought this was taking a very unnecessary risk of losing the bird. I found the red-beaked partridge easier to hit than the Chinese pheasant, but both are easy for one trained on California valley quail.

After the Armistice was signed Ordnance sent four G. P. F. rifles and four tractors up to the target range at Randanne and we went up there again for real target practice with these big guns. The entire regiment went this time. My battalion got there first and found a sort of bay in a strip of thick woods, which sheltered us from the bitter northwest winds, for it was winter now and there was snow on the ground. We made our kitchen in this bay and built a mud oven and got a battalion mess going and were quite happy, until another battalion arrived.

Now, the major commanding the battalion ranked my major, in priority of appointment, by six months, so promptly he ordered my major to move out of our snug kitchen and let him have it! He claimed this was his undoubted right by virtue of his seniority. My major wasn't at all certain that this right did not exist, so before obeying he asked me about it. I went crazy. I denied the right and said no gentleman would do such a thing, that he might rank a junior out of a pleasant kitchen location, but never an equal, and to tell him to go to hell, and if he didn't care to I would have great pleasure in performing as his Victrola. Finally my major decided that, in the interest of peace he would give up the kitchen and I almost wept with rage. I pointed out to him that he would lose caste with his subordinates, but evidently he didn't believe me, either as a prophet or volunteer judge advocate. The men, of course, were furious.

This was one of the most extraordinary bits of jackassery I had witnessed to date and is here offered as evidence of the crackpot ideas that come to some men in the army, although in civil life no crackpot ideas are in evidence. I thought at the time: This could not have happened if the commanding officer of this regiment had been competent to instruct the officer personnel on military etiquette and had taken time out to do it.

Upon investigating the equipment we were to shoot with I discovered that Ordnance had not sent us any loading trays, rammer staffs or cleaning rods, as well as a supply of rags and gasoline to get the enormous gobs of cosmoline out of the tubes. We had an ungodly supply of shell, powder and primers, however. When I reported this state of affairs to my major and stated that, under the circumstances, I would not be able to start shooting at 11:00 A.M., next day he pulled one of those queer notions of military efficiency that some boob had inculcated in him. Probably he acquired it in school when reciting Tennyson's "Charge Of The Light Brigade:"

Their's not to reason why,
Their's but to do or die.

"Captain Kyne," he informed me, "you will start shooting those guns tomorrow at 11:00 o'clock—or else. You seem to lack initiative. You can cut a small tree in the forest yonder and whittle out cleaning rods and rammer staffs—"

"Passing the fact that a G.H.Q. order forbids us to raid French forests, I haven't a man thin enough to crawl into the gun and dig out the cosmoline with his finger nails, and a home-made rammer staff will not do, and water and oil will not mix, else I'd use water on the cosmoline instead of gasoline, and a loading tray is really necessary. So, until you get me the tools to work with there will be no shooting."

He repeated his instructions, to my vast amazement, for he was and is a very sane and sensible man. I have always thought he was trying to discipline me. I assured him we would never shoot the guns anyhow because every time we fired a gun it cost Uncle Sam about forty dollars and somebody down at the training center would awaken to the absurdity of wasting ammunition on a regiment that would be starting home very presently. And I was right in this, for the following morning at ten forty-five an order arrived fobidding the shoot, whereat I hooted joyously. And the next morning we returned to Plauzat because orders had been received for us to clean up our affairs in our respective villages and be prepared to move out and take train to Bordeaux, there to await water transportation back to the United States.

Now, my pal had had a grouch against the colonel for a year. It appeared the colonel had one day sent for him

and then had made him wait an hour outside the door. So now, when we were about to go home old pal swore he would not go home with the regiment, that he would be shot before he'd walk up Market Street behind the colonel. He began scheming to get a new job and presently he saw an opening in Paris. So he and the major decided it would be a nice thing to take a jaunt to Paris, the goal of every man in the A.E.F., and to that end they went down to Clermont-Ferrand and struck for a pass to Paris from the old brigadier who had temporary command over us, now that we had been made army artillery and detached from our original brigade. They were refused, but the old man's sympathetic adjutant told the schemers they must have a sort of military excuse for the granting of such a favor and suggested they go get one.

Now, the colonel and the lieutenant colonel had gone in the former's car up to view the wreckage of the Western Front, and my fellow author, Major Stewart Edward White was commanding. So the two schemers induced White to write the brigade commander a letter requesting that the pair be sent down to Bordeaux immediately in order to prepare billets for the regiment which would be leaving for Bordeaux any day. This constituted a military excuse and it was so ordered. The old brigadier did not know that at the Bordeaux port of embarkation, Camp Genecourt, there were huts enough to house a division!

While this was going on I had been very ill with tonsilitis and had a high fever, but this did not stop this precious pair from beating it to Paris and leaving me in command with all the dirty work of cleaning house before boarding the tain. Old Pal felt sad at leaving me but at the last he had a bright idea. Said he: "What's to prevent you joining us in Paris after you've cleaned up here?"

"You two have used up the only military excuse available," I replied.

"Nonsense," replied Old Pal. "You're a fiction writer and it should be no trouble for you to invent a marvelous military excuse. Meet us in Paris in seventy-two hours," and he fled without leaving me his Paris address. Later I will tell you how I invented an excuse and met him in Paris in forty-eight hours, after ten minutes of detective work.

I must here relate a couple of tales of this old brigade commander. He was an old regular, close to the retirement age, a prissy old dud whom field artillery had passed by shortly after Capron's Battery ceased firing at Santiago. He appeared in Plauzat with his staff one morning when I was temporarily in command, so I crossed to his car, opened the door, saluted and named myself and my outfit and command. I knew he was sudden death when, instead of giving me a smile, which costs nothing, he gave me a dirty look, as if he suspected me of dirty work and would presently uncover it, and said: "I'll inspect your billets, captain."

Now, I had soldiers billeted upstairs and downstairs, but I elected to show this aged general the upstairs ones only, so that quickly wearied him and he went on the prowl for dirt in my kitchen. What a chance! That was Snooper's domain. Finally, unable to find anything at which to complain he said he would inspect my latrine, so I led him down to it and he said:

"Hah! No overhead covering, I observe. Are you not aware, sir, that the rainy season is approaching; that men coming down to this latrine will, unless protected by overhead cover, get wet, take cold and possibly develop pneumonia? Hah! Heavy sick report. Maybe some deaths. And all your fault. Hah!"

I said "Fiddlesticks, sir. I was a wet private in the Philippines for a year and nobody worried over me." I then went on to inform him that I had not given any thought to the subject of overhead covering and enumerated my reasons. I could weave a sort of porch from branches of trees but an order from G.H.Q. forbade us cutting as much as a switch off any Frenchman's tree. I could have bought some lumber and erected cover, but to do so I would have had to use the battery fund, and the purchase of lumber from the battery fund was not authorized. I would, if I broke the law in this respect, have to camouflage my purchase as fresh vegetables and I was beyond such crookedness. Of course I could buy the lumber with my own money but investigation had developed the fact that the nearest lumber was sixteen miles away. I had no transportation to go there and none to bring back the lumber if I succeeded in buying it.

He told me I was an unenterprising, unresourceful, neglectful fellow and went back to the kitchen to see if he couldn't, by unusual diligence, uncover something dirty.

Now, a French girl in our village had a little Bayard car, a sort of French Ford, and in return for flour and coffee and bacon grease, etc., she had told me I could use her car if I could secure oil and gas. So my motor mechanics fell upon it and fixed it up and I went to our supply officer and solicited a gift of gas and oil and was brutally refused. Unfortunately for the supply officer, his supply sergeant, one Samuel Marcovitz (Berlin papers please copy) heard me and after dark that night this excellent fellow arrived in my village on a motorcycle with a bathtub attached and the bathtub full of oil and gas. All he asked was that I keep away from the supply officer's village.

Well, now, while my general continued his snooping, I summoned faithful Marchand and ordered him to take the little car and run down to Authezat, where a wag I liked commanded D Battery. He was to inform Captain Richmond that the brigade commander was out in force, with a particular grouch against battery commanders who did not have overhead covering on their latrines.

That afternoon my colonel came over in his Cadillac car, quite excited, to ask what I had been doing to the brigade commander. It seems the old gentleman had called on the colonel to inform him that the man Kyne, commanding in Plauzat, was a pretty small military potato. No initiative, no imagination, careless, indifferent and too pert. On the contrary, the man Richmond, commanding in Authezat, was a splendid fellow, full of initiative.



*"Hah! Heavy sick report. Maybe some deaths. And all your fault. Hah!"*

resourcefulness and imagination. Good man to remember when majorities were given out.

I couldn't explain the situation except by a blanket indictment to the effect that the general was in his dotage and ought to be chloroformed. But when the colonel departed, still disturbed, I ran down to Authezat to ask Richmond how he had fared with the old man, and was informed the old man hadn't inspected anything in his village except the latrine. It happened to be a new latrine they were just digging and the old latrine had just been filled in and posted. Acting on my tip about overhead cover he decided to beat the old gentleman to the punch, so he said: "I'll have this latrine ready in an hour and then I'll put my overhead covering on it. Got to protect my soldiers from rain."

"And how, my dear captain," purred the general, "do you purpose effecting overhead covering on your latrine?" Whereat the devil, Richmond, always the quiet wag, replied: "I'm going to take the tarpaulin off my kitchen!"

So that was it. I was damned because I declined to keep dry a soldier bent on a three minute job, and Richmond was a hero because he purposed making the mess sergeant, four cooks and six or eight K. P.'s work out in the rain sixteen hours a day; because he would permit the rain to pelt down into the hash and the soup and stew, and thus drive his soldiers crazy. Of course Richmond was much more intelligent than I. He had recognized the old man for a nut on sight and had treated him accordingly. And how that rascal did laugh at me, charging me with that gravest of all field artillery crimes—a total lack of initiative and instantaneous decision!

I had a feeling that the general would return in a mad

effort to dig up something else on me, and I was not surprised when presently he appeared one day when I was down in a potato field training my gun crews on a G.P.F. rifle.

Now, I had sent a smart sergeant down to Clermont-Ferrand with my first string gun crews to learn the technique of the G. P. F. In reading the scant literature the French gave us on this subject I learned that it was considered good work if one put this Big Betsy into action in soft picking ground in one hour and a half. Always a skeptic where the French were concerned, I didn't believe this. I *knew* we could knock fifteen or twenty minutes off that time so I instructed my sergeant to learn all the French had to teach him and then use his own judgment. What I craved was speed and speed could be produced by wise coördinated effort.

Well the sergeant had returned and reported that he could do the job in soft picking ground in exactly one hour. I challenged him to show me and he did, but he could not have done the job in fifty-nine minutes to save himself from a firing squad.

After greeting me after the fashion of an old dog growling over a bone the general asked me how long it took me to put the gun into action and in my customary spirit of deviltry I assured him we did it in fifty-eight minutes. So he said he knew I was an arch-bluffer, because the gun couldn't be put into action under an hour and a half. "Pheui," I assured him. "You have been reading some bad French literature, general. That's Frog time. A stately measure. My lads prefer jazz."

"I'll call your bluff," he declared. "Let me see you put that gun into action in fifty-eight minutes."

I called to the sergeant and ordered him to put the gun into action in fifty-eight minutes. The worthy fellow's eyebrows went up a trifle but like the good soldier he was he bowed his head and took the deadly stroke. I got out my stop watch. "In the rear of the piece! Fall in! Prepare for action. How-wowow!"

At the tick of fifty eight minutes I signalled the sergeant who tossed his arms aloft and yelled: "In action, sir." I begged the general to inspect the piece and the wretched sergeant went away from there, unwilling to be a witness to my humiliation. The spade could have stood a lot more tamping, the gun was not level, as any boob could have told by looking at the bubble (provided he knew where to look) and the aiming stake had not been put up. But of these things the old gentleman was blissfully unconscious. He was so angry he could have struck me, I think, and in silence he climbed into his car, and left and I never saw him again. The minute his car turned the bend in the road the gun crew started throwing picks and shovels into the air and capering like the wild young devils they were. I gave the sergeant some francs and instructed him to take my brave lads up town and buy them liquid to wet their whistles, for they were hot and perspiring.

We remained in Plauzat two or three weeks before receiving the order to move. We roved over the area at will and presently we heard that the 339th Field Artillery, in a village between us and the railroad, was fighting a terrific battle with influenza. Our information was that it had lost a hundred men and had about four hundred incapacitated before its medical unit broke down from exhaustion—whereupon the colonel of the 339th called on our colonel and asked him to loan his regiment our medical corps. Our old man, always courteous and obliging, readily granted the request.

When my battalion surgeon got the order he screamed like a wounded horse. "Our men are passing through that 339th village by the dozens daily," he said. "Does our colonel think *his* regiment is immune from this scourge?"

I borrowed a bicycle from a French woman and pedaled nine kilometers to protest against this latest and most serious bit of jackassery. I reminded my colonel that it was just too bad about the 339th, but charity began at home and that it was just pretty awful to leave his own regiment defenseless and sacrifice us Native Sons of California to a regiment from Iowa. So verbally he threw me out and got very angry because I had assumed to tell him his business. "If my men get flu and there is no help and one of them dies," I warned him, "I'll certainly prefer charges against you." "Clear out of my office," he commanded.

Well, our battalion surgeon mixed up about ten gallons of Dobell's Mixture and gave me a big squirt gun and a clinical thermometer. Snooper prowled among doc's stock of medicine and got familiar with them and said he knew how to use a hypodermic and give injections of morphia and strychnine. And with a heavy heart doc left us. Immediately I lectured to the noncoms about flu. At the first sign of a watery eye and a blowy nose and pains and aches they were to bring the man to Snooper or me. If he showed half a degree of fever we put him in a hospital I had already provided by appropriating a ruined chateau, with a vast baronial dining room and a huge fireplace at each end. I bought small wine casks and sawed them in two for use as toilets; I bought clean oat hay and made beds; in the old chateau kitchen I installed a diet kitchen and we were ready for the siege.

It came and as fast as a man came down with flu I put him to bed, with his clothes on and kept him full warm and dry, with a shot of rum every little while. They had to put on their shoes and keep their blankets around them when answering Nature's calls. I saw to it that every man had his nose and mouth sprayed with Dobell's Mixture and each day I took the battery out into a pasture and let a feeble winter sun shine for an hour on all their effects. I made the men strip so the sunlight could disinfect their clothing and their bodies and I gave them setting up exercises to keep them warm while the disinfecting process was going on. I made them sleep head to foot with shelter tent walls between them. Snooper was chief surgeon and a good one and once or twice our weary battalion surgeon came up to see how we were getting along.

We had about fifty pretty sick men, but only one got pneumonia and died. And he would not have died if I could only have succeeded in inducing old Doc, our chief

medical officer, to get an ambulance out for him from the hospital at Royat. I knew the boy had pneumonia and made him a pneumonia jacket and did all we could for him, but when Old Doc finally got him to hospital he passed on. B Battery lost a first lieutenant and he only died because he was scared to death.

The morning after the major and Old Pal left me, I received a warning order from regimental headquarters, followed later in the day by a definite order commanding me to have my battalion at a certain village at 8:00 o'clock the following morning, there to entrain for the port of embarkation near Bordeaux.

I got out of bed quite groggy and shakey on my legs after a week of tonsilitis or quinsy and settled all claims the French could trump up against the outfit. Dear old jolie Madame Cosson almost broke my heart. She claimed three hundred francs damages for broken windows, the damage having occurred when my men played baseball in the street. I knew this was a lie because they only played catchers, but Madame Cosson said she had the balls that had come through the windows and had, with true Gallic perspicacity, held them as material witnesses. So I told her to bring down the balls and she arrived with *six*—all superannuated *tennis* balls! I dropped a baseball on the floor, then picked it up and handed it to her, which broke the heart of dear old jolie Madam Cosson and she burst into tears. Seems to me I always had madame weeping. Three times she imported a flock of foolish non-virgins, hoping to make a clean-up while the troops were there and three times I had banished the girls. She could not be cured of a habit of overcharging so I had declared her estaminet out of bounds. She couldn't win a bet.

Four old frogs tried to collect sums of from fifty to eighty francs for a hardwood log that had lain beside the highway for twenty years. They said they could have made wooden shoes out of that log if my men hadn't cut it up for fuel. I settled with the first claimant for fifteen francs and told the first sergeant to settled with the other three, which he did by vigorously booting them down the stairs of the mairie, to the great scandal of His Honor, the mayor, who had the claims filed with him for adjustment.

The mess bills had to be settled and we owed several hundred dollars. One by one every officer under me came to me, confessed he was short and begged me, as a favor,



*"Dear old Madame Cosson almost broke my heart. She claimed three hundred francs damages. . . ."*

to pay his mess bill and carry him until next pay day. And I was broke myself, and the only man from whom I could hope to borrow five or six hundred dollars was my major and he was somewhere in Paris doing a little high and lofty hell-raising. I was afraid I'd have to ask the colonel for the jack. I knew I'd get it but sometimes I hadn't been as patient with him as I might have been and I think he thought so, too, which made it a little difficult to come around asking favors.

In the midst of my desolation I received from my literary agents in London a draft on Paris for some two hundred and fifty pounds sterling and an accounting of the royalty on six months sales on my books. I fled to the Comte de Seray with my interpreter and explained that I yearned for his favor in helping me cash this check at his bank in Clermont-Ferrand. The count reduced two hundred and fifty pounds sterling to francs and commenced to tremble. He wanted to help me out but what if my draft on Paris bounced after he had endorsed it and I far away on the billow?

He took me down to his bank, however, and the entire board of directors had a look at my draft and then they'd look suspiciously at me and the count would talk. I think he must have told them all about the sacks of white flour and white granulated sugar and the cans of real coffee and the sides of bacon and ham I had bought him in our commissary and the cigars and candies for Madame La Comtesse and the fact that I was a real author, if the gossip of my men could be believed. Even the clerks and stenographers finally got sucked into this business vortex; there was wild figuring of exchange and I knew they were going to murder me on that. But I didn't care. I had to have the money, so finally, after reducing me to a pulp they socked me a stiff fee for the trouble of cashing my check and did me out of about ten bucks on the exchange. But I went home and paid the mess bill, and felt quite virtuous, as one does, when he can certify to his commanding officer that he has moved out with all bills paid.

Now, as previously stated, Old Pal had, when leaving with the major for Paris, ordered me to invent a sound military excuse that would enable me to join them in Paris in seventy-two hours. Having cleaned up all my bills I now laid my mind to this job and presently gave birth to a bright idea.

The colonel was still angry with me as a result of our battle over loaning our medical detail and I doubted if my plan would work, but anyhow I decided to try. So I wrote him a note informing him that I had been very ill abed for ten days with a terrific sore throat that might be tonsilitis or quinsy or flu. Without the aid of a doctor I could only guess. I told him I would put my troops aboard the train on time but that I dreaded a ride of two days and two nights sitting up in a cold second-class coach all the way to Bordeaux and having to live on cold rations. I feared pneumonia and now that we were ordered home I didn't want to get pneumony of the lungs and perish. So please couldn't I go down to Bordeaux by a regular passenger train, in advance of the troops and there, in a comfortable hotel, await their arrival? And couldn't I take my striker with me to look after me? I was so weak and ill I feared to travel alone.

This note I sent to the colonel by my striker on a borrowed bicycle. Back came a nice friendly note, expressing regret at my illness and granting me permission to do as I desired and I could consider his letter as a travel order. It was written in long-hand and had neither seal nor adjutant's attestation appended. And the colonel knew better than that. He knew it was no travel order but he hoped, I think, that I wouldn't, and when I tried to use it as a travel order I'd be in all sorts of difficulties and maybe the M.P's would take me for a skulker or a spy and jug me while they investigated my standing. The old man also sent me a pint of Dobell's Mixture and begged me to use it freely. I cursed him for his slyness in appearing to be a good fellow when all the time he knew he wasn't. I did, however, agree with him that he owed me a poke or two.

I met him when we loaded the troops and he gave me his Cadillac car to ride to Clermont-Ferrand in and there turn it in to Ordnance. The first thing I did thereafter was to go to the railroad station and make a reconnaissance. A marine guard was there with a corporal in charge, but the railway transportation officer was not present. Why should he be? The last troops in his area had just gone through en route home, so he could go up town now and get soused and nobody would find it out.

I discovered that this marine corps corporal would be on guard again when the train for Paris left at 11:21 that night. He had a wound stripe so I asked him where he had been wounded. He said he blushed to tell me, but the fact was that one day he started chasing a Prussian guard around a tree. At least he laid the flattering unction to his soul that he was chasing that Prussian guard but it seems that all the time the Prussian Guard was chasing him! And caught him on the posterior. I laughed and craftily asked him how long since he had been paid. Well, it had been three months. So I said that was a horrible way to treat a marine and handed him a hundred franc bill. "When you come off guard, corporal," I instructed him, "take your gang over into the town and buy them a nice luncheon and cigarettes. Hoist a few on me."

So he took the hundred francs—being a marine, because a marine will take anything except a punch in the snoot. . . .

Well, at eleven o'clock the striker and I arrived and the B.T.O. was still A.W.O.L., and the marine corporal was at the gate making everybody show cause why they should be permitted to board that train. He smiled at me and said: "The boys thank you for the party, captain. I suppose the captain has a travel order for himself and this soldier."

I produced the colonel's letter and the corporal read it and looked at me sadly. "But this isn't a travel order, sir." he said.

"Hell's fire," I said, "do I have to have a marine corporal tell me that?"



*"The Marine corporal was at the gate making everybody show cause why they should be permitted to board that train."*

"I think your colonel doesn't like you, captain. I think he hung something on you?"

"No, he didn't corporal. I'm too smart for that."

We looked hard at each other. Now, marines are pretty intelligent, by and large, and suddenly this corporal thought. "I've been swindled. I've accepted for myself and my squad a swell luncheon from this field artillery captain, and now he's here to collect." He grinned all over.

"Dirty pool, sir," he declared, "but you win. All aboard, sir. Good-bye and good luck to you and your man in Paris. They do things to soldiers in Paris if they can't show proper authority for being there. For of course nobody in the A.E.F., ever traveled in France without doing it in circles so as to make at least a one-night stand in Paris." He gave me a snappy salute. "If the frog conductor tries to collect for the ticket you haven't got, sir," he advised, "pretend you are stone deaf and speak nothing but Chinese. If you give him any money he'll keep it."

So we lit in Paris at 7:00 o'clock next morning and without having any more idea where the major and Old Pal were than a baboon has of hydrostatics, but I located them in half an hour. The late Colonel Charles E. Stanton, paymaster of the A.E.F., was our good friend and belonged to our clubs in San Francisco. It was Stanton who, in the 1917 Fourth of July oration at the tomb of Lafayette, in Picpus Cemetery in Paris, coined the famous line: "Lafayette, we are here." I recalled that the morning Old Pal and I landed in France we sent Charley a telegram that read: "Lafayette, we are here, too." So I knew he would have called on Charley, at the Elyesee Palace, and so he had and I picked up the trail and ran him to his hotel.

My first move was to go to my friend, Colonel Whitney, chief of staff to General Harts in the Paris sector. He had a snappy guard at those headquarters and I complimented him highly on his guard until I got him in good humor and asked him to issue me a three-day pass to save me from the M.P.'s. I got it but when I asked for one for my striker he refused. He said no enlisted man had ever had one of those passes, but I told him that a foolish consistency is the bob-goblin of little minds and unless he wanted to be considered the proprietor of a little mind he had better kick in. So finally he did.

Old Pal had already fixed things so he would not have to march up Market Street behind the colonel. Herbert Hoover had a few days before arrived in Paris to organize a mission to feed Mittel Europe, and Mr. Hoover and Old Pal had been to Stanford University together. So he had called on the old fraternity brother and said: "Bert, I do not want to go home with my regiment. I want to stay here, join up with you and help distribute the loaves and fishes."

This was up Mr. Hoover's alley, for he knew, out of his own intimate experience, that my pal was a man of power, imagination, driving force and mad enthusiasms. So he wired General Pershing to give him Old Pal and Pershing did it instanter and immediately Mr. Hoover put Old Pal in supreme command of what turned out to be the mightiest job of feeding that has ever been attempted by man. It had a lot of barter and trade in it and some shell-fire, like the night Old Pal, having traded some Serbian pork for Esthonian gasoline and oil, had to run the gantlet of fire from a battalion of Polish field artillery that fired on the train. He rode in the cab and looked back and counted the overs and shorts and said: "Well, if a shell lights in one of my gasoline cars I'm gone." But it didn't.

Well, having caught up with him and the major and listened to the news we went out to luncheon and ran into Samuel G. Blythe, the old political writer for the *Saturday Evening Post*. Further up the Rue di Riloi we bumped into Will Irwin, then a war correspondent, and held a convention of authors. In the midst of the luncheon Old Pal said to Sam Blythe, without consulting me:

"Sam, I want you to fix it to have Peter detached from our regiment and given a nice soft job in Paris. You can do it, Sam. You know everybody and his dog."

So Sam said he thought he might be able to put me over. Anyhow he'd think it over. The next day he ran into one Hurley, president of the Emergency Ship Corporation and said to Hurley: "Hurley, I'm going to do something nice for you. I'm going to give you a military attaché."

Said Hurley: "I don't need one, Sam, and I'll be shot if I know what I'll do with him when I get him."

"That's the big idea. Do nothing. This chap doesn't like to work. He's a writer and he was raised in the shipping industry before that. You're a tool manufacturer over here buying ships. What do you know about ships? Nothing. Take Peter B. Kyne and he'll tell you about them. He'll buy himself some nice new uniforms and ride around Europe with you in your car and keep you amused. How about it?"

"Well, since he's a friend of yours—"

"Wire Pershing and tell Pershing you want him and he'll be ordered to report to you immediately."

So Hurley wired General Pershing who handed the telegram to somebody else and after three happy days I went down and joined my regiment at Camp Genecourt. And here, for three weeks, it rained and I never saw the sun and suddenly I began to think it would be silly of me to go gallivanting all over Europe with Old Pal just because he loved me and wanted me around to raise hell with when the day's work was done. I told myself I should go home and take care of my wife and start writing again. I'd been out of the game nearly two years and a magazine writer is soon forgotten.

Pretty soon I was nearly nuts to think that the order would come any day and ruin me. I told my major all about it. One day he sneaked up to Paris with the colonel and upon his return he said. "Peter, little as you deserve it, I did something nice for you in Paris yesterday. I was

in Colonel Whitney's office and he picked a document out of his tray and said: "Pretty soft for Pete Kyne, isn't it? Here's an order from G.H.Q., detaching him from his regiment and ordering him to report to Hurley of the Shipping Board as Hurley's military attaché."

"Tear it up," the major pleaded. "If Peter gets that order he'll die. He wants to go home."

"He gets what twenty thousand men would give an ear to get and then he throws it away," said Whitney. "Isn't that an author for you? They're all nuts, although personally I always regarded Peter as reasonably sane."

So Colonel Whitney tore up the order and I went home and a year and a half later Old Pal came home with a couple of foreign decorations on him for giving pigs knuckles and sauerkraut to starving Bohunks. But he was broke and had to start his abandoned law practice all over again and I was having plans drawn for a ninety-seven foot auxiliary schooner yacht to sail the seven seas and search for the Happy Isles. However, I never built that yacht. A man got hold of me and told me I could build a much bigger yacht the following year if I'd put the money into his oil wells. So I did.

Only recently a lady asked me what I had done with all the money I had made writing and I replied: "My dear lady, I took it out of the air and put it in the ground!"

*(To be concluded)*

# Major General Guy V. Henry, Retired

**Captain, Army Olympic Equestrian Team**
**Assistant Commandant, The Cavalry School**
**Commandant, The Cavalry School**
**Chief of Cavalry**



**General Henry renders final official military salute upon relinquishing command of Fort Riley and The Cavalry School. "The termination of forty years of distinguished service in the Cavalry. His shadow will lengthen as time marches on."**

# Cavalry Affairs Before Congress

Major General John K. Herr, Chief of Cavalry, appeared before the Subcommittee (Military Affairs) of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, to discuss matters pertinent to the cavalry. Extracts of his remarks follow:

Mr. SNYDER. General, we have your Cavalry School item before us, but before we turn our attention to that, I am sure you would like to tell us something about your branch.

### GENERAL STATEMENT

General HERR. Mr. Chairman, the Cavalry School is both an institution for the instruction of officers and enlisted men, Regular, National Guard, and Reserve, and a center of cavalry studies. Its importance to the Army extends far beyond what is commonly considered the curriculm of an educational institution.

During the past eight years, cavalry has conducted intensive study and development in mechanization. Our studies and experiments have convinced us that we can apply automotive machines to the execution of cavalry missions to a very considerable extent. We are satisfied that the iron horse is here to stay. Each year, however, brings a more complete realization that the present development of fighting machines falls far short of the requirement that mobile warfare places upon cavalry, our most mobile ground fighting force. I am convinced that American horse cavalry today constitutes the most effective highly mobile fighting force in the world for operations on the American continent or similar areas. I am equally convinced that combined with a proper proportion of mechanized cavalry, the capabilities of cavalry are greatly increased.

Our problem is perfectly clear. It consists of continuing the improvement of our iron horses of every type always with a view to increasing the mobility and fighting power of cavalry; at the same time continuing to increase these same qualities in our horse units; and finally to maintain a proper balance between horse and mechanized units so that our cavalry as a whole will always be at maximum efficiency.

Although most of the technical development of mechanized cavalry must be carried on at Fort Knox, Ky., the station of our mechanized cavalry brigade, it is essential that the Cavalry School keep fully abreast of this development and take the lead in those highly important studies connected with the combined employment of horse and mechanized units. Mechanized cavalry studies at the Cavalry School have only been carried on at a scale commensurate with their importance for the past two or three years. They must be still further expanded as our ideas become more crystallized and suitable facilities and personnel become more available for research and instruction.

### COMBINED HORSE AND MECHANIZED FORCE MOST EFFECTIVE

MR. STARNES. In the development of a mechanized cavalry, is it your experience that probably the most effective cavalry force, speaking of the cavalry for combat purposes, that is, the cavalry you are developing now, a combination of horse cavalry and mechanized force is the most effective?

General HERR. That is my opinion. Of course, there are occasions when you could better use the combined cavalry in operations and there are certain times when just the one would be better.

Mr. STARNES. They are complementary to each other?

General HERR. Yes; and the most important use of cavalry is in large groups. You may recall at the beginning of our Civil War, General Scott fought bitterly the forming of cavalry regiments and Sherman referred to them as the arm of romance. It was only in the latter years of the war after the Union forces had learned to raise and concentrate cavalry in great groups and turn it over to leaders like Sheridan for independent movements that it was able to achieve decisive results contributing so vitally to ending the war.

Mr. COLLINS. Of course in the Civil War they did not have any automobiles.

General HERR. I am not referring particularly to horse cavalry; I am referring to any cavalry.

Mr. STARNES. You are using the word "cavalry" in the sense of your present organization?

General HERR. Yes. They have a very great mobility and fire power, and I can conceive, for instance, of a cavalry corps made up of two or three horse cavalry divisions and a mechanized cavalry division as being a tremendous instrument; it would be highly mobile. The mechanized cavalry has great strategic mobility and has great volume of fire. If the two are used together, and I have studied this to a considerable extent, I think it would be a very powerful weapon in any war of movement.

### CAVALRY VALUE IN RECONNAISSANCE WORK

Mr. STARNES. Of course, in times past they relied upon the cavalry for reconnaissance purposes more than any other branch and it was very valuable for that purpose because of its mobility and its ability to operate over a much wider range than other troops.

General HERR. Yes.

Mr. STARNES. To what extent has its use been supplanted for reconnaissance purposes?

General HERR. Of course, aviation takes over long-distance reconnaissance work; and also the mechanized units can carry on a considerably longer distant reconnaissance, but for close reconnaissance, such as you have in a timbered country, no vehicle can actually do it. Of course,

the mechanized vehicles could do the work along roads, but no vehicle is adequate for complete ground reconnaissance off the roads.

Mr. STARNES. You do not envision at present the mechanizing of the cavalry to an extent that it can be finally mechanized to take the place of the horse for all reconnaissance cross-country work.

General HERR. The answer is distinctly no. No vehicle can go over the difficult country that a horse can. Then, when you take a vehicle and there is a lot of firing to be done, going over bumpy, rough terrain, it is hard to hit anything. It does not have the actual mobility of the horse where there are no roads, and you will not have roads on a battlefield in the next war, in my opinion.

### EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY DURING TIME OF WAR

Mr. ENGEL. Did I understand you correctly to say, General, that the best results were obtained by use of masses of cavalry during time of war?

General HERR. If by cavalry corps you mean——

Mr. ENGEL. The horse cavalry.

General HERR. Horse and mechanized.

Mr. ENGEL. You do not mean to state that you are going to lead a Charge of the Light Brigade in the face of the modern machine gun?

General HERR. Oh, no; not at all; far from it. The popular conception seems to be that cavalry might do something of that kind, charge against a machine gun. But nothing is further from the truth. The operation would be through dismounted cavalrymen. And they would not be combined into any big, solid mass; but I mean to say that a large organization that would spread out for the purpose of reaching a common objective and for delivering firing power, because it is more mobile, would be able to reach such objective, and that is how it would be used. But under no circumstances would the cavalry all be jammed close in mass formation. We never would do that.

Mr. ENGEL. How far do you think that Sheridan or Jeb Stuart would have gotten if you had had half a dozen, 10, or 15 men with machine guns spotted in the woods on both sides firing into them?

General HERR. I do not think there would have been any great probability of their doing that; they would not under any circumstances have charged right into a machine-gun nest.

Mr. ENGEL. They would not have undertaken any such movement.

General HERR. I do not believe they would have undertaken to move with machine guns being fired on their right and left.

Nevertheless, in spite of the popular idea to the contrary, there are times when it is practicable to attack individual machine guns mounted. For instance, consider this bitter right here in front of us as a flat plain. I will put one machine gun right down here on this edge; back here some six to eight hundred yards distant I can place four horsemen behind a ridge at intervals of about 100 yards and start them simultaneously at a run toward this machine gun and across this plain which has no cover and they will capture the gun. A machine gun must have some time to target. It may do this by striking dust or by use of tracer bullets. Men crawling along the ground would be picked up without any difficulty where there is no cover, but I doubt that this machine gun would strike a single one of these fast-moving horses under the conditions described.

That is just giving you one little simple instance; but the cavalry is not going to charge machine guns.

Mr. ENGEL. But my question is: Suppose you had had machine guns scattered along in the woods, back in the Civil War with the cavalry and army moving like it did at Fredericksburg and around through Winchester, say, with a half dozen machine guns, what chance would they have had against those hidden machine guns?

General HERR. They would not be surprised. There are security detachments. No horse cavalry is going to run up against a machine-gun nest; we have advance guards with scouts to discover these machine guns.

Mr. ENGEL. And tanks, with the infantry following up.

General HERR. Of course; you might say also that when a tank comes along the road it would be waylaid by hidden antitank guns.

### OPERATIONS OF CAVALRY DURING WORLD WAR

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask you this question: So far as the horse cavalry exists today, would you point out to us what it did in the last war?

General HERR. Well, that is a pretty big question. I would like to discuss that a little if I may. When the World War broke out, the European cavalry was in no wise——

Mr. ENGEL (interposing). I am talking now of the mounted cavalry.

General HERR. I understand; I am, too. But you have to be mounted in order to get places before you can dismount, you need the horse to get to the place where you can apply the fire to the best advantage; and, furthermore, in actual fighting many times, with the use of horses, and the cavalry, you can get your men there immediately and delay the approach of the opposing side until the infantry can come up.

But when the World War broke out no European cavalry was equipped as the American cavalry is equipped. The American cavalry, first of all, was better than the European cavalry. They were still attacking mounted, carrying a gun that was nowhere near as effective; it was supposed to be effective at least 300 yards but with the best shots they could not hit anything at more than 200 yards.

Both their training and equipment were different from our own. Many of them were still equipped with the lance, and they were taught to attack normally mounted. They had practically no dismounted training except as to the British who had taken to heart somewhat the lessons of our Civil War and of their Boer War.

Let us consider first what took place on the western

front (and, in my opinion, we are not going to have another western front insofar as we are concerned but rather a war of movement. Certainly if we are to fight on this continent or on this hemisphere it would mean a war of movement). Even on this front whenever there was movement, there was need for cavalry in large groups. When there is no movement, we have a war of futility. At the very beginning of the war, during the retreat from Mons to the Marne, the British Cavalry Corps by protecting the left and rear of the British Second Corps saved it from destruction and thereby prevented the entire allied forces from being thrust off their line of retreat and meeting disaster; and in the subsequent "Race to the Sea" two French Cavalry Corps, augumented by the British Cavalry Corps, for several weeks established a mobile curtain from the Aisne to the Lys, thereby holding back German forces and permitting infantry divisions and corps to arrive and take over the front, thus blocking the capture of the channel ports and the turning of the allied left. Again, in 1918, when the Germans were rupturing the allied lines in different places, the cavalry was brought up rapidly and, in fighting here, there, and everywhere, sometimes mounted and sometimes dismounted, were able to contain the enemy until reinforcements definitely checked them. If the Germans had had any cavalry to exploit their breakthroughs, they would probably have won the war.

### Justification for Horse Cavalry

Mr. Engel. I would like to have an answer to this question and you need not answer it at this moment but may insert the statement in the record if you desire: What justification is there, in the face of modern warfare, for the existence of a cavalry unit in the Army; what is the mission of the cavalry unit in the Army, in the face of modern machine gun at this time. Those are questions that are going to have to be answered and I would like to be in position to answer them by referring anyone to your answer in this record.

Mr. Snyder. The horse cavalry.

General Herr. I welcome your question.

Mr. Engel. Yes.

Mr. Collins. Suppose you let him put the answer in the record.

Mr. Herr. I had just as soon do it now if you wish.

Mr. Snyder. In order to save time will you just insert your statement in the record?

General Herr. I will be glad to do that.

(The statement referred to is as follows:)

Justification for horse cavalry must rest on two pillars of support.

The first pillar of support is that of historical facts concerning the use of horse cavalry in the World War, where we have very solid support because the recorded facts show that horse cavalry was used in all the historic rôles of cavalry to be described hereafter, that its use was vital and necessary, and that, even on the western front with its seige warfare, whenever movement was restored there was urgent need for cavalry.

The second pillar of support is to show clearly that the airplane and motor cannot displace the cavalry by executing more effectively its historic missions. In this connection it must be remembered this is somewhat like considering a man guilty until he proves himself innocent when, as a matter of fact, there has been nothing except theory, conjecture, and peacetime maneuvers to uphold the thought that the horse cavalry which has stood the acid test of war may be displaced by elements which have not yet demonstrated their ability in the same acid test of war. It is also interesting to note that considering all these factors, that is, the use of horse cavalry in the Great War and since, and the devlopment of air and motor, that all the principal nations of Europe are retaining more or less horse cavalry; that the average percentage of horse cavalry with reference to the total active forces in the principal European nations is greater than that in the United States.

It is also interesting to note that those nations which are retaining a greater amount of horse cavalry appear to be those which have greater resources in horses and forage and also wider reaches of country somewhat similar to our own which would seem to indicate a war of movement. Both Poland and Russia are maintaining great masses of horse cavalry and even France on the western front is maintaining a larger percentage of horse cavalry than we are. The United States is in a peculiarly fortunate position as regards its resources in both horses and motors. We have over 12,000,000 horses and more than 4,500,000 mules in this country and our motor industry is the best in the world. We have therefore an unequaled opportunity to develop the best cavalry in the world, both mechanized and horse.

It must be borne in mind that in any consideration or discussion of these cavalry missions that modern horse cavalry is completely armed with the latest weapons of every kind.

In order that we may understand clearly the missions which horse cavalry can perform in warfare under modern conditions, I should like to review briefly the war organization of our modern American horse cavalry.

The horse regiment at war strength has nine rifle troops (grouped into three squadrons of three troops each), a machine-gun troop, a special-weapons troop, and a headquarters and service troop.

Each rifle troop has 132 officers and men, all mounted on horses and armed with automatic pistols. Of these men, 97 are mounted with the model 1903 rifle, which is to be replaced by the semiautomatic rifle as soon as it is available. The troop also has 6 light, air-cooled machine guns carried on pack horses. The saber is no longer used.

The machine-gun troop has 12 heavy, water-cooled machine guns and the special weapons troop has 8 caliber .50 antitank machine guns and four 60 mm. mortars for antimachine-gun fire, all carried on pack horses.

The headquarters and service troop includes the necessary staff for administration, intelligence, operations, and supply of the regiment. It has personnel for radio com-

munications as well as messenger service, both horse and motorcycle, scout cars with ¼-inch armor for reconnaissance and command, and cargo trucks for supply. Each scout car is armed with one caliber .50 machine gun, two light machine guns, and one submachine gun. Cargo trucks carry weapons for their defense.

The war strength regiment has 1,687 officers and men; 1,812 horses, both riding and pack; 11 scout cars; 12 motorcycles; 33 trucks; 86 light machine guns; 12 heavy machine guns; 23 caliber .50 machine guns; 11 submachine guns; 4 mortars; 1,687 pistols; 1,013 of the new semiautomatic rifles; and 17 radio sets.

Of course, we do not maintain this strength in time of peace. The above figures should be about halved to show our peace organization. Since we expect to use our cavalry early in the event of war, this discrepancy of one to two is too great and I have recommended that the peace organization should more nearly approach the war strength.

Thus, you can see that our modern horse regiment has been equipped with all the modern means for combat. It has a small arms fire power comparable to that of infantry in equal numbers and this fire power is extremely flexible and maneuverable on the battlefield. Should the regiment be separated for any reason from its motor vehicles, it can still operate efficiently by using horsemen for command, communications, and reconnaissance. It can then be supplied by attached pack trains or airplanes and, in emergencies, can live off the country.

Our 12 Regular Army horse regiments are grouped together by fours to form three horse divisions. Each division, in addition to its four horse cavalry regiments, has a regiment of horse artillery (75 mm. howitzers), a division headquarters and headquarters troop, two brigade headquarters and headquarters troops, all of which are largely motorized, a scout-car squadron of 39 scout cars for division reconnaissance, a light tank company, and the usual auxiliaries, including a signal troop, an engineer squadron, a medical squadron, a quartermaster squadron, and an ordnance toop, all motorized.

The horse division is, in reality, an independent unit of all arms, except air corps and infantry, in which all modern means are utilized to the fullest possible extent.

The characteristics and limitations of horse and mechanized cavalry must also be considered.

*Mechanized cavalry.*—Mechanized cavalry has great strategical mobility over roads and can ordinarily march about 150 miles a day. It has considerable volume of fire, but it is difficult to hit anything while moving over rough terrain. It will move largely on the roads and will be very vulnerable to air attack. It will be difficult to control in large groups in any combat because, when the shutters are put up, the drivers must look through slots. Its armor will deflect or stop ordinary rifle or machine-gun fire. It must be remembered, however, that there is no combat car or tank built or to be built for which there has not been or cannot be manufactured a multitude of antitank weapons at less cost than that of the vehicles and which will shoot holes through them in the same manner that the rifle or machine gun may shoot through a man or a horse. This force has not within itself the adequate elements of complete ground reconnaissance because it is composed entirely of vehicles which will move largely on the roads and which are unable, even though moving across country, to negotiate the many difficult types of terrain such as woods, bogs, streams, stone walls, and ditches which are easy for the horse. Also, the moment one of these vehicles stops, it is highly vulnerable not only to antitank gun fire but also to artillery fire. Their defensive capabilities are admitted to be one of the weakest points. The initial cost and maintenance of mechanized cavalry regiments is three times as great as that of horse cavalry.

*Horse cavalry.*—The horse cavalry has not the strategical mobility of mechanized cavalry but can be moved by rail or motor over long distances. It is capable, however, of making forced marches of 100 miles in 24 hours or 150 miles in 48 hours. In battlefield areas where there will be few roads, it is the most mobile of all ground troops because the horse can transport its fire power to desired points. The horse cavalry is capable of protecting itself at all times; and has greater fluidity and flexibility than has mechanized cavalry because each man is a self-contained fighting unit. It is less vulnerable from air attack because it has greater power of cross-country mobility and dispersion. It can at times cut loose entirely from its motor elements and be supplied by pack trains or by air, or live entirely off the country.

In general it may be said that the characteristics and limitations of horse and mechanized cavalry are such to render them complementary to one another, that is, when used in large groups such as corps, the main objectives or missions can as a rule be better attained by using both horse and mechanized cavalry than by using either alone.

Getting down to brass tacks, let us consider very definitely whether or not the airplane or the motor can displace or assist horse cavalry in each of its main historic missions. If it can assist it or displace it in any or all of such missions, let us set forth to what extent in each case. Also, if it is not able to completely displace the horse cavalry in each mission, let us set forth clearly why this is the case.

The traditional missions of cavalry may be grouped into those of reconnaissance, pursuit, covering, and combat. What effect will the adoption of airplanes and motor vehicles to modern warfare have on these cavalry missions?

The enormous expansion of the Air corps of all nations and the importance of this arm are well known to all. Nevertheless, certain limitations of airplanes for military purposes must be understood. In the first place, while great advance has been made in flying under adverse conditions, such as darkness and in bad weather, the very term "blind flying" shows that the aerial observer cannot see the ground when flying under such conditions. An even greater limitation to aircraft, however, is the fact that they cannot hold ground. They will undoubtedly cause

casualties among ground troops which they have located, but that portion of the ground forces which is not killed or wounded will push on and, if not stopped by opposing troops on the ground, will accomplish their missions in spite of the efforts of aircraft to prevent it.

There seems also to be some misapprehension as to the current status of motorization, at least in our Army. Some people have the idea that in future war the whole mass of the army can be permanently motorized. In our newest infantry regimental organization, on the other hand, all of the rifle companies, that is about 80 per cent of the regimental strength, still march normally on foot. This is the regiment which forms the basis of the so-called streamlined infantry division. The foot troops of a few such divisions can be placed in motortrucks when necessary and moved with the motorized elements of their divisions at the speed of motors to a threatened point. This speed is about 150 miles per day, the same as that of mechanized cavalry. Such a command would need the protection of mechanized cavalry temporarily detached from their cavalry corps for that purpose.

Again, by a system of shuttling all available motortrucks back and forth, all of the foot troops of the whole army can be given lifts in relays one after the other. By this method, the rate of advance of the army as a whole can be stepped up to about the average daily rate of march of horse cavalry, which is about 35 miles per day. Thus horse cavalry, brought into the theater of operations by water, rail, or motor just like other troops, and placed in front or on the selected flank of the army, has the mobility necessary to maintain its relative place in the whole formation and there perform its missions.

Any idea that a large army can be moved all together at the average speed of motors is an empty dream. Even were many roads and the necessary number of trucks available, the length of the truck columns on the roads and the resultant congestion would be so great that the object of increasing the speed of advance of the army would be defeated by the very means adopted to attain it. Anyone who has ever driven to a large football game, or similar event, where the roads are usually good, can recall the slow speed of the vehicles as they draw together at the appointed place and as they leave after the event until the vehicles break up into small groups and move off in different directions. But an army cannot separate into small groups. It must be kept together.

Another thought on motorization should be kept in mind during the consideration of cavalry missions. It is this: Unlike some nations we never know beforehand where we are going to fight. It may be in some theater of operations where roads and other modern means of communications are practically non-existent. In such a theater motors will prove of very little value, except for purposes of supply behind the combat zone, where roads can be built as the army advances. In this type of warfare we must rely on the old established combat branches, Infantry, Cavalry, and horse artillery, supported by long-range aviation, based, if need be, in the zone of the interior.

Let us consider the mission of reconnaissance. As you know, reconnaissance means finding the enemy, determining his strength, composition, and disposition, and also reporting on the nature of the terrain over which the fighting will occur. Before the era of airplanes and motors, cavalry was the only reconnaissance agency available to the army. Lee called Jeb Stuart's cavalry the eyes of the army.

Nowadays the Air Corps, in spite of certain limitations, is the best branch for distant reconnaissance. Darkness and bad weather will hardly last long enough to prevent the Air Corps from discovering the main concentrations of the enemy. When the opposing forces draw closer together, however, these intermittent periods of blindness become more important because short moves by the enemy may have decisive effects on the outcome of the battle. Infantry in trucks is not suited to reconnaissance because it is too vulnerable and the mission involves fighting which cannot be done from unarmored vehicles.

Mechanized cavalry and the mechanized elements of horse cavalry are well suited to ground reconnaissance on and near the roads. Off the roads, and particularly in dense woods, which are closed to view from the air and inaccessible to vehicles, horse cavalry must be used. It is also needed to get exact detailed information of the location, flanks, and rear of an enemy disposing himself for battle, as well as of the exact configuration of the ground. In this service horse cavalry has become more the fingers than the eyes of the army, feeling out what the Air Corps and men in mechanized vehicles have seen. Those, and there are some who wish to reduce cavalry to a purely reconnaissance arm, are entirely wrong, unless reconnaissance is the only mission which cavalry can perform. Actually, while still important to cavalry, reconnaissance is no longer its primary mission.

*Pursuit.*—As with reconnaissance, cavalry was also once the only arm capable of conducting efficient pursuit of a defeated enemy. Now attack and bombardment aviation can assist. Infantry in trucks can take more chances in pursuing a defeated enemy than it can in opposing a fresh and undefeated one. Mechanized cavalry can pursue on and near the roads and is valuable in pursuing an enemy retreating in trucks. However, an alert enemy, even though defeated, will take every opportunity to destroy the roads, bridges, and other avenues of pursuit, even laying waste to the entire country in his rear. Here horse cavalry, which is independent of such means and can cross almost all obstacles, is still supreme. The combination of air attack to increase the enemy's casualties, mechanized cavalry, if roads are available, to further harass and disorganize him; and horse cavalry and other arms, as they arrive, to destroy him will be a powerful team to insure the victory of destruction.

*Covering missions.* — Covering missions include a variety of important duties, such as security for the main army during concentration, at a halt and on the march, preventing ground reconnaissance by the enemy, seizing and holding important terrain pending the arrival of other

troops, covering withdrawals of our troops, fighting delaying actions against the enemy, and providing liaison between large units of our Army.

While only the front of the army need be covered initially, as soon as movement starts, its flanks and rear, in these days of rapidly moving motorized and mechanized threats, become extremely dangerous and therefore almost as important as the front.

The Air Corps can assist the ground troops in covering missions by causing enemy casualties and by indicating the direction from which his advance will be made. But it cannot actually execute covering missions satisfactorily because it cannot hold ground. The necessity for covering far from ceasing in darkness and bad weather, becomes more important, since the enemy will take advantage of inactivity in the air to make his advance.

Infantry in trucks is not entirely satisfactory for covering missions, due to its dependence on roads, its vulnerability, its inability to fight from its vehicles and the difficulty it will have in extricating itself quickly from combat.

Cavalry, as it always has been, is the ideal arm for executing these missions.

Mechanized cavalry, which can fight from its vehicles, will be of great value on and near the roads. It can execute covering missions for entirely motorized elements of the main force. But, horse cavalry is the ideal arm to execute covering missions for the army as a whole under all conditions of climate, weather and terrain. It can do so in time — constantly, and in space — anywhere, on the ground.

*Participation in battle.*—While cavalry must fight in carrying out its missions of reconnaissance, pursuit and covering, discussed above, it must also fight in coöperation with the other ground arms to further the accomplishment of the main mission, which is always the defeat of the enemy in battle. This form of cavalry combat will be more important in the future than at any time in the recent past.

It is readily admitted that cavalry has little or no value in trench warfare. But wherever there is movement the use of cavalry in large groups is vital. The whole idea of modern military doctrine, organization, and training is to restore movement to the battlefield. If this attempt is successful, it will largely eliminate those obstacles, particularly trenches and wire, which render cavalry, as such, useless in stabilized situations. With movement, comes a looser articulation between units, both large and small. Gaps between units appear. The flank and rear of enemy units become accessible. Opportunities for cavalry combat will be many.

Mechanized cavalry is well suited for attack on the enemy's sensitive points at some distance from the front. Horse cavalry is ideal for relatively close-in attacks on similar enemy objectives, especially in the area where motor vehicles are too vulnerable to enemy fire. Here the battlefield mobility of horse cavalry, which means its ability to cross streams, rough terrain, dense woods, and all types of close country faster than other troops, and the great flexibility of its fire power, may well be decisive.

Some people picture cavalry fighting only in the old boot-to-boot charge on horseback. Nothing could be further from the truth. Nowadays, whether cavalry attacks mounted or dismounted, it does so in open formations; several waves of men at distances of several hundred yards, with individuals in each wave at intervals of 5 yards or more apart. This formation reduces the effect of enemy fire and our attack is supported by all the modern means of combat, that is, attack and bombardment aviation, artillery (including antiaircraft and anti-mechanization units), smoke tanks or combat cars, machine guns, mortars, and antitank weapons.

In case anyone may think that the above discussion is purely theoretical, I should like to remind the committee that in Spain General Franco started out 2½ years ago with no horse cavalry at all. He now has, according to latest reports, over 50 horse squadrons. A successful commander does not add useless units to his army in the midst of war.

It is my fixed opinion that, although in some cavalry missions it may be better to use horse cavalry alone or mechanized cavalry alone, on the whole the best results can be accomplished by using them together.

Gentlemen, I have an abiding faith in the future of cavalry and am convinced that it will give a good account of itself in any war in which this Nation is involved provided it is given the proper strength, is properly organized and trained in peace and in time of war is assigned proper mission by the army commander.

Mr. SNYDER. Thank you very much, General Herr. You have made a very excellent presentation of your estimate.

General HERR. Thank you.*

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# A CAVALRY EPISODE

## *Third Army Maneuvers*

By MAJOR FENTON S. JACOBS, Cavalry

The spectacular operations of the Blue Cavalry, during the Third Army Reserve Maneuvers, last summer in the Pole Mountain Wyoming area (7 miles east of Laramie), has caused considerable pro and con discussion. The affair was comparatively small—a reinforced brigade (Red), opposed by a reinforced regiment (Blue). The 4th Cavalry marched from Fort Meade, South Dakota, and arrived just in time to participate in the maneuver. The regiment, less the 1st squadron with a platoon of machine guns and a section of scout cars, was attached to the Red Force; the 1st squadron reinforced, commanded by Major Arthur T. Lacey (now Lt. Col.) similarly was attached to the Blues.

The terrain in the Pole Mountain area is extremely rugged. Massive rock formations rise up abrupdy like great monuments—as a trooper remarked: "Gosh, this country stands on end." The Van Horne Ridge, elevation 8,230 feet, extends from point B (on the sketch) to the northeast, while the Sherman Mountains, including Pole Mountain: about 10,000 feet elevation, extends from Cheyenne Pass, point D, to the southeast. The badly cut up valley between these formations averages about 8,000 feet above sea level, with numerous patches of woods and boulder masses.

Having been asked for my comments, as Blue Cavalry Umpire, I will confine my remarks to the operations only of the Blue Cavalry on the last day of the maneuvers, August 11, 1938; and I also shall make a few observations on maneuvers in general.

The situation at Pole Mountain, briefly, was as follows: The Red Force marching from Laramie, Wyoming, on August 8th had driven the Blue Force, defending Cheyenne, to the southeast corner of the Fort Frances E. Warren, Wyoming, Target and Maneuver Reservation (Pole Mountain reservation). On the night of the 10th, the remainder of the Blue Division, theoretically approaching from the northeast was injected into the problem, thus forcing a night withdrawal by the Red force. Contact was lost. At daylight August 11th, the Blue Cavalry, preceding the Blue force along Happy Jack Road, regained contact and developed the situation which disclosed that the Reds had taken up a strong defensive position extending from Pole Mountain northward, about four miles, to Eagle Rock. Blue scout cars and patrols were operating on the north flank.

When the Blue Infantry arrived at point A, the Blue Cavalry in vicinity of Happy Jack Road (south flank) was relieved and rapidly withdrew to the southeast, about two miles, to point B, where orders were received at 10:00 AM to encircle the Red south flank and disrupt Red communications. Red cavalry was protecting the Red north flank.

The Blue squadron, less detachments, followed a stream line to the southwest, under cover, and reached point C at 11:00 AM, where it watered and dropped cantle-rolls. Then the steep climb over the Sherman Mountain Range was begun. The horses, being in splendid condition stood the effort and altitude remarkably well. The progress of the advance guard indicated a route and the squadron arrived at Cheyenne Pass, point D, at 12:30 PM; *unobserved* by Red observation planes (as their reports later indicated), which constantly were in view of the area.

After a half-hour's halt at Cheyenne Pass, assuming that the Red lines of communication were being cut, the squadron moved eastward down Happy Jack Road, directly in rear of the Red front lines. At point E, the Blue squadron encountered an outpost of a platoon of Red infantry and a section of machine guns, which, after a brief skirmish was defeated. The squadron then continued at a gallop and captured an Engineer detachment while it was at mess. It then, unopposed, barged straight into the Red Force Command Post point F where the Red commander, completely surprised, was made captive—in the presence of the Eighth Corps Area Commander. Still unopposed, the squadron charged a nearby battery of field artillery and later drew the Red reserve to the west denying its use to the Reds for several hours. The Blue squadron finally withdrew to a high point G, where it remained in observation of the Red rear until 4:00 PM, at which time the maneuver was terminated.

Some claim that this squadron, in real warfare, would not have survived this operation. In my opinion, it would have lost about one platoon in its various skirmishes. Be that as it may, the fact remains that what this squadron accomplished in negotiating this difficult terrain, a regiment or regiments of horse cavalry could as well have done. This potential threat to the Red line of communication obviously made the whole Red Force jittery and rear-conscious. At critique, the Red commander pertinently and honestly admitted that for him, throughout the entire maneuver, the Blue cavalry was (in his own words) "a pain in the neck."

In this instance, one is reminded of the harassed Russian Commander Samsonov in 1914. The German 1st Cavalry




*Pole Mt. Reservation.*

Division had caused him to move his CP so often that finally he lost control of his command, walked into the bushes and committed suicide.

And again, we might remember the words of Marshal von Hindenburg in his memoirs relative to the battle of Amiens, France, August 8, 1918: "It was reported that masses of British cavalry (only a few squadrons) were found already far in rear of our front line of infantry. On the front everyone became anxious. Positions were abandoned before which strong enemy attacks had just been repulsed. Liaisons, that had been lost were sought with the rear. In this situation, the imagination builds phantoms and one sees in them very real dangers."

Incidentally, it was the Battle of Amiens which produced from the Kaiser an order to Secretary of State von Hintze to open peace negotiations. It was this battle which caused von Ludendorff to tender his resignation to von Hindenburg, and to write later in his memoirs that "8th of August was the black day of the German Army in the history of this war."

From a cavalryman's viewpoint, the outstanding lesson taught at Pole Mountain was that no commander can safely anchor his unguarded flank to whatever in his mind is an impassable mountain; not while horse cavalry is present and is at liberty to maneuver. If a mechanized squadron could have executed this operation the noise of the motors would, unquestionably, have disclosed its presence, thus preventing the surprise that was effected by the Blue horse squadron.

As for maneuvers in general, I believe that to produce reality, assumptions should be held to the minimum. To assume that a machine gun is either .30 or .50 caliber is not only confusing but may lead to incorrect training in the employment of weapons. In war, we know that a unit rarely is up to Tables of Organization strength, either in men or weapons, so why not play the maneuver "as is?" For garrison training, the combining of peace strength units can give the desired war strength perspective. Moreover, in future maneuvers, it would seem sound to give more emphasis to night marches and to camouflage. There is another point which I wish to mention, with my fingers crossed as it were, often in an effort to "save the horses" in peace time maneuvers there is the danger of giving the impression to other arms that cavalry is fragile, timid, or is nonaggressive. Too often maneuver reports contain the criticism of "lack of reconnaissance," "lack of aggressiveness." Maneuvers afford cavalry an excellent opportunity to stimulate *esprit de corps,* and to provide visible evidence for those who have been influenced by peace-time motor propaganda that cavalry, particularly horse cavalry, still is an essential fighting element of the Army Combat Team. When horse cavalry reputation is at stake there should be no holding back. A cavalry which enters a field maneuver of the combined arms, with old or poorly conditioned horses, or with a commander who is unwilling or afraid to extend his command in the execution of cavalry missions, will surely do cavalry more harm than enemy bullets. But, such could never be said of the Blue cavalry at Pole Mountain, which I personally observed, and wish to commend for its exemplification of cavalry historical traditions.

* * *

## Report of Lieutenant Colonel O'Connor, Cavalry—Umpire Staff

The Blue Squadron, moving by perfect cover and concealment through the woods, climbed over the top of Pole Mountain, descending through heavy woods in rear of the Red position. At the end of this descent, it encountered, largely by accident, the Red Command Post; immediately attacked, and would have captured or killed the personnel thereat, including the commander and his staff. It then moved further to the rear, utilizing perfect concealment through the woods and very rugged country, with the purpose of blocking the pass which the Red position was defending and cutting off the Red line of communications. In this movement the Blue Cavalry discovered the batteries of the Red artillery in position in open places in very rolling terrain, their guns trained to the front. Cavalry machine guns were placed covering the batteries, who did not suspect the presence of the Blue cavalry until fire was opened upon them and who had no protection other than their field pieces. Ranges were within 200 yards, and the obvious outcome would have been inevitable. The squadron then continued on its purpose of blocking the pass and cutting off Red communication to the rear.

It does not take much imagination to visualize the effect on the Red defense this action in their rear would cause: with the command post silent and calls on the artillery for support futile, the Blue attack would have had easy going.

What about all-around defense? Practically it was here at best only an idea. Where was the Red cavalry? It had been assigned a mission well out on the other flank where an attack was feared, with only scout cars patrolling the Red right on roads—the impassably rugged Pole Mountain was considered adequate safeguard on that flank.

Now there were several reasons (or so it was alleged) why this action of the Blue squadron was unreal: there would have been all-around defense; there would be better aerial observation to discover the movement; the cavalry leader would not have taken this hazardous movement had bullets been flying; the artillery would have had local small arms protection. But the fact remains that the cavalry encountered no fire of any consequence in executing this action; and its extrication at any time could have been effected were it necessary. No action of any other troops could have so excellently assisted the Blue attacking infantry. When it is recalled that cavalry carries as much fire power, man for man, as the infantry, it may be realized that this force of some 160 cavalrymen, with some 12 machine guns, in the rear of the enemy position was more than a serious menace, it was decisive. This sort of thing happens so frequently and such opportunities are so frequently presented in maneuvers—of trained troops—that the question is not malapropos: What is to prevent their occurrence in war?

Mechanized cavalry, horse cavalry, and infantry tanks were all brought into play in rôles deemed sound and suitable. They are all deemed essential to a modern army. Combat cars and tanks do not replace horse cavalry rather introduce new efficient approaches for the solution of similar problems; the limitations of one, and each has limitations, are compensated for by the other.

During the concentration of the Army on the battlefield, the mechanized cavalry and horse cavalry operated together to cover and screen the advance of the army—the horse cavalry on terrain difficult and impossible for mechanized cavalry, which was quickly moved over suitable terrain to support the horse units or to meet the enemy's mechanized cavalry. As the battle progressed, the mechanized cavalry entered the main fight, first on the west and then on the east flank by making a rapid night swing around the rear of the army. Bear in mind the NOLIN RIVER on our west flank, terrain difficult for mechanized cavalry, but practicable for horse cavalry. In the same way the infantry tanks engaged in the battle with the infantry until the NOLIN RIVER blocked them when they were thrown east around this obstacle and joined mechanized cavalry in the last stages of the fight. These employments picture the value of these different units. They are all essential and each has its part to play.

—MAJOR GENERAL HUGH A. DRUM, U.S.A.
Comments on Second Army CPX.

# Sidelights on Organization

## By CAPTAIN W. W. YALE, Cavalry

Merely because we can now separate cavalrymen by drawing a distinction between the reek of the stable and that of the garage it is the fashion to consider the two odors in the light of a division of force. A bit of reflection, however, will serve to recall that it has never been possible to consider cavalrymen as all-purpose propositions. In the old days it was suicidal to ask a dragoon if he belonged to the umpteenth hussars, and even in 1915, when the last Frenchman had thrown away his cuirass and the molds of Cavalrymen reached a new peak of uniformity, there was still the sharp line of demarcation between the "Independent Cavalry" and the cavalry which was used in close support of Infantry Divisions and Corps.

This typing of cavalry in accordance with whether it is intended to support infantry directly in small units or to support the infantry indirectly by operating strategically in large masses is still with us, complicated by the appearance of mechanization. Since Tables of Organization already recognize the need for more than one kind of cavalry, it seems rather odd that a tendency exists for officers to suggest a new cavalry regimental or divisional organization without giving some explanation of the purpose for which their brain child is designed.

The organization question is one of the most important confronting us today. Upon the correct answer perhaps depends the decision of future campaigns. There is a great deal of sound thought being devoted to it, yet there has been little organization of ideas on organization among the various field organizations, so to speak, where such ideas are likely to have the most merit.

For example, not long ago a questionnaire was sent to various cavalry regiments to get a consolidation of thought on the set-up of a new division. Also, tests were conducted in the 1st Cavalry Division recently with different tentative organizations, actually on the ground, towards the same end. Both moves resulted in an unbelievable mixture of opinions, practically one per individual. If any classification were possible it might have resulted from the fact that officers serving with small units in small posts tended to decentralize, that is, to equip troops and squadrons with special tools and weapons, whereas their confreres in large posts tended to eliminate the specialties from the lower echelons and to consolidate them in the higher.

This diversity might have been lessened by assigning a mission for would be organizers. What are we organizing for? What is this new division to do and how is it going to assist the infantry?

We must never forget that cavalry is a supporting arm of infantry. We must keep on recognizing that assistance may be given either by having small units of cavalry spread through the army as organic parts of Infantry Divisions and Corps, or by massing large bodies of cavalry which are intended to perform mobile strategic missions which benefit the infantry indirectly. Or better, by doing both. Then when we speak of cavalry squadrons we can realize the obvious, namely, that a squadron forming part of a Cavalry Division will have a lot of gadgets and services available to it from nearby troops that the squadron forming part of an Infantry Division will need but not have available—unless we organize it with the gadgets as permanent fixtures.

Let us consider the broader aspects of the organization question in the light of "Direct Support" Cavalry and "General Support" Cavalry by shelving the differences between the horse and the machine for the moment and thinking of them in the same terms. For horse cavalry and mechanized cavalry are alike in their need for flexibility, in their need for fire support, in their need for superior leadership and control, and, finally, in their need for one another. Flexibility, because it applies to all these things, perhaps being the most important.

### II

Here we might borrow an idea from Ernest Hemingway and appoint a Poor Old Lady to assist us by asking what we mean by this and that. "For instance," says the P.O.L., "what is this business of flexibility? Is it anything like the cliché about 'fire superiority' that everyone talks about but can't define?"

Well, you say to the P.O.L., yes and again no. Let us take first the flexibility of rifle troops. What is flexible to Smith is not at all flexible to Jones. It is a matter of degree, yet the thing itself is not so hard to define because the flexibility of a unit come right down to a question of close order drill. Your troop may be marching along a road and by doing a column of platoons, first platoon twos right gallop!, may execute a very nice pistol attack to the east. Or by making some passes in the air you can get your squadron into column of troops, with raised pistol facing south, north or north by west. This makes your outfit flexible—maybe. On the other hand, to do this, I may have to say fall out and fall in again over there, which may make my crowd not at all flexible.

However, if you have to sit down and write a field order with two annexes to get your outfit into attack formation, then perhaps I can beat you to it after all and outdo you in flexibility. Thus you may be flexible, but not flexible enough.

When General Herr introduced Formations A, B, and C at Fort Bliss in 1936 his purpose was to add flexibility to the regiments. These formations were assumed during that most important of all phases of cavalry action, the development, a phase of action usually ignored by the mental

giants who consider trucked infantry a suitable replacement for cavalry.

The development, or the breaking from route column to semi-deployed formations upon which *ultimate* attack is based, is the phase of maneuver over which the leader exercises the greatest influence. Here he disposes his assault troops and his fire power in positions to facilitate the final jump-off. Here he balances his power to insure striking a decisive blow at the enemy's weak point. Here, by flexible handling of his troops, he guards against surprise and, at the same time favors surprise and quick action in his own attack by eliminating awkward methods of control.

The development is almost always mounted or mechanized and is the great test of the cavalry leader. It is the application of battlefield mobility which at once sets cavalry in a class by itself—in a field impossible to trucked infantry which, once entrucked, are an invitation to disaster from both horse and mechanized cavalry and once detrucked are infantry.

Following development comes battle, perhaps mounted, perhaps dismounted. But control over battle is a matter of small units in which the leader of the whole force must stand by until the situation unfolds and reserves must be committed. Leadership, then, is at peak importance just prior to battle and involves preliminary disposition of force. Since organization seeks mainly to simplify the problems of the leader we must look to the development phase as giving the surest clue to proper organization.

Formations A, B, and C are simply regimental drill formations such as line of squadrons in column of platoons, assumed when maneuvering near the enemy and which serve a double purpose. By semi-deployment they render a unit relatively invulnerable to air attacks or artillery fire. By permitting any suitable attack formation to be assumed quickly from any other they insure flexibility in the regiment and minimize the embarrassment caused by the enemy not being where he was reported to be, or not staying where he was, or by the enemy making a surprise attack himself. Of course you cannot take up formation A in a cornfield, yet it is almost certain that a regiment trained to the formation ABC idea will never be caught in a cornfield. But if it is, it can soon get out.

At this point our POL appears to be more than ever concerned about flexibility. She thinks that there is a time and place for everything and to worry about having to barge off in every direction at the wink of an eye is nonsense pure and simple. It just isn't done.

Well, we can answer the POL and everyone else by saying that if any book of military history is dropped on the floor, it will open to a place where someone is being surprised or is miscalculating something. It might be that merry-go-round of divisions at Lodz in 1914, or it might be Guadalajara in 1937. Things never have gone according to schedule and in these days of increased burdens upon the commanders there is no reason to expect improvement. Quite the contrary. So if the cavalryman is to take pride in his mobility he must, at the same time, recognize that his horse or his combat car will get him into trouble just that much more quickly if he doesn't watch out. The winner and new champion is usually the man who made mistakes but recovered from them by using flexible troops and methods to re-form and get going again.

Our POL brightens up at the word Guadalajara. It develops that she was there and that there was mud, sure enough, and some conflict of orders. But she thinks that if the Italians had been able to jump into Formation B and follow the leader that they might have been able to save a truck or two. We cannot help but agree and reflect that where there is no flexibility there is no organization; where there is poor organization there is poor control; and where there is poor control there is a great deal of trouble.

Now, getting back to our cavalry types, where do we apply flexibility to "direct-support cavalry" and where to "general-support cavalry"?

A squadron which is operating in close or direct support of infantry and as an organic part of the infantry force generally has missions greatly restricted from the wide field open to Cavalry masses. It serves its infantry by reconnaissance, by counter-reconnaissance and delay. Beyond these functions it rarely goes. If the squadron is to continue to function efficiently, it can best do so by avoiding combat wherever possible, except, perhaps, in the defensive measures and flank thrusts used in delaying action.

To fulfill its usual missions, then, close-support cavalry will operate mostly as a group of small units, following the tactics laid down for corresponding missions. It will rarely work as a compact unit but will usually decentralize its control. It will work habitually with mechanized reconnaissance agencies and with Air Corps. It will be habitually tied to troops having an inferior mobility even though it may operate at some distance from them in the initial stages of the operation.

In contrast, the squadron within the Cavalry Division is simply a cog in a machine containing many similar cogs. It may occasionally perform some individual task such as advance guard or reconnaissance detachment, but in the main its commander takes his place in a formation of higher units. The idea of our troops and our squadrons "acting alone" as was done during some phases of the Punitive Expedition has no place in the operations of Cavalry Brigades, Divisions and Corps. In these higher units will be found artillery, fast tanks and special arms and services which can be made available, by reason of their road and coss country mobility to assist the assault troops when necessary.

As far as the rifle units themselves are concerned, both the squadron-within-the-division and the squadron-supporting-infantry need to be flexible. But in the first case a higher degree of flexibility is required. Where, with Infantry, the control of cavalry units is decentralized and the line of action comparatively clear, within the Cavalry Division the squadron commander rarely knows what is

going on. He does not need to know. But he must be prepared to move on signal to a new locality, with little or no time to make troop dispositions other than those accomplished by signals of his own. It is highly important that the squadron be able to shift formation quickly and to keep within the space limits imposed by adjacent units, at least until assembly positions are reached which mark a new phase of action.

Of course, as regards flexibility, the organization of rifle units is not particularly important. Whether there are two, three or four squads to the platoon; two, three or four platoons to the troop; or two, three or four troops to the squadron makes little difference because any combination of these figures can be put into close order drill, taught approach formations and rapid changes of formation without particular difficulty.

Unfortunately, no information, either for attack or defense is worth a hoot without fire support. Nor is any weapon used for fire support purposes such as the machine gun or 75-mm. howitzer particularly useful when it is not firing. So we must enlarge our definition of flexibility to say that not only must cavalry troops be able to shift quickly to meet emergencies but that their leader must have supporting weapons so disposed that he can coördinate and control them to make their support effective.

How shall we provide these supporting services for the Cavalry Division and for the cavalry in direct support of infantry? How far down among the troops shall we distribute them to give maximum support and yet minimize the troubles of that poor devil, the troop leader, who might well be fresh from civil life?

Here is the crux of the organization problem. What do you think?

III

Our Poor Old Lady, during her sojourn in Spain, was distressed to discover that fire power on the defense was, if anything, stronger than when she was a girl on the Western Front. Worse yet, nothing seemed to have been learned about the use of fire power in support of the attack, and this, no doubt was (and is) why nobody appeared able to attack, or at least to attack successfully.

To the POL who doesn't know much about these things, artillery and machine guns are just about the same proposition. The POL isn't so far off, at that, in some respects. But like many another, who considers himself a machine gun expert because he once did a blindfold strip-act, the POL stops when she says that both can fire but it is easier to carry machine guns around than it is 75-mm. howitzers.

Because they are hard to carry around, no one advocates equipping rifle troops with 75's. Yet, because they are easily packed, many people advocate equipping rifle troops with machine guns. They say that the fire power is always needed and that it should therefore be always available to the troop. This statement is very plausible, indeed. But we are back again to our differentiation between cavalry in direct support of infantry and forming an organic part of the Infantry Division, and cavalry operating in mass.

Which kind are you thinking about? Will you reconnoiter and delay in a series of small groups or will you fight more or less like the infantry would if they could go that fast?

We hear much about the massing of fire of artillery on the vital spot of the defender or on the most likely route of approach of the attacker. To accomplish this obviously desirable matter requires central control over the artillery, either by orders given on the spot or by prearranged plan to effect the massing of fire at a certain time. To long range, high angle fire artillery pieces, this is no particular trick.

Since the attack by envelopment was practically invented by the cavalry we have, since the beginning of time, required that the bulk of our force, and therefore the bulk of our fire, strike the enemy at a vital spot. This means massing of fire, not only by artillery, but by everything else, especially machine guns, that we can employ.

But the machine gun fire is a tailor-made proposition. There are large areas in the brush country of south Texas where you cannot use machine guns at all; on the midwest plains, machine guns are at their deadliest. Wherever it may be the gun has to fit its cone of fire to the probable target and to the intervening ground. Especially in defense, all guns require careful coördinating. There may be only one or two sections needed here while two or more platoons may be needed there. In short, over a given strip of terrain, some spots will require more guns than others.

Rifle troops are not so restricted. Granted that we defend by garrisoning certain strong terrain features, there will still be large areas in which riflemen will have to be stationed and which are not suitable for machine guns. In other words, even in the most static situation, the passive defense, it is possible to have machine guns organized among such small rifle units that they will occupy ground unsuited to the guns. In this case guns would either be unused or detached to augment the defense in another locality.

If we turn to the opposite type of action—the development followed by a hasty attack—we have a condition which demands the maximum fire power available in the minimum of time. The problem is solved only when the largest force capable of executing a sudden mounted attack, say, the regiment, has its machine guns consolidated under regimental control. Consolidated guns get into action at once with the rifle squadrons maneuvering around them as a pivot. Without being consolidated they do not get into action at all and the attack is foredoomed to the fate history assigns to most *unsupported* mounted attacks.

The regimental mounted attack is of course an extreme case but one not uncommon in past campaigns, especially on terrain approximating our most probable theater of action. Although it may occur but rarely, the unit which is prepared for it is obviously prepared as well for any type of slower moving action, and for any distribution of fire power which less hasty actions might dictate.

Close consideration of all phases of fire support for large

forces or cavalry will show that while some situations will call for massed machine gun fire and others for the attachment of guns to rifle troops, or even platoons, it is evident that during the development phase or the initial stages of action, that consolidated guns afford a leader the best means of influencing the action. Prior to action he can decide what distribution of weapons will give maximum fire power to the main attack and the mobility of the weapons can be relied upon to effect timely distribution. In defense, it can scarcely be argued that central control over automatic weapons will not give maximum coördination.

This policy of separation of fire power is followed by the Infantry, and currently is probably going farther than the mobility of Infantry guns warrants. In the Cavalry Division, extensive experiments indicate that maximum fire-power control is furnished by organizing a regimental machine gun squadron containing all automatic weapons of the regiment which require a crew for their operation.

A great diversity of exercises has clearly demonstrated the superiority of this organization as opposed to others which place guns in lower units. There is no greater fallacy than the belief that in situations calling for massed guns, automatic weapons can be detached from lower units, consolidated under a leader and given a mission in the face of a mobile enemy.

The guiding factor is the availability of the guns for use. A given regiment may have fifty or a hundred machine guns assigned to it. Yet, if they are awkwardly organized, the difficulty of transmitting orders may result in only a few guns getting into action.

At the 1938 maneuvers of the Cavalry Division, two regimental organizations were demonstrated, one with a regimental machine gun troop and, in addition, a machine gun troop assigned to each of three rifle squadrons. The second organization provided for three rifle squadrons and a machine gun squadron of three machine gun troops. The demonstrations showed that in spite of the fact that there were more machine guns organically present in the first-named set-up, when it came to actual control, the machine gun squadron type got over twice as many guns into action in less time. Moreover, it displaced part of the squadron on a separate mission, re-assembled again and contacted its trains to effect ammunition supply.

The POL is right. There is a great similarity between machine guns and artillery when it comes to control. Both should be carefully coördinated for attack as well as for defense, so that the mass of the fire can be placed in the vital spot. Any commander should be reluctant to disperse his fire power beyond his control, which he does when he fails to consolidate his guns, at least in the development phase of the action.

The consolidation of fire power is a principle well known to infantrymen and long ignored by cavalrymen. Of course you can gather so many guns under one head that they cannot be controlled themselves, but you can handle twenty-four guns in the movements demanded during the mounted or mechanized development. If a greater number of guns is needed to serve a particular unit in deliberate action they should be organized as part of a higher echelon and distributed as the slower moving situations warrant. This suggests perhaps a regimental machine gun squadron for hasty action and a brigade machine gun squadron to reinforce the regimental gun when deliberation is permissible.

This is one way of taking advantage of the packed mobility of cavalry machine guns so that they *all* can get into action regardless of what type of maneuver is employed. It will work for hasty mounted attacks where fire support is of paramount importance and for other actions as well.

But what about the cavalry unit which is in the Infantry Division? Here indeed is a different problem. Remembering that we now have a force working principally on reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance and delay, a force usually split up in smaller groups with control decentralized, it seems logical to infer that these groups will have fire-support problems of their own. Because they will operate at distances greater than those used in combat by other cavalry troops it will be correspondingly harder to distribute weapons to them under all conditions. So it is obvious that this type of Cavalry must organize its weapons decentralized. The rifle troop ought to have organic machine guns under its control. Perhaps experiment would show that decentralization might go even farther.

In performing close-in reconnaissance for Infantry Divisions the cavalry will not often resort to combat as a unit to gain its information. On the other hand, the large cavalry forces must always expect to fight for information or to deny it to the enemy. So in considering reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance of large cavalry commands we may expect that the same requirements for organization will obtain as for other missions.

Thus to organize a unit for inclusion into an Infantry Division we must plan on distributing weapons rather than on consolidating them. Further, we must furnish reconnaissance, signal and other agencies which are commonly accepted as divisional tools in order that our small unit may operate over the wide terrain demanded by its habitual missions.

At the present time the question of fire support shares the peak of importance with that of getting a balance between horse and mechanized cavalry. To solve the problem we must answer this question in the affirmative: "Have we placed our automatic weapons where all, or nearly all, of them can be brought into action to support all types of cavalry action so that the vital point can be adequately covered by fire?"

## IV

Our Poor Old Lady wept bitterly over the Italian troubles near Guadalajara. She insists that motorization and mechanization did not get a square deal. Years ago she was sore at Sordet and Von Moltke and said then that by giving either side Jeb Stuart and Nathan Forrest the show could have been finished in 1914, with the star of cavalry very much in the ascendant. There is no one to dispute

this so perahps there's something to what she says today. Certain it is that mechanization is even more dependent upon good leadership, organization and control than horse cavalry is, was, and ever shall be.

We have been told that (1) mechanization is a replacement for horse cavalry (2) an amplification of horse cavalry (3) a costly and worthless experiment. Most of our written information and propaganda comes from Europe, where even a most casual perusal of organization tables will convince you that their cavalrymen and in some instances, their General Staffs have had a foot off-base. As General Hawkins pointed out recently, you cannot combine fast tanks, horse cavalry, cyclist battalions and trucked infantry and get anything short of chaos. The commander of such a force should receive commiserating glances from the ghosts of all unsuccessful generals since the year one.

The truth is that Europe knows little of cavalry. No exaggeration is inteded by the statement that the average Riley graduate with a subsequent year or two at Bliss or Knox or their equivalent, is far more competent to express an opinion than, for example, Captain Liddell-Hart. European general knowledge of cavalry faded with Murat and Napoleon—things have changed quite a bit since then. Their leaders who really did get results, such as Allenby and Jack Seeley, now no better than forgotten die-hards, are the exceptions proving the rule.

In 1914 the contrast between the American Cavalryman and his European counterpart approximated the difference between the trench-helmeted Tommy and one of Wellington's breast-plated hearties. The world's infantry and the American Cavalry had long since abandoned the hollow square and the closed-rank charge. Not so the Uhlan and the French lancer regiments. They were meat for machine guns then; they have been groping ever since, swinging from horse to machine, then back to horse or to a heterogeneous collection of bastard troops defying description.

It has been said that the old time Cavalryman could never be classified with a single label. The early dragoons were a sort of mounted infantry, using the horse solely for transportation purposes, like trucked Infantry now proposes to use trucks. It was then found that this scheme did not work so well, whereupon the dragoons graduated into the "heavy cavalry" of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, burly men on massive horses, crushing opposition by simple steam-roller measures. They were, in effect, animated tanks, so heavy that lighter weight cavalry, or Hussar regiments were formed to work in conjunction with the dragoons and to perform the reconnaissance and other mobile missions of more modern Cavalry.

Out of the "heavy" and "light" categories emerged the "light dragoon," who was supposed to combine the qualities of his predecessors and to be an all-purpose trooper. The World War, however, with its great influx of automatic arms demonstrated the need for again typing cavalry according to its manner of serving infantry, as has been discussed. Now, mechanization promises to return us to a modification of the dragoon and hussar days.

American thought, already well advanced compared to European, has had time to digest mechanized Cavalry in a sane way. The force is being developed as units capable of performing traditional Cavalry rôles by the combination of fire power, mobility and shock. Wisely, the organization has been kept homogeneous and a goal set of simplifying the problems of leadership. It is recognized that as long as men dare to dig in for a last ditch defense, or as long as ground won is to be held, the horse cannot be replaced by the combat car any more than the infantryman can be replaced by tanks. It is also recognized that the mechanized units can reach out to be on the spot in many cases where horse cavalry has hitherto been only an unfilled need. Again, we grant the possibility of operating on terrain where the supply problem and the rough ground will eliminate the machine entirely.

We are coming to a crystallization of thought in which mechanized cavalry appears as the dragoons of old. There is, to a degree, a restoration of the shock characteristic, so long missing from cavalry ranks. But rather than a shackling of mobility through weight we see a great extension of mobility through speed and radius of operation. Fire power, too, is enormously increased.

So we have a new classification of heavy and light cavalry. Both can perform many tasks equally well. Each can do certain things that the other cannot do.

It seems fairly apparent that the two should work closely together provided that we do not mix small mechanized units and small horsed units, a mixture that savors of Europe by thoroughly violating the principle of organization already discussed in relation to machine guns.

But to correlate the horse and the machine we must stop thinking along divergent lines. Just now we are wasting much time and thought by considering mechanization from the enemy standpoint rather than being guided by a consideration of the horse and the machine in their relation to one another. This shows most glaringly in the stupid and rather comic efforts to equip horse cavalry so that it will be invulnerable to mechanization, such as the recent inclusion of the fifty-caliber machine gun troop in the cavalry regiment, horsed.

The protection of horse cavalry is of course a laudable objective provided that we do not, at the same time, so organize these protective agencies as to cripple the functioning of the units along normal lines. Present efforts, unfortunately, not only interfere with the smooth control of commanders but actually are unsuited to execute the missions for which they are designed.

Numerous exercises at Fort Bliss in which the T/11 armored car, a vehicle of inferior cross country mobility to the combat car, acted as a harrassing or bulk threat to horsed troops showed that packed weapons, regardless of their accuracy or striking power, are a futile reply to mechanization when used by maneuvering troops.

The exercises fully bore out experiences elsewhere which have been expressed in the anti-mechanization principles now in force at the General Service Schools—

"anti-mechanization agencies must be of greater mobility than that of the troops supported and at least of equal mobility to the vehicles they are designed to neutralize."

Once a packed weapon is emplaced on the ground, it surrenders mobility to enemy vehicles which can refuse an initial objective to maneuver for less costly approaches. There have been attempts to solve the problem by placing a cordon of anti-mechanization weapons about a moving body of troops, but this brings up the fatal objections of any uncoördinated tactical effort—it is hopeless in its absolute lack of weapon control and in its inability to mass fire at critical points. Nor is it practicable for mounted troopers to stand by while machine gunners fight off a mechanized attack.

The simple truth is that the best defense against mechanization is mechanization itself. We might say that we could place a corps of anti-mechanized weapons upon stripped down vehicles with the idea of providing cavalry units with a share of devices having equal mobility to the threat. But why do this when we already have mechanized cavalry? Why not work the horse and machine under such control as will permit each to take advantage of its characteristics, yet with each supporting the other? If the enemy has mechanization can we afford to ignore it by despatching our own mechanization off on individual missions? Rarely.

All of this talk of operating mechanized cavalry a hundred miles or more ahead of an army may apply for the initial day or two of hostilities. But it does not take armies long to meet. The radius of action of all forces, mobile or otherwise, becomes sharply curtailed. Aside from raids which are of doubtful value, the longest jump a mobile force can make is to move from one flank to another behind the lines, a move which, because of traffic difficulties might well be matched by rail movement.

Once contact has been gained, the mobility characteristics of cavalry, both horse and mechanized become matters of great speed over relatively short distances. In other words, mechanization has the battlefield mobility of the horse, plus. Its radius of action will be greater, but not much greater than that of horse cavalry.

Mechanization can operate close enough to horse cavalry to eliminate in great measure the threat of hostile mechanization to the latter. Although its type missions may call for an operation at some distance from horse cavalry with which it may be coöperating, its great mobility permits it to extend greatly our former ideas of what "supporting distance" may be. The effect of such support may well be the elimination of most, if not all, of the heavy, cumbersome, awkwardly controlled anti-mechanized weapons now assigned to small horse cavalry units.

Horse cavalry should operate close enough to mechanized cavalry to execute missions requiring the power of individual troopers and which may have proven impracticable for the mechanized troops.

Both horse and mechanized units should remain within supporting distance because of the enormous and decisive striking power produced on the occasion when it is practicable for the two to operate on the same maneuver. For example, that elusive goal of the generalissimos of history, the wide envelopment, should prove relatively easy for a corps of the new heavy and light cavalry.

What is the answer to this combination from the point of view of organization?

Is it a mechanized squadron within a cavalry regiment? No. A thousand times no. This small force of vehicles has no mass, no shock power. The troopers lack mass as well. The mechanized troops could not take advantage of their inherent mobility without leaving behind a weak force unable to contain itself. All things being equal, such a force might conceivably be defeated by an all-horse or all mechanized regiment intelligently handled as a unit.

The same line of reasoning can be carried on until it becomes quite plain that we must deal in large numbers. At the least we should have brigades, all-horse or all mechanized, and probably increase this to divisions within corps.

To deal in large numbers is to ignore the necessity of cavalry being present within Infantry Divisions as has been discussed under the organization of fire power. For these squadrons, regiments or brigades with specialized missions of reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance and delay, we must be most careful in stepping from the horse to the combat car. There is no argument, of course, for the use of mechanized reconnaissance vehicles, because these are already of proved value as well as being horse-savers, but the conduct of the specialized missions, with decentralized groups operating as we have already seen, is at present, except as stated, solely the function of the horse. The inability of the mechanized troops to hold ground, the inadvisability of tying them to a modified infantry mobility and the advisability of operating them in mass appear to be sound theoretical reasons for keeping them out of the Infantry Division and Corps. In practice, the Proposed Infantry Division tests conducted last year convinced unofficial cavalry observers that the motorizing or mechanizing of a special reconnaissance unit was a mistake.

So for the present let us keep the machine out of the close-support cavalry. There is plenty to do in working out practical methods of controlling both types of cavalry in the larger, general-support cavalry missions.

Horse cavalry, of course, cannot give up all anti-mechanization measures. But if these were confined to bivouac, or halt protection the horse cavalry leader would be freed from a large measure of the mental hazard of control on the move as well as freeing him physically from the presence of a mass of packed weapons within his approach and march formations. Horse cavalry within a Corps containing one or more mechanized divisions certainly should feel free to maneuver in the presence of a threat from hostile mechanization.

To sum up, let us organize so as to utilize to the fullest extent the mobility inherent to the packed weapon and the combat car. In the first case, we can make cavalry units homogeneous to a degree not possible in the infantry

and feel confident that we can distribute the weapons as needed when the time comes. In the second, we can count on having horse and mechanized cavalry in close support of one another and yet rely upon the machine to permit the meaning of "close support" to be extended far beyond what we now consider it.

Both cases illustrate the principle of mass. The combat car strikes in force at distant objectives, yet can protect the horse elements. The latter must be available to mechanization in order to execute the countless missions requiring massed individual troopers for assault. For both horse and machine, fire power must be massed on the critical point. Finally, units which are all-horse, all-mechanized and which separate fire power and movement to the greatest degree are the ones which are the easiest to control.

As has been said, after the command has left the march formation and breaks into small columns for the approach or development, the leader of cavalry troops gets his severest test. The test of the leader is the test of good organization. If a command can employ its mobility to the utmost, if it is capable of shifting formation quickly under protection of the bulk of its fire power, and is capable of being handled by an emergency officer, then everybody, including the Poor Old Lady, should be happy.

All of these things are not for theorizers. In the end, the problem cannot be solved without obtaining the use of several million acres, putting the troops thereon and going through tactical exercises without benefit of rehearsal or prearrangement. All good cavalrymen should work towards the day when the Cavalry Corps of heavy and light, dragoon and hussar, combat car and horse is ready to show the world a new and powerful force. As always, the last word in advancement, the American Cavalry.

We seem to have done all we can think of to reduce the army to a state of semi-impotence. We dispensed with the loyal services of famous Irish regiments, whose colors prove the contributions they made to the growth of the British Empire. With the regular battalions went time-honored militia formations, and Ireland was not allowed a volunteer or territorial force, a prohibition which is simply grotesque. This was a grievous loss to the army, *more so almost than the disappearance of famous cavalry regiments* by linking or amalgamating with others and reducing the residue to temporary impotence by what looked like a violent transformation from their natural method of locomotion to one that even now has not been tried out with anything approaching appreciable result.

—*The United Services Review*, London,

# May I Say a Word for the Horse?

## By One Who Rides When He Must

Not long ago, a newspaper editorial made some such casual statement as that "Practically all military experts agree that the horse is obsolete." One need not begin the usual profound argument on this, beginning with a demand for definition of terms like, "What is an expert?" But it is necessary to point out that the expression quoted above is a marked symptom of the current disease—wishful thinking.

It is certainly a reproach to a mechanized civilization that Old Dobbin is still amongst us. It is a great pity, from a good many standpoints, that the horse is not obsolete, and one can understand and sympathize with the irritation the sight of him inspires in the engineer and the engineer's fans—all of us in the latter classification. We have all been benefited by modern improvements in health, education, housing, transportation, communication, leisure, and amusement to such an extent that we have conditioned our stimuli to the anticipation of even greater gifts on the morrow. That anachronism, the horse, faintly recalls to us the admonition, "Remember, man, that thou art dust. . . ."

Well, you say, the horse is all right in his place. Let the rich ride horses in shows, at polo, in the parks; let the middle classes play at dude ranching. But surely, when the last fire-department team of Dan, Dan, and Dan is relegated to the pasture and replaced by a ripsnorting mechanism that will cut their time to a fire to a mere fraction, it is incumbent on the Army, of all classes of people, to give up its Indian-fighting complex and plan to go to war Twentieth Century style. What is the matter with you fellows? Is it nostalgia for the Good Old Days, or that you're afraid you won't have any polo to play, or that you think horses are romantic, or you're just dead between the ears, or what?

A soldier of my acquaintance answers—"Soldiers are always being accused of stodginess and lack of imagination. If being stodgy implies that conservatism that makes one look before he leaps, then let's plead guilty. Lack of imagination? We'll fight that charge. It is one that rests with more justice on the other side."

Let's take a look at the horse, no new model of which will be produced this year. (No new model of John Soldier will be presented, either.) From a perch atop his quarterdeck, you can see a lot more of the country than you can from the ground, and if you're interested, just work out the distance the horizon recedes when you mount a tall chair. The horse is a narrow beast. He can pass between tall saplings off the road. It is true that a tank will make short work of the saplings. But even if you don't mind trampling the saplings and creating a disturbance for the enemy to see, either directly or in air photos, the tank has to slow down to do it. If it does slow down, what price motor speed compared to the horse? If it doesn't slow down, that tank will be a wreck. Don't send any of your 60-mile tanks against underbrush they'd easily overcome at slower speeds. The horse has good axle clearance, and no high centers in the road ever disturb him. He has a very short wheelbase, and can change direction on a dime and give nine cents change, where mechanical vehicles can't turn on a thousand dollars in reichsmarks.

Like his pal of several thousand years companionship—John—the horse has reserve fuel tanks where you'd never suspect them and can always move a half mile farther unless rigor mortis has set in. He will back without grinding gears, and whether night, fog, dust, or noise assail his driver and himself, he will never dodge any bridges and jump into rivers. He does this without lights, too. Furthermore, the horse is one of the quietest of animals. He neither barks, snarls, nor crows, and his whinny is very rare. In emergency—and any time the rider considers it to be so, that's an emergency with the horse—he will swim, and the last motorcycle to attempt this has not yet been dredged up to find out what made it go down.

The horse has three speeds, walk, 4 miles an hour; trot, 8 miles an hour; gallop, 12 miles an hour. Most models are equipped with an overdrive, the extended gallop, 16 miles an hour or higher. These speeds are pretty slow, but they are convenient to figure. They're very nice to be able to count on—and I mean definitely. And the trouble with the last war, as somebody has said—I guess he wasn't an expert—is that the difficulty on the battlefield lay, not in failure to go thirty miles an hour, but failure to go 2½ miles an hour.

One soldier—one piece of transportation. That has its advantages, too. You may get a lot of soldiers into three trucks, but suppose you want them at seven places? You can't send a messenger from one to the other without tying up the arrangements for movement between other points.

A great many mounted men can be controlled by voice.



***HORSE, M-39. Equipped with self-contained direction finder.***

and whistles or bugle calls will enable the control of even more. They may be started, stopped, turned, or their formation changed, in the dark—even in the midst of a forest, or while moving faster than a man can run. The principal handicap to even weak attempts at this with motor vehicles is that you can't drive a motor vehicle and watch for signals at the same time. (You can't hear any signals at all.) But a horse will continue the general direction at which you last aimed him, meanwhile avoiding trees and other impediments, and surmounting obstacles impassable to vehicles.

Great Britain has been engaged in de-horsing her armed forces. Why? It is said that there is a shortage of horses in the country; that obtaining them and their replacements in war from the Dominions would entail the use of too many ships. The implication is that ship bottoms will be needed for food; that acreage which produces fodder will likewise be needed for food.

The Poles are not de-horsing. The greatest horse country of Europe, with vast forests and muddy bogs to traverse, maintains, according to Hanson W. Baldwin, military expert of the *New York Times*, forty regiments of cavalry.

The Russians are not de-horsing. They have, it is said, the largest number of mechanized units in the world. They also have, according to The CAVALRY JOURNAL, the greatest number of horse-mounted men under arms anywhere, and reports credit them with more mounted men than the continental U. S. has combat soldiers.

The Japanese are not de-horsing. A press dispatch of 1937: "The prolonged rainy season having bogged down a large part of the highly mechanized Japanese forces, General Terauchi called on his cavalry. . . . An estimated 20,000 horsemen who thundered across pontoon bridges. . . . A few days later, with dry roads, the mechanized force . . . opened another wide breach in the Chinese lines. . . ."

Brigadier General Henry J. Reilly, of the famous Rainbow Division, has written, "Cavalry is NOT a thing of the past. Neither has it got to go to gasoline and oil to exist." General Reilly, who has spent most of 1938 in Spain, was writing from Zaragoza, and said that he had had a talk with General Monasterio, cavalry leader of the Insurgents, who told him that early in the war, no division commander wanted to be bothered with cavalry. Now, he said, they all want it.

The Italian campaign in Ethiopia was a victory for animal transportation—horse, mule, and camel, which sat around Addis Abbaba waiting for the big shots to arrive with the motors.

The horse must go. Yet Lieutenant Colonel Lancelle, German Field Artillery, writing in the *Militär-Wochenblatt* for August 5, 1938, says: "In 1918 . . . the artillery had lost its mobility—which, as some are inclined to believe, was due not so much to the shortage and poor condition of the horses as to the lack of care and interest in their welfare, and the ignorance displayed in the handling of the teams. During the World War an officer learned to fire within a very short space of time. Expert care and training of the horses, as well as the knowledge of what to expect of them, usually calls for life-long experience, intensive work, self-control and self-training. With the motorization of the staffs, the inability to judge the capacity of the horse and the disregard for his welfare have become even more widespread than they were during the World War." This from a senior officer of an army in which the high command rides in automobiles, but the guns of the division are still drawn by horses.

The horse must go. And how he went in the Ethiopian campaign! In December, 1935, the Italian forces had 78,000 animals in use there, according to the *British Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps*, August, 1938.

The horse must go. "Some of the horses of the 2d Australian Light Horse Brigade and the 7th Mounted Brigade had not had a drink for *84 hours*."—*The British Cavalry Journal*, October, 1929. Try that on your V-8.

Or try anything on your V-2 of say, 1905, against a 1939 model. The Chileans, at Madison Square Garden, just got through exhibiting a master timbertopper, 27 years old, the Irish a 26-year-old; and *Dakota* and *Ugly*, great U. S. Army jumpers, are 12 and 17, respectively. *Kismet*, a 33-year-old jumper, performed at Fort Myer, according to the papers, on March 15 of this year. The equine power plant improves with age.

In fact, there are many mounts today whose ability to put out top performance has outlasted that of the riders who trained them and grew up with them.

Before we pass a resolution repealing the horse, let us consider his chassis, perfectly streamlined by nature, equipped with silent springs and one-shot lubrication, guaranteed to last for a lifetime. Most remarkable of all, the horse, with few protruding fenders, will straighten out his own dents if given a little time. But since few people have ever successfully house-broken a horse, no doubt the horse must go.

Thank God he hasn't gone yet.

# The Phillips Military Saddle

## By Colonel Albert E. Phillips, Retired

The Phillips Military Saddle was fully described in my article published in the May-June, 1935, issue of THE CAVALRY JOURNAL under the caption "The Phillips Cross Country Saddle," as it was then called. As this new saddle was designed as a modern *forward-seat* saddle, I shall discuss in this article, among other points, the saddle in its relation to the "forward seat."

Knowing full well the aversion to a change in riding methods, it was with some reluctance that I acceded to the requests of many of our accomplished horsemen to design a saddle which would enable the American Officer to easily acquire that "form" and seat so essential in military riding—namely, the modern forward seat.

For several years our riding instructors, too, had asked for a saddle that would make it possible for the students to easily assume the type of seat they were being taught, as many were the faults found in existing type of saddles: some were too short; others were too flat; some were too wide where the rider's legs passed over the seat; or the throat was convex when it should be concave. And the truth of the matter was, there were grounds for these complaints.

It has only been for the past few years that we have really begun to appreciate the many advantages of the "forward seat." The Italians were the first to adopt the forward-seat position for the rider, it differing from the French position in that in the latter there is a tendency toward riding with the weight somewhat to the rear and to keeping the horse closely collected and flexed. However, as Cavalry became more mobile, the French also gradually moved the seat forward.

The modern "forward seat" is readily attainable, and naturally a rider is assisted in assuming it with a saddle especially designed for it. Some may ask: Why the "forward seat?" The answer is briefly: The "forward seat" is both technically and scientifically correct for all types of military riding, from ordinary marching to cross-country work, and it is the most secure position for the rider and the easiest for the horse. For High School work, however, and for polo, other "seats" perhaps may be found more desirable, depending upon the whim of the rider.

Let us bear in mind that the horse carries approximately five-ninths (5/9) of his own weight upon his forehand and that this natural balance should be disturbed as little as possible. In military riding, the first consideration of a "seat" should be one which places the rider in a position favorable to the horse. By so doing, the rider will be compensated by getting out of the horse all that it is capable of giving with the least effort. And the horse is capable of giving his utmost when a preponderance of the rider's weight is carried forward of the horse's center of motion, so that the horse's loins and propelling members (hindquarters) will be free and unhampered! But in addition to the rider's weight being correctly positioned, it is important that the horse be permitted to travel much as in nature, with a normal or fairly low carriage of head for all cross-country work where speed and ability to negotiate obstacles are required. The same principle applies to ordinary marching. By these methods we tend to maintain the natural balance of the horse. Just how far forward the rider's weight should be carried depends entirely, of course, upon the gait of the horse.

Lt. Colonel Harry D. Chamberlin, one of the Army's

*1—Seat all wrong. Rider slouched on cantle, and stirrups too short. Weight too far back on the horse. Unfortunately, quite a common sight. 2—Correct seat at posting trot. Stirrups at correct length for cross-country riding and hunting. Should be about two inches longer for the military seat. 3—Incorrect seat at gallop. Rider's loins convex to the rear, buttocks under him and crotch too far forward. Seat lacks grace and security. 4—Correct "forward seat" at gallop, with stirrups shortened for hunting and cross-country work. Buttocks to the rear, but with weight inside of base of support; no weight on cantle.*




*1—As a training saddle. 2—As a field saddle. 3—Training saddle, small man. 4—Field saddle, small man. 5—Training saddle, medium man. 6—Field saddle, medium man with field officers equipment. 7—Training saddle, tall man. 8—Field saddle, tall man.*

most distinguished horsemen, in discussing the "forward seat," states:

"One of the greatest errors which prevents the rider's assuming a correct forward seat, and which leads to the grotesque positions often seen, results from two things; first, saddle seats are frequently too short for the riders; and, second, the rider endeavors to push his crotch and buttocks too far forward in the saddle. The crotch should be in the throat or deepest part of the saddle, and the fleshy part of the buttocks should be kept well to rear, but due to the rider's constant forward inclination of the body from the hips there should be practically no weight on the cantle. Assuming a proper seat on the other hand necessitates a properly made saddle with the throat or deepest part of the seat a little in front of the center. The forward seat is easy to acquire, although one unaccustomed to it will at first become tired in the loins. After having acquired it through practice, however, both the rider and his horse will outlast the man who leans backward, and the horse which carries the rider's weight on his loin."

The "forward seat" is uncomfortable to assume with a saddle not designed for it; that is, with a saddle that slopes downward towards the cantle. The majority of saddles we have are of this latter type—with the low point of the seat in rear of the central part of it and the stirrup loops too far toward the rear; and to make matters worse, most of these saddles are placed so far forward upon the horse as to raise the pommel higher than the cantle. With a saddle not designed for the "forward seat" and with pommel higher than cantle, it is practically impossible to even assume the forward-seat position, let alone riding it with any degree of comfort.

Nor is comfortable riding assured by the use of a for-



ward-seat saddle *if it is improperly positioned;* for even with a forward-seat saddle, if it is placed upon the horse in a too forward position, with the pommel higher than the cantle, the rider will be riding the cantle and reaching for his stirrups and to that extent be uncomfortable, as the stirrups of forward-seat saddles are necessarily positioned farther forward. ***But with a correctly designed forward-seat saddle, properly positioned upon the horse,*** that is, with the bearing of the saddle approximately level, the rider can quickly adopt the forward-seat position and thus ride with ease and comfort, grace and security, and in balance with the horse.

(NOTE: Before deciding upon the location of the stirrup loops, I contacted the service boards and also several of our able riders, and all were in agreement that the front edge of the stirrup loops should be placed three inches from the front edge of the saddle.)

Let us now discuss briefly the "low point" of the seat of the saddle. The majority of military riding saddles were so constructed as to have the low point in the central part of the seat, but in some cases this low point has inadvertently been moved backward or forward, depending upon how the saddle was broken in. It is obvious that if the pommel is raised, as occurs when the saddle is placed too far forward, the low point will be in rear of the center of the seat.

Many riders place their saddles too far forward. A glance at the illustrations in our CAVALRY JOURNAL and other riding magazines will bear out this statement. In discussing this matter with an officer, he stated that he had been instructed to place his saddle as far forward as he could put it. I am sure that what his instructor meant to convey was that the saddle should be placed *well forward.* There is a proper place for a saddle. If it is placed too far forward, its bearing will be under the pommel and cantle, resulting in possible injuries to the horse at these points of support. A saddle too far forward will also interfere with the movements of the horse's shoulder blades and possibly bruise the broad, back muscle over the withers and its connections with the shoulder blades, as well as cause injuries to his loin. Although it has been stressed that the saddle should be well forward, its bearing must be *on a level,* even though it necessitates moving the saddle slightly rearward. The Phillips Military Saddles now being produced will have the low point approximately one inch forward of the center of the seat. Some other minor improvements in the saddle are being made as a result of the recent six-months' durability test.

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The Phillips Military Saddle and its accessories were officially approved for adoption by the War Department January 25, 1937, and designated Model 1936. However,

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***1—As a field saddle, showing cantle roll support attached. 2—The correct positioning. Note that cantle is higher than pommel, as it should be. 3—An incorrect positioning. Note that pommel is higher than cantle. In this position it would be difficult for the rider to adopt the "forward seat," and if he rides the cantle he will have difficulty in reaching the stirrups and knee rolls.***

this saddle was actually produced in 1934 under the name of the Phillips Cross-Country Saddle, official photographs of same being taken November 6, 1934. After completing this saddle I assisted in the design of a training saddle, M. 1935, and a field saddle, M. 1935. These three saddles were submitted to both the Cavalry Board and the Field Artillery Board for test and, after having undergone very strenuous test, the Phillips Military Saddle was recommended for adoption by both boards. Recently the 1st Cavalry Division Board also tested the Phillips Military Saddle and likewise recommended its adoption, thus gaining the unanimous approval of the three leading testing agencies for this saddle.

*The Phillips Military Saddle Equipped for the Field:* In a previous article I mentioned the many advantages for both rider and horse of having one saddle only for daily riding and for the field; but the greatest value of the Phillips Military Saddle, as I see it, is as a *field saddle*, for it is in the field where the horse must be given fullest consideration. The elimination of extended side bars, which unduly bear upon the horse's loins, is of primary importance. We have all seen many horses disabled by extended side bars of field saddles. We have likewise seen many horses disabled by saddles which have narrow pommel arches, and by saddles which have uncomfortable seats. Such injuries are caused by poorly designed saddles. But many injuries, too, are caused by faulty saddling and riding. No matter how perfectly a saddle may be designed, if it is not properly positioned upon the horse and correctly ridden, injuries will occur. In the design of the Phillips Military Saddle, every projection of other saddles which rubbed either rider or horse was eliminated. I wish to emphasize one important point in riding this saddle in the field: Forward-seat saddles are designed to facilitate easy riding, whether in a "forward seat" or an upright position, assuming of course that the saddle is on a level bearing surface. However, a forward-seat saddle will be somewhat awkward and perhaps uncomfortable for the rider who in the field habitually rides the cantle, and especially so if the pommel is higher than the cantle, as in that case he will be reaching for the stirrups.

In addition to meeting the demands of the three testing boards, we have met the expectations of the Army's leading horsemen, many of whom have written in highest praise of the merits of this saddle. In conclusion, may I quote Major Wm. B. Bradford of the Cavalry Division and former Olympic Team Captain, who wrote: "The saddle was used during both the Provisional Cavalry Division Maneuvers at Balmorhea and the Third Army Maneuvers in the vicinity of Fort Bliss. It has also been ridden for polo, hacking and jumping, and has given satisfaction in every phase of its use. I think it is a splendid piece of work that is sure to win approbation of the horsemen of the Army."—It is my ardent hope that the Phillips Military Saddle will prove a satisfaction likewise to each and all of our Army riders.

# CORRECTION

## Revised Tables of Organization for the Cavalry Horse Regiment

Manning Charts of the revised tables of organization for the cavalry horse regiment appeared in the January-February issue of The CAVALRY JOURNAL. Three corrections should be made:

Page 60—Machine Gun Troop; Troop Headquarters, the second saddler shown at the head of the ammunition section should be the ammunition corporal.

Page 62—Headquarters and Service Troop; Forward Echelon, in the Scout Car Platoon, one of the platoon sergeants shown should be the platoon commander.

Page 63—Rear Echelon; the administration platoon should be the transportation platoon.

## REVISED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

## HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP, CAVALRY DIVISION, HORSE

### REAR ECHELON

#### GENERAL STAFF CAR

Station Wagon

#### MILITARY POLICE SECTION

Motorcycles

Truck

Passenger Car

#### SERVICE GROUP



Trucks

#### TROOP HEADQUARTERS

Truck — Station Wagon

#### SPECIAL STAFF, POSTAL DET. & HQ. HQ. SP. TRS.
(Moves by echelon)



Trucks — Station Wagons

### FORWARD ECHELON

#### SCOUT CAR SECTION

#### COMMAND SCOUT CARS




#### COMMANDING GENERAL'S GROUP



Passenger Cars



Station Wagons

#### SERVICE GROUP



Trucks

#### Horse Group




### LEGEND

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CG = Commanding General | MP = Military Police | G = Gunner | Sig = Signal |
| CS = Chief of Staff | Sgt = Sergeant | AG = Asst. gunner | CW = Chemical Warfare |
| GS = General Staff | Cpl = Corporal | Hrs = Horseshoer | Tr = Troop |
| Ex = Executive | MS = Mess Sergeant | Sad = Saddler | SpTr = Special Troops |
| CO = Car commander | SS = Supply Sergeant | Bug = Bugler | SpSt = Special Staff |
| O = Officer | Rm = Enlisted man | St = Stenographer | Pl = Platoon |
| Pro = Provost | C = Chauffeur | Msc = Mechanic | MC = Message center |
| Mar = Marshal | M = Messenger | Ck = Cook or cooking | Op = Operator or operations |
| Adjt = Adjutant | D = Driver | R = Radio | Int = Intelligence |
| Maj = Major | S = Scout | Sup = Supply | Ra = Rations |
| Capt = Captain | Arm = Armorer | Sta = Stable | Mot = Motor |
| Lt = Lieutenant | Cl = Clerk | Com = Communications | P = Pack |
| A = Aide | | | (W) = War only |

REVISED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON, MECHANIZED CAVALRY DIVISION, HORSE

SQUADRON HEADQUARTERS (WAR ONLY)




RECONNAISSANCE TROOP (ONE IN PEACE, TWO IN WAR)

RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON

(Four in Troop)




TROOP HEADQUARTERS

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


FORWARD ECHELON




REVISED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP, CAVALRY BRIGADE, HORSE

REAR ECHELON

TROOP HEADQUARTERS

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


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


STAFF AND SERVICE GROUP




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


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


COMMANDER'S GROUP

Horse Section




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

# FALSE LESSONS IN COMBAT AND MUSKETRY EXERCISES

## By Brigadier General H. S. Hawkins, Retired

The following article was written at Fort McKinley, P. I., in the spring of 1928, after a conversation with General Wm. Lassiter on the points involved. General Lassiter asked me to put in writing for him some notes on the subject. I did so and gave the paper to him unsigned. He sent it to the War Department for comment. It was sent to the Infantry Board at Fort Benning, Georgia, and given consideration for six or eight months. What the result was or whether suitable modifications were ever made in the Training Regulations in regard to Combat Firing and Musketry I do not know. As I had not signed the paper, I did not receive any official copy of the report of the Infantry Board, although someone informally sent me a copy. This copy was loaned to someone to read and never returned, and is thus lost to me.

My original paper was shown to some officers at Fort McKinley who returned it with some arguments against the ideas contained in it. I showed the paper, with the arguments included, to General Lytle Brown whose short note in comment is given as follows:

(Note) "General Hawkins: It looks like you have the better of the argument. The question is one of balancing the advantage of fire power against the disadvantage of vulnerability.

If you seek fire power without regard to vulnerability then the losses will destroy the moral value of your force. A body of men will stand so much killing and no more (British at New Orleans, Union troops at Cold Harbor —narrow escape in the latter case.)

If you crowd men and guns in places where they are quite vulnerable they may have superior fire power at the beginning yet they will be defeated on account of their vulnerability.

Cover — producing a low vulnerability — has always been one of the governing features in tactics and cannot be neglected. For this reason I think that you have the best of the argument. (Signed) Lytle Brown."

After much study and reflection, and considerable experience in teaching these principles to troops for nearly ten years, I am still of the same opinion, and submit the article to readers of the CAVALRY JOURNAL with the added note that, so far, the lessons from the wars in Spain and China seem to support these views very substantially.

A combat exercise with ball cartridges, as practiced for the training of small units, involves musketry training which is designed to teach an effective collective fire.

In musketry exercises we do not concern ourselves with the tactical handling of these small units but merely practice fire problems in order to teach collective fire principles including fire discipline, fire control and fire distribution. In these exercises the number and distribution of hits on the targets which represent the enemy are taken to indicate excellence in this practice.

This training is supposed to fit in with tactical principles in combat exercises. In my opinion it does not fit.

We cannot disassociate fire problems wholly from tactical dispositions without teaching false lessons. Musketry exercises teach unit leaders to control fire while the men are out in the open with no cover. They do not teach the control of fire when men are properly taking cover. The methods of control while paying no attention to cover will not work when the unit must take cover.

The result is that we see combat exercises in which insufficient attention is paid to cover and the advance under cover, and too much attention is paid to firing and getting hits on targets at ranges that are too long. I object therefore to both musketry exercises and combat exercises with ball cartridges.

Furthermore, I object to the basic principle that our riflemen in the attacking echelons must fire at ranges greater than two or three hundred yards in order to advance. There are of course exceptions. But I believe that on almost any terrain over which attacks are made in the future the advancing riflemen will not be able to see farther than two or three hundred yards farther. The stationary supporting units may often take advantage of hills or slight elevations or houses, etc., to see and observe their fire at long ranges. Even the machine guns that are following their battalions in close support can usually find some fire positions from which to fire at ranges between 1,000 yards and about 500 or 600 yards. But the riflemen, moving by bounds, from cover to cover, will seldom be able to see and shoot at an enemy farther than 300 yards without exposing themselves unduly.

But even when they can see over the ground for long distances they should not be required to build up firing lines at ranges greater than 200 or 300 yards.

To begin at the beginning, the first objection I have to combat exercises with ball cartridges is that the targets are invariably placed in a manner that gives the soldier a very false impression of what he can expect to see of the enemy.

Even though targets were properly placed (which is in itself a very difficult thing on account of the labor and expense involved) combat exercises with ball ammunition now require firing lines to be built up in such a manner that the men can fire upon and hit the target. This causes them to expose themselves in a way that would be to such advantage to the enemy that the line would never move forward again.

Tactical exercises *without* ball ammunition and combat

exercises *with* ball ammunition teach opposing principles. We teach in one form of tactical exercises the moving forward of skirmish lines taking full advantage of cover by all possible means. This is done under the leadership of platoon and squad leaders. Team work and coöperation between these small units is shown by the avoidance of crowding upon each other and by the avoidance of any effort on the part of any unit to occupy a piece of ground which really should belong to another. Each unit must consider the units on its right and left and accept the ground which naturally falls to it, rather than impose itself upon the ground belonging to another unit. Otherwise, bunching, exposure and serious losses occur. All this is done in a tactical exercise, so that the soldiers finally arrive within a very short distance of the enemy line before exposing themselves, and then make a final rush with the bayonet. If one watches such an exercise he can see that it would be impossible for any unit the size of a squad or a platoon to build up a firing line that could see anything to shoot at and not have that firing line very much exposed itself. So, with one hand we teach the men to keep under cover to the very point of moving forward with the bayonet, and then, with the other hand, in these so-called combat exercises, we teach the men always to find a place where they can shoot at the enemy and therefore expose themselves. Thus the teaching is contradictory.

The whole theory of combat exercises is built upon a false idea that infantry advancing upon an enemy in position can outshoot the enemy, thus gaining what is called fire superiority; whereas, as a matter of fact, the enemy in position always has the advantage in that he has had time to hide his men, to dig at least hasty entrenchments, and to post his machine guns in fox holes or something better if the position has been occupied several days. The attacking infantry rarely sees the enemy and has no definite targets to shoot at. With the enemy the exact opposite is the case, because if the attacking force builds up firing lines, it can always be seen by a watchful enemy. Each firing position that the attackers take has to be selected hurriedly without any preliminary careful reconnaissance and naturally cannot be as good as the firing position of the enemy. The front lines must necessarily be thin, the deployment of force in depth being the only formation that troops can use to avoid annihilation by enemy machine guns, which makes it impossible to have a heavy firing line in front. So that to attempt to gain superiority of fire in this manner is futile. Superiority of fire, which is simply a fire which holds the enemy down so that moving troops can advance toward him, must be supplied by troops using what is called the "fire of position," principally with machine guns and artillery.

In a zone of action, on most kinds of terrain, the places where a fire position for a unit can be found and at the same time cover obtained are very few. It is from such places that supporting fire can be delivered and from such places only. These places are not going to be found by all units. Most units are going to find that cover is incompatible with fire. They should take the cover and make no attempt to fire.

The good fire positions should be quickly occupied by machine guns in order to let the riflemen continue their rôle of moving forward.

Cover for a few sharpshooters can frequently be found that enables them to fire with very little exposure. This kind of cover exists in spots, not in long lines for a whole unit to occupy. It is true that a man can often get cover by lying down perfectly flat. The moment he raises his head and props up his shoulders so as to enable him to fire he becomes very much exposed, except in these infrequently found spots where both cover and fire are possible.

Fire from these spots, to pick off machine gunners when they have been sighted, can be permitted at any reasonable ranges. The other men should not expose themselves to fire, because if they do, it is the enemy machine guns that will get *them*. Riflemen in the attack cannot compete with machine guns in the defense.

"Fire superiority" is a term that was created by the Germans some thirty or more years ago, when they deliberately filled up their firing lines in the attack to one man per yard in order to gain a heavy overwhelming rifle fire during the advance and just before the assault. The theory was that it was better to accept the losses that this crowded firing line would bring rather than to weaken the firing line and fail to obtain the necessary volume of fire, thus risking a repulse and subsequent losses that in the end would be greater than if a sufficiently strong firing line had been used in the beginning. But this was before the day of the machine gun.

With the development of the machine gun, firing lines had to be thinned out. It is no longer possible to gain that fire superiority with such thin lines, even if the theory were correct, which is very much doubted.

The principal obstacle to the attack is the machine gun, and the only hope of the attackers is to keep out of sight, at least when halted, and to gain superiority of fire over the hostile machine guns by artillery and our own machine guns firing from carefully selected positions that afford both cover and fire action. And while this is going on, the hostile machine gunners should feel the menace of constantly approaching riflemen who show themselves only for a few seconds at a time and then while moving.

It is entirely probable that the fire from a defensive position will be, more and more, from machine guns, and less and less from riflemen, who will be kept under cover to execute counter attacks when the attacking riflemen have gained the position or ground in near proximity to it.

The duel between opposing infantry riflemen in order to gain fire superiority has therefore disappeared except at very close ranges. The rôle of the modern rifleman in attack is to get forward under cover with the support of machine gun and artillery fire, and to leap upon the enemy at close quarters. He must be trained to advance from cover to cover and to withhold his fire until he can see the enemy at close range.

All of these remarks apply up to the time the attackers reach a point within 300 yards of the enemy. After that there may probably be more firing by the attackers preliminary to a rush, all depending upon the nature of the ground. But even within 300 yards it will be found often that the enemy has the advantage if we attempt to engage him in a fire fight; and if there is sufficient supporting fire from artillery and machine guns it would be better for the troops of the front line to rest under cover, if there is any, until the moment for the final assault. In other words, they should rest in the most forward cover they can find before this assault, and the distance of the assault will depend upon the distance of this final cover from the enemy's line.

The main training of infantry in attack should be to get forward by skillful movements, taking advantage of the ground, and then to leap upon the enemy for close combat. Halts during the advance should be made only when there is cover. Halts should never be made on ground exposed to observation and fire. The object should be to get forward, not to shoot. On flat, exposed ground, to halt is to fail. Halts are made only under cover and to gain breath, to escape from a burst of annihilating fire, to rectify alignments and intervals, to reëstablish coöperation between units and to regain order and control. For this purpose, all movement forward should be on the principle of movement by bounds.

Fire is resorted to only when the enemy is not entrenched but exposed like the attackers themselves, and then only at very close ranges, to resist counter attacks or in actual close combat. Sometimes fire will be required when the infantry rifle units have gotten so close to the enemy that the covering fire of the machine guns and artillery is masked and must lift to be placed on enemy rear echelons; then, at very close distance, rifle units may resort to their own fire.

Under such circumstances it is practically impossible for platoon commanders and squad leaders to give directions and instructions regarding fire distribution although they may perhaps point out important targets, like machine guns.

NOTE: If the enemy exposes himself and presents a good target, it is not intended to prohibit riflemen from firing at him, provided they themselves are in good cover and not exposed by so doing. But even in this case, which is rare, it is not wise to fire at ranges greater than battle-sight range or to try to build up a firing line with all men of the unit upon it. Occasionally a few sharpshooters may fire at close ranges—that is all, until the assault, or unless the unit finds itself in an exposed place without cover near enough to reach it, like a wide plain. Then it may as well defend itself by firing as to lie there being shot at without replying. But this should not be contemplated in training. It would be a bad situation into which the rifle units should not have gotten. Infantry should not be forced on to open plains where there is no cover, unless the enemy is running or very inferior in some way, or unless preceding the infantry there is cavalry or tanks, or unless the supporting artillery fire is so unusually strong as to overwhelm the enemy during the advance.

In all these cases the infantry should keep moving and should not halt without cover. The cover may be slight. A slight fold in the ground scarcely observable at a distance may afford protection from aimed fire of small arms. Grass and bushes may at least screen the riflemen from view. But the attempt to build up firing lines generally takes the men out from even this slight cover.

Small open spaces without cover should be crossed at the run. No halting in them to fire should be permitted. All of our Combat Exercises with ball cartridges violate these principles, because the men must come out of cover to see and fire upon the targets, and we always see them throwing themselves down on open exposed ground in order to fire and get hits.

The question is sometimes asked—What are you going to do if the zone of action assigned your unit is a wide open plain with no cover? The answer is as follows: There usually is some cover if you are skillful enough to see it and to use it. If there be absolutely no cover, then units on the right and left where the going is better should work forward and relieve your situation before you advance out of your cover. Or, if this is impossible, then a concentration of artillery fire should be called for for the particular benefit of your unit. Or, in the case of a large unit, cavalry should be used to attack over the wide plain in front of you followed closely by infantry. Or tanks, if the objective is not very far away, should be used instead of cavalry. Without any of these auxiliaries you should not attempt to attack over such ground. If you are forced to it, it means great loss and probable failure.

Thus, combat exercises with ball cartridges, if had at all, should be had under these principles and firing never required at distances greater than 300 yards except by a few sharpshooters and then only when in excellent cover.

It should be remembered that we are considering in this discussion the attack against an enemy in position and the value of combat exercises with ball ammunition, with the enemy represented by targets. It is not intended to convey the impression that infantry rifle units do not fire in any attack. As already pointed out they do fire at very close range. And in other kinds of fighting, such as meeting engagements, infantry in attack will probably fire at ranges longer than 300 yards.

But a meeting engagement soon resolves itself into a situation with one side holding a position and the other advancing to attack. As soon as this occurs the attackers should bring all the machine gun and artillery fire to bear that is possible, and the rifle units should then commence getting forward under cover, taking advantage of every fold in the ground, every tree, bush, rock, building and any other obstacle to the enemy's observation and fire. They should withhold their fire until the last possible moment and avoid the attempt to build up firing lines

at ranges over 300 yards. The stationary units supporting the attack by fire, viz: the machine guns and artillery, and sometimes rifle units using the "fire of position," should pour in a tremendous fire.

Our combat exercises do not teach this. They teach the building up of firing positions at ranges that are too long, cause too much exposure, *put too much emphasis on the number of hits on the targets and a corresponding neglect in the art of advancing under cover,* give a false impression as to the visibility of the enemy, neglect the great principle "never deploy or disperse a unit beyond the limits of control by the leader," and violate other tactical principles, all in the interest of getting hits on the targets that in war we shall not see.

For these reasons I would abolish these exercises. Teach the men to pull a trigger properly at known distances. Teach the art of advancing under cover without bunching, avoiding halts on open ground, movement by bounds, keeping only a general alignment on other units, avoiding too much dispersion of the platoon, and many other practical principles for the advance under cover. The actual movement forward should be done by individuals advancing from cover to cover and without exposing themselves for more than five seconds at one time. No advances by rushes except where an open space which can be crossed by a single rush lies in front of a whole squad or platoon. Cause platoon and squad leaders to have much practice in this very interesting work. Attempt no "fire distribution" in the attack and teach men to shoot at close ranges at what they can see. No sight settings other than the battle-sight should be permitted excepting the 300 yard which can be used as a permanent setting.

I am referring to the *attack*—not the *defense*. In defense, rifle units will have more opportunity for fire at medium and close ranges and for fire distribution. Therefore, our target practice up to 600 yards should continue, and fire distribution taught in defensive positions. But the attack is another matter and resolves into two grand and simple principles: *Fire from troops and weapons in position to support the advancing rifle units. Advance rifle units without firing and with skillful use of cover.*

Under these two principles, when firing with battle-sights becomes necessary it will take care of itself.

I would not object to combat exercises with ball cartridges if they were controlled by these principles. But they never are. Unit commanders are too anxious to get hits because of the way the regulations are written. And even though this were not so, the difficulties of getting up a natural situation and solving it correctly on the ground available on most of our reservations are almost insurmountable. The direction of fire must always be just along a certain line in order not to endanger the garrison and the neighboring inhabitants. Unsuitable terrain must be used. For one thing or another the problems always teach false lessons. Tactical exercises with blank cartridges have not the same limitations and should be substituted.

Finally, I believe in teaching range estimation and target designation. Fire discipline and fire control can be well taught with blank cartridges while properly performing a tactical exercise on any reservation or right in the post and among the buildings which give good training in village fighting. But I do not believe in fire distribution or any complex form of control that will cause extra loss in platoon commanders and noncommissioned officers. Nor do I believe in causing unnecessary losses to the men by building up firing lines at ranges greater than 300 yards. And I do not believe in the wide dispersion in depth now practiced in handling infantry platoons, thus making the platoon leaders' job more difficult and causing greater losses of these valuable young officers than is suffered in proportion by any other military grade.

For training purposes I do not believe that we begin to realize the usefulness of blank cartridges for tactical exercises. They give to the men all the sensations of having men firing around them and the practice of avoiding accidents to each other, enable the instructor to know what his men are doing, can be used on any terrain and in any direction, give more variety to tactical exercises involving firing, and finally preclude the tendency to make men expose themselves to get hits on targets at too long ranges.

I have selected 300 yards as about the right range for riflemen to open fire because at that range our men can see and pick off an enemy who may be firing at them. The supporting fire must slacken or be lifted as the troops advance from such a range. The front line riflemen must now fight it out and the assault begun at once or delayed if the cover is excellent, some units firing to support the advance of others.

*Fire distribution* is one of the false theories we have indulged in for many years. A platoon or squad that sees a small exposed group of the enemy should concentrate its fire on that group and not try to disperse its fire along a line of bushes or other cover where it thinks the enemy may be. That is wasting fire. Destroy by concentration of fire the enemy you can see and he will soon duck under cover and perhaps fail to expose himself thereafter sufficiently to shoot at you. In our combat or musketry exercises we expose a few targets and then forbid the men, excepting a very few, to shoot at them. The targets cannot fall and disappear as a hit enemy would (at least not without very expensive and complex and impractical arrangements), so for fear of filling them with an unnecessary lot of bullet holes we only permit a few men to fire on them while the balance of the squad must shoot at the bushes where the enemy may be. In real combat the result would be that the exposed men would often get off scot free and no one who isn't exposed would be hit either. Very few hits are obtained on unseen targets unless you know precisely where each target is. Every hunter knows that to kill a duck you must select one and aim at him and not fire blindly into the flock. The theory that to hold down the enemy fire you must cover his whole supposed but not known line will not hold water. When the hostile soldiers find out that you are not concentrating on every group that exposes itself they will not be disturbed

and will wait for you to expose yourself and then concentrate their fire on you until you are down and then wait for another group to expose itself. The attempt to effect fire distribution causes noncommissioned officers to expose themselves too much. Since in any event fire should not be opened by riflemen (except a few sharpshooters at exposed machine guns) at ranges greater than 300 yards, fire distribution would not apply in any case until very close to the enemy, and then our men can see any enemy who exposes himself to fire and should aim and shoot him.

Fire distribution at targets accomplishes its purpose of getting a few hits on all the targets instead of many hits on a few, but at live men it is an entirely different proposition, and this shows again how seriously inanimate targets misrepresent a live enemy. Machine guns and artillery should practice fire distribution and use it in battle. These weapons, also, have frequently to comb a line of bushes or the edge of a wood, or tall grass, where an enemy machine gun lies hidden. A platoon of riflemen may exceptionally have to do this, but in that case it is better to order simply, "fire at edge of that wood," or, "at that clump of bushes," without attempting to designate in miles the width of the target or use any of the elaborate methods suggested in Musketry Regulations. The men themselves will, naturally and even unavoidably, distribute their fire sufficiently. It must be remembered that the men are now close to the enemy and probably under hot fire, and platoon commanders and squad leaders cannot expose themselves to crawl here and there to direct the fire of individuals as we see in Musketry practice.

The teaching of all these principles is simple and direct. They vary from what is now taught only slightly, but the differences are all important. They are as follows:

1. More practice in the advance under cover.
2. No halting in open, exposed places.
3. No firing, generally, until very close to the enemy.
4. No attempt at fire distribution. Concentrate fire.
5. Less dispersion in the platoon, but never any bunching. This would probably involve a smaller platoon and a difference in the method of deployment in depth.
6. More study of supporting fire by machine guns and of the means of getting them forward under cover, and more practice in quickly improvising covered emplacements for the guns in each successive firing position.

NOTE: Low, light carriages with small wheels (perhaps wire wheels with rubber tires) that can be dragged along by men with ropes 20 or 30 feet long so that the men can keep under cover. Some machine gun units held back to provide overhead fire if terrain permits.

The machine guns giving close support must learn to keep under cover, move by bounds, coöperate with the advancing riflemen by keeping slightly in rear, on flanks, and in gaps, just as the regulations now prescribe, but more practice with rifle companies, all using blank cartridges.

If the terrain is so thick with bushes, trees, hills, villages, that machine guns in close support cannot be used, then the riflemen will have to depend on their own fire; but in this case they cannot see to fire at ranges greater than about 300 yards, so that it comes to the same thing as the advance without firing to the 300 yard point previously advocated.

These principles are at variance with TR 420-85, 13-(3), (4), (5). I am in agreement with TR 420-115, 5 b (1). This sub-paragraph states, "To engage in a fire fight at 800, or even 600 yards, gives the defender a decided advantage." But many of our musketry exercises require firing at 600 yards or more.

I am not in agreement with those paragraphs of TR 420-110 which violate the principles set forth above.

I am in complete disagreement with TR 145-5—Pars. 30, 35, 49, 51, 53, 54, 55, because I regard them as unnecessary and impractical and too much emphasis is laid upon the number of hits on targets, men are permitted to fire without taking proper advantage of cover and at ranges that are too long.

Firing without cover and firing with cover are very different problems. There is no good to be gained in teaching something which cannot be done when you combine it with other principles in tactical exercises.

The soldier can absorb only a few practical principles. He can understand the firing on "A" ranges to teach him to shoot. He can understand the practical tactical exercise in which he is taught to advance under cover and to shoot only at what he can see at close ranges. But when we put in intermediate steps and teach him to halt and expose himself on open ground in order to get hits on targets, he will remember that lesson as associated with actual firing in combat formations, and this false lesson will stick in his mind when under the excitement of battle. He will not take cover, or at any rate not more than to throw himself down on the ground believing, like an ostrich, that he is covered when he is really in plain view. Furthermore, he is actually taught and required to do this by the regulations to which I object.

It will not be very long before the infantry and the cavalry are armed with self-loading rifles. This is being considered more seriously every day, especially in relation to defense against attack aviation. When it comes about, the infantry will no longer insist on firing at ranges greater than 300 yards in the attack.

☆ ☆ ☆

# Third Cavalry Wins Rifle Shoot—First Cavalry, Pistol Shoot

By CAPTAIN P. M. MARTIN, *Cavalry*

During the month of February all Regular Army Cavalry Regiments participated in an inter-regimental small-bore rifle and pistol tournament. The matches were arranged by the Chief of Cavalry. Considerable interest was created. There was a series of three matches, held weekly, the scores being sent by radio to the Chief of Cavalry's office where they were consolidated and published by radio. The targets were sent to the Department of Weapons and Matériel at The Cavalry School, where they were officially scored, for the sake of uniformity.

Following are the final results with names of the members of the winning teams. The points were computed from the relative standing in each match. Where ties were encountered they were decided by aggregate score.

1st CAVALRY PISTOL TEAM

*Left to right, sitting: Sergeant Kellerman, Troop A; Captain Evans; First Sergeant McGimpsey, Troop C. Standing: Staff Sergeant McGannon, Machine Gun Troop; Corporal Mitchell, Troop A; Sergeant Stewart, Headquarters Troop; Private Cornwell, Headquarters Troop; Private Miller, Service Troop.*

**THIRD CAVALRY SMALL-BORE RIFLE TEAM, WINNER OF THE CAVALRY SMALL-BORE RIFLE CHAMPIONSHIP**

***Left to right, standing:*** **Corporal Curtis T. Mimna, Machine Gun Troop; Private Avery M. Greer, Troop F; Sergeant Edward G. Krebs, Machine Gun Troop; Corporal Stanley J. Olender, Machine Gun Troop; Private James P. Mills, new shot, Troop E.** ***Sitting:*** **Sergeant Albert Martina, Troop E; Sergeant Edward Yeszerski, Machine Gun Troop; Private Warren G. Davis, Troop F.**

***Absent members, 1st Squadron, Fort Ethan Allen Vermont:*** **First Sergeant Stanley Blazejevski, Troop A; Corporal Richard L. Hazel, Troop A; Private Francis E. Gormley, Troop A; Private Ernest C. De Mello, Troop A.**

3RD CAVALRY RIFLE TEAM

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| DeMello | Blazejevski | Greer | Mills |
| Gormley | Mimna | Krebs | Hazel |
| Olender | Davis | Yeszerski | Martina |

1ST CAVALRY PISTOL TEAM

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kellerman | Cornwell | Miller | McGimpsey |
| Mitchell | McGannon | Stewart | |

RIFLE CHAMPIONSHIP

| *Place* | *Regiment* | *Points* |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 3rd Cavalry | 6 |
| 2 | 13th " | 8 |
| 3 | 6th " | 12 |
| 4 | 14th " | 15 |
| 5 | 2d " | 15 |
| 6 | 11th " | 15 |
| 7 | 1st " | 19 |

PISTOL CHAMPIONSHIP

| *Place* | *Regiment* | *Points* |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1st Cavalry | 6 |
| 2 | 14th " | 7 |
| 3 | 13th " | 10 |
| 4 | 3d " | 11 |
| 5 | 2d " | 12 |
| 6 | 11th " | 17 |
| 7 | 7th " | 23 |

It was obvious that some teams were not ready for these matches. One of the teams improved its score almost one hundred points each week. The purpose was to promote interest in competitive shooting in the Cavalry regiments. This end was attained to a very gratifying degree.

This spring, service rifle and pistol matches are to be held between Cavalry Regiments at certain selected stations. It is hoped that these competitions will be as successful as the small-bore were.

# Notes On the M1 Rifle

By LIEUTENANT J. D. WILMETH, *Infantry*

Upon issue of the M1 rifle to your organization, opinions will be quickly formed. Your own opinion, publicly announced, will color the opinions of your men more than will that of anyone else. For the sake of your marksmanship season, and regardless of what opinion you may have of the M1, if you fail to openly endorse this rifle as the best of any military small-arm weapon, you have already created an alibi for those men in your company who lack determination.

It is natural that you will want to familiarize yourself with the piece prior to marksmanship season. Notice I say, and now emphasize, *familiarize*. It would be unfortunate to give the impression that this is an *experimental* weapon and that you are going to *experiment* with it.

Select your instructor group with a view to obtaining men who have not grown too old to accept a change and the initial hardship that a change always entails. Together with them study this rifle from butt plate to muzzle. Stress functioning! A thorough knowledeg of the working parts will reduce stoppages; for if stoppages occur too frequently, confidence in the piece will wane.

If it is at all possible, even with considerable hardship, to take yourself and instructors on the range prior to preliminary instruction with the company, do so. This will give your instructors and your instruction the lining of "personal reaction" that will enable you to apply to preliminaries those lessons learned on the range. Insist that your instructors bring all difficulties to you for discussion. Insist, and in strong terms, that they *do not* take any difficulties to the men! In the presence of the men they must have nothing but encouragement. They must evince a genuine satisfaction with the piece. A few malcontents can start an alibi order before the sight setting equipment has been taken out of the supply room.

Where a difference of opinion on any point arises among the instructors, talk over the matter with them, select the best thought, and then have all men understand that the opinion selected will be the instruction which the company will receive. Explain to your instructors the necessity for all of you to speak the same language. Instruction given to the men must be completely standardized in *every detail*. The ruin of the company will be insured where each instructor is teaching a different "system."

Live by the book! The M1 BFM was written after years of experience with this weapon by men who know weapons. Do not inject your own ideas before you have tried an approved solution. Take the manual as dogma, unless you can prove with evidence that will stand up in court that your individual deviation is the better. Avoid being a "now-the-book's-all-wrong-on-this-point" egoist. That attitude on your part or on the part of your instructors is not conducive to the confidence you must engender in your men in order to complete a successful season.

### Sighting and Aiming Exercises

Sighting and aiming exercises are conducted in the same manner as with the 1903 rifle. The equipment you have on hand is usable as is, except the rifle rest boxes must be modified to hold the stock of the M1.

The new peep sight is larger than the old one and closer to the eye. For these reasons it is a little more difficult to keep it centered. For the preliminary work men must be cautioned to make a habit of consciously glancing at the alinement of peep sight-front sight.

The Belgian aiming device can be applied to the M1 without modification. It should be used frequently to check the alinement existing between sights.

It is well to spend most of the time in making triangles at a range of 300 yards. This will glaringly show errors of sighting, men take more interest in the long distance work, and range work calls for considerable firing at this yardage.

### Position

The prone position is essentially the same as the old, but no elbow holes may be dug. Because of this lack of support the left elbow should be placed on the right side of a vertical plane through the piece. As there is no bolt to manipulate, it is unnecessary to push forward with the right elbow. It should have the more comfortable position, drawn back, and close in to the body. The more nearly vertical the arm is from shoulder to elbow, the better.

Kneeling is virtually the same, with these small differences. The elbow is not raised above the horizontal but is held at a more comfortable angle in order for the hand to get a proper grip on the pistol stock. The left knee is drawn a little closer to the body, and the upper body is advanced as far forward as possible so that the left arm pit is almost over the left knee. As no holes may be dug, it is advisable to wear a stiff sole on the right foot for support while sitting on the heel. In most cases sitting on the side of the right foot will throw the man's weight to the rear and result in overturning him during time fire.

Standing position has not been changed other than by dropping the right elbow slightly so that the pistol grip of the piece may be held properly. As only four shots are fired from this position do not devote time to it that could better be used on the kneeling, a comparatively strange position, from which sixteen timed rounds are fired.

Sitting position is not used.

### Trigger Squeeze

The M1 has a far better trigger than has the old rifle. Its action is more velvety, less creepy. But the M1 *needs* a far better trigger. On time fire the tendency to jerk is all but overpowering. This fault is developed by rushing; it

can be overcome, in fact it will not be introduced, if you make a rule *never* to say "Speed up!" The birth of a jerk is mental. It arises from a feeling of rush. Most jerkers get their start on the practice field, where the fault is not so evident, and are not discovered until they reach the range. Too often then the jerk is neo-chronic. To reduce this jerk is a gigantic task, and one almost impossible of accomplishment on the range. Jerkers must be removed from the firing line and returned to dry work where they can be closely supervised. They must always squeeze—never jerk. In this way, and it is the only way, a proper habit is built. The more times men squeeze the farther they get from jerking. The old adage "Practice makes perfect" presupposes that the practice itself is correct. It can be antonymed to read "Wrong practice makes imperfect."

Often an instructor will unconsciously develop jerkers through a misunderstanding of "cadence firing," as the book terms it. This, at surface glance, seems to call for the regular occurrence of the explosion. If timed explosions are insisted upon the men will give them—but by jerking, the most natural way to correct what is believed to be at fault. Before time fire exercises are introduced the instructor should have an understanding with his men that cadence, first of all, is a *mental* process. If he will have the men repeat to themselves "slack up—squeeeeze! slack up—squeeeeeze!" in cadence, the explosions may not be exactly rhythmic but the score will be in tune. It follows from this that it is a great mistake to try to achieve cadence by whistle blasts at certain intervals, an unfortunate practice that has sprung up.

Often a jerk can be washed out by having the thumb lapped across the stock, having the man get a mental impression of trying to push down his thumb tip to meet his trigger-finger tip. If this impression can be left with the man he is cured, for it is impossible for him to jerk with his thumb. Also, the thumb-across-stock protects the lip from bruising, and a bruised lip may be a cause of jerking.

### Miscellany

Once range practice is started do not remove the gas plug from the muzzle, because in replacing it the fit may be a little different from the time before. As this plug is the last part to come in contact with the bullet, its effect must be consant in order for the piece to be zeroed.

If chamber brushes are not available, buy some bottle brushes. Swab out the chamber after each firing while it is hot. This will reduce stoppages almost 100%.

As two-thirds of your record firing is time fire, it is wise to use this same ratio in preliminary work and practice firing.

The most time saving order of firing record is to start at 500 yards. Here prone, slow is fired. Then move to 300 yards and fire prone, time. Then, at 300, fire kneeling, slow. Move to 200 yards and fire kneeling, time. Then standing, slow. Fired in this order the course will require an average of forty-five minutes per order. With no more than six orders, record practice can be completed in one morning—a decided improvement over the old course.

New men, I believe, are better with this rifle than with the old. In my company the M1 was fired for record for the first time this past summer. The scores of previously unqualified men averaged but one point lower than the scores of the previously qualified.

# A Target Range Trailer

**By MAJOR CHARLES R. JOHNSON, Cavalry**

The trailer which is described in this article was made for experimental use with an R.O.T.C. Unit on the target range. It has proved entirely successful.

Briefly, the idea is to construct a very rugged cleaning rack, tool bench and record desk, mounting it on a salvaged chassis. This body carries all necessary range equipment for six firing points and is covered by a tent fly while in use. While traveling, the tent uprights, which are hinged, drop forward letting the ridge pole, which is hinged to the uprights, fall into two chocks and the tent fly remains on the ridge, serving as a wagon cover. An important feature shown in the pictures is the reinforcing of the uprights at their bases to prevent sidesway when the tent is up. This was accomplished by attaching to the base of each upright two ells of strap iron 1½ x ¼. The hitch was purchased from a mail-order house. The trailer has spaces for cleaning six rifles.

The following equipment was carried:

- 12 Cleaning rods
- 6 Rifle rests for use at firing point
- 6 Horse covers for the firing points
- 6 Shooting coats
- 6 Shooting gloves
- 12 Folding stools (1 per coach and 1 per firer)
- 1 Spotting scope, complete with tripod. (35X)
- 4 Folding chairs (1 for telephone, 1 for scope, 1 for record desk, 1 for C.O.)
- 2 Stiff wire chamber brushes (for rapid fire)
- 1 Trigged testing weight
- 1 Road smoke torch, covered with a galvanized iron funnel, for blackening sights
- 5 Gallons kerosene

*1—Detail of uprights and ridge. 2—Stripped frame, constructed of 2x6 material. 3—Angles to brace uprights. 4—Ridge pole in traveling position. Note the steel brace on base of upright. This brace is essential. 5—Trailer packed for traveling. Field desk end. 6—Trailer packed for traveling, tool bench end. 7—Trailer set up on range.*

- 1 Box of cleaning material
- 4 Buckets (1 for live ammunition, 1 for empties, 1 for trash, 1 for boiling soda solution)
- 1 Coffee boiler for ice water
- 1 Package of folding cups.
- 1 Kerosene pressure stove for boiling soda
- 1 Folding iron screen to shield stove from wind
- 1 Shovel
- 1 Pick
- 2 Trowels
- 6 Field glasses
- 1 Micrometer
- 1 Shot hole gauge
- 1 Mechanical pencil sharpener mounted on desk
- 1 Emery wheel, hand
- 1 Vise mounted on work bench

1 Tin box of Ordnance repair tools and spare parts
1 Tent fly mounted on the trailer
6 Guy poles for fly
1 Jar of vaseline and graphite, mixed
1 Belgian aiming device
Necessary tent pins
1 Sledge
1 Extra fly with poles and pins to be used away from trailer for men not firing
1 Telephone
1 Wire incinerator
1 Milk can of extra water
1 Whistle
1 Spare tire

To the above should be added a beach umbrella for the telephone man. This definitely locates him.

This target season was preceded by a three weeks' march where the men carried their Class "A" rifles on the saddle. The trailer was set up in camp each day and was a material aid in keeping the rifles in excellent condition. On the range it materially contributed to the high quality of the men's shooting.

46 R.O.T.C. students shot as follows:
5 Experts
21 Sharpshooters
15 Marksmen
5 Unqualified

While I say that the trailer aided this rather exceptional R.O.T.C. qualification, the major amount of credit is due Captain Clark L. Ruffner, Cavalry, for his energetic and thorough conduct of the firing line. He made little use of the extra chair.

# The Fourth Cavalry and Equine Encephalomyelitis

By LIEUTENANT COLONEL ELWOOD L. NYE, *Veterinary Corps*

Much has been written in recent years on equine encephalomyelitis; however it appears that specific experiences with this disease in relation to the animals of the Fourth Cavalry might be related with some benefit.

In that part of western South Dakota, the Black Hills area, which surrounds Fort Meade; encephalomyelitis* has occurred with varying intensity; but in epidemic proportions for a number of years. The writer's experience with the disease in this area began in 1935 and continued uninterrupted for the next three years. It had been present in this region prior to 1935; and it is the writer's opinion that it has existed here for many years unknown or called by various other names as: forage poisoning, blind staggers, etc.

During the first several years of the prevalence of encephalomyelitis in this area cases were confined to civilian-owned animals. The first cases to appear among the horses of the garrison occurred in the fall of 1937. Two animals developed the infection at that time. Both recovered under treatment.

From the time the writer reported at this station in 1935 until the present; the usual precautionary measures have been observed during the season. Herding and pasturage of animals have been discontinued or restricted; horses were stabled except when actually in use; stables were screened and darkened; and insect repellents were used. Every possible effort was made to keep the animals in excellent general condition.

Having found through extensive use on civilian-owned animals that the brain tissue vaccine was at least 90% effective the writer considered its use justified and made recommendations each spring that all animals at Fort Meade be vaccinated. Certainly it was the best thing to be done at that time. All such recommendations were disapproved.

Thus we have the situation as it was in July, 1938, when this regiment departed for an extensive march and maneuvers. It was known at this station; and so reported to higher authority, that the only possible route of march (water) led through an area in which a considerable number of cases of encephalomyelitis had already occurred. As stated above the animals to make the march were unprotected by any sort of vaccination; however the start was made on July 19, 1938, and for 18 days either marching or in camps, until Laramie, Wyoming, was reached; the horses were more or less exposed to infection. Mosquitoes and other biting insects were not a problem of importance except in and around Wheatland, Wyoming. At this point, infection was known to exist among civilian-owned animals, and flies and mosquitoes were plentiful. It is significant to note the date of the camp at Wheatland. It was July 29, 1938.

Laramie was reached August 5th and on this date three cases of encephalomyelitis developed, two of them very severe. Two days later a fourth case appeared. No serum was available in time to be beneficial; so the animals were given medical treatment and all recovered. It is of course difficult to treat such cases successfully under field conditions.

Telegraphic reports as to the situation were made to higher authority and on August 11th the War Depart-

*Sleeping sickness.

ment by radiogram authorized vaccination of all animals present with the command in the field. It was suggested that the new chick-embryo vaccine be used. This vaccine was procured in Denver, Colorado, and on August 12th, 486 head of horses were given the initial dose of vaccine. Regardless of unfavorable field conditions the site of injection on each animal, a spot centrally located on the rear side of the neck was shaved and swabbed with alcohol. Injections were made deeply into the muscles; experience having indicated that there was much less local reaction following such injections than with the subcutaneous method.

The writer had been assured by persons familiar with the use of chick-embryo vaccine that there was little, if any, local or systematic reaction following its administration, and that animals so treated could be worked immediately following injection. However, the horses were rested during the afternoon of August 12th and the following night. The return march was started the morning of August 13th. It quickly became apparent that many of the animals were not normal. The usual spirit and ambition were decidedly lacking; and there was pronounced lassitude and indifference on the part of many. However all horses completed the day's march, which fortunately was rather short. Upon arrival in camp about twenty-five head which had reacted most actively were checked at the veterinary dispensary. Their appearance was dejected, respiration about 30 per minute, and temperatures varied from 102° F. to 104° F. Each of the above animals was indifferent to food and some ate not at all. This was also true of a number of the others, of the regiment. For the second day's march, a rather long one, those horses continuing to manifest pronounced reactions were placed in a detachment which followed the main column at a slow walk. The above conditions continued for three days, and some temperatures remained above normal for four days. Thus our experience indicates that a definite and persisting reaction in about 35% of individual animals may be expected following the use of the vaccine in question. This is supported by a similar experience when the second injection was made at Fort Meade fourteen days later. This time the animals were given absolute rest yet reactions were apparent for two days.

The question may be raised as to why the march was resumed so soon after the initial injection and before any immunity could have been established. Experience of others than the writer had indicated that considerable immunity was developed five days after the first injection; and as stated above, it was reported that no reactions followed. Therefore since the area surrounding the camp where vaccination was started was known to be infected, and since all the territory to be traversed on the return march was in the grip of an extensive and virulent epidemic; there seemed little choice as to where the animals were at any particular time. The march was continued.

This return march gave a severe and thorough test to the new vaccine. Only one dose had been given and it was impossible to avoid close contact with the disease for over two weeks. The question of water supply made it impossible to change route; and had it been possible nothing would have been accomplished as the infection was so widely spread that it could not have been avoided. Camps were made on ranches where animals had recently died of encephalomyelitis; and on several occasions active cases of the disease were within a half mile of the camp. Insects were never a special problem on the return march but some mosquitoes and flies were found at several camps. The animals came through this severe test without the development of a case of encephalomyelitis; and the second injection was made the day the command reached Fort Meade. As stated above there was also considerable reaction following this dose. The epidemic terminated soon after and no cases ever developed among the vaccinated animals.

The writer is firmly of the opinion that there is at last available a cheap and effective means of preventing equine encephalomyelitis. Certainly the severe test made by the return march indicates it most emphatically. It may confidently be expected that no animals of any command will ever encounter more adverse conditions than those described above; and yet the animals came through without difficulty.

Experiments so far conducted indicate that the vaccine is effective for about six months. This is sufficient to protect through any single epidemic; but in the state of our present knowledge it will be necessary to vaccinate all animals each year. This should be done early, probably in May, in order that immunity may be developed before natural infection occurs.

The question naturally arises: "Should all equines everywhere be vaccinated each year for a period of two or three years and no cases of encephalomyelitis occur; would the disease spontaneously disappear?" A negative answer is indicated. It has been definitely established that this disease is due to a virus or organism; and experimentally, at least, that it can be transmitted by certain varieties of mosquitoes, flies, and ticks. It has also been proven that the virus is found in certain poultry, pheasants, quail, rats, mice, gophers, and cattle, and man. Therefore if all the above may furnish reservoirs of infection it becomes apparent why a systematic and general vaccination of horses probably would not eliminate the disease.

The writer has highly recommended the chick-embryo vaccine. It must be remembered however that any vaccine can fail at times. No biological product is 100% effective, and this will be true with the vaccine under discussion. It will fail to protect in a very small percentage of cases. This is due to the difference in individuals; assuming that a standard and uniform product is used in each instance. Certain animals fail to respond in developing immunity, as rapidly or as completely as the majority. Others may fail almost completely to acquire protection. This, however, should in no way destroy confidence in a product which has proved so highly effective and offers protection against the greatest equine scourge of modern times.

## Wounded Knee

Dear Sir:

The article "Wounded Knee" by Brigadier General E. D. Scott, Retired, published in your last issue of The CAVALRY JOURNAL (January-February, 1939) was certainly an accurate and most deserving account of the Battle of Wounded Knee. General Scott is to be heartily congratulated for his successful effort to correct the misrepresentations and the misunderstandings which have been published during recent years concerning that battle.

I was particularly interested and thrilled over General Scott's historical masterpiece, as General Whitside (then Major at Wounded Knee) is my grandfather. At the time of the battle my mother, Mrs. Archibald Miller, of Washington, and my uncle, Colonel Warren W. Whitside, now commanding the Remount Depot at Front Royal, Virginia, were children at Fort Riley, Kansas, then the home of the famous Seventh Cavalry. I am inclosing an old photograph of members of that regiment taken on the target range at Fort Riley in 1888.

The fact that Colonel Forsythe and Major Whitside the two ranking officers at Wounded Knee, were both promoted to the grade of general, the former within two years after the battle, substantiates General Scott's research and also the justification of the action at Wounded Knee.

Very truly yours,

WHITSIDE MILLER,
1st Lieutenant, 2nd Cavalry.

* * *

## Borium

Dear Sir:

As a member of the San Francisco Sheriff's Mounted Posse I think that you will be interested in knowing that by shoeing our horses with Borium the shoes not only last longer but have practically eliminated the danger of slipping on pavements and car tracks.

In one of the parades preliminary to the World's Fair out here, I rode for a solid hour on Market Street in the midst of several hundred thousand people with bands playing, sirens screaming and people shooting off guns. I was riding a rather nervous horse. During that time he

**HAPPY DAYS**

***Left to right, Seated on ground:*** **Miss Hattie Bache, Miss Bessie Forsythe, Mrs. Wm. J. Nicholson, Master Wm. C. F. Nicholson, Miss Nicholson, Mrs. Winfield S. Edgerly, unknown, Miss Marion Forsythe, Miss Mary Hare, Miss Madeline Whitside, unknown.** ***Seated in chairs:*** **First Lieutenant Edwin P. Brewer—7th Cav. Miss Berta Bache, unknown, unknown, unknown, Mrs. James W. Forsythe, unknown, Mrs. S. M. Whitside.** ***Standing:*** **Miss Mary Forsythe, Lieutenant Glennon, M. C., Miss Kerr, unknown, Master W. W. Whitside, Major Dallas Bache, Med. C.**

stepped on street car tracks at least a thousand times, and not once did he slip. As a matter of fact, I felt as secure as if we had been on a dirt road. I think that the non-skidding angle is one that we should develop further because to us who are parading constantly on pavement it means safety and we certainly aren't going to overlook anything that will keep our horses from going down.

PAISANO.

* * *

## Training

Dear Sir:

From time to time during recent years I have enjoyed several interesting conversations with junior officers of the cavalry. On several occasions their discussions have warranted much consideration. This conclusion holds particularly in their remarks on training which one encounters among the scattered posts of the cavalry.

Some initimate that troop officers rarely see the senior field officers of the regiment on the drill field or during the conduct of exercises covering the field of minor tactics. Perhaps the absence so noted may be the result of lack of time consumed in matters of an administrative nature, for there is no doubt that on posts involving CCC affairs much time is required in that activity. Again, it may be based on the opinion that the presence of a field officer during troop training is a detriment to the initiative of troop commanders and troop officers. Under either occasion or for any other reason, it is believed that the junior officer is the loser. The field officer, with definite ideas on the conduct of tactical training, covering for example the conduct of a point of advance guard, may well inject friendly counsel and comment to the profit of all. The mere presence of a field officer should not necessarily denote an air of critical supervision but rather one of friendly coöperation. True it is that the training of a troop is a responsibility of a troop commander, but in no wise is this responsibility lessened or deterred by the presence of senior officers who are there in an atmosphere of curious interest or perhaps with a word of suggestion or advice given upon an opportune moment. With a fund of genuine knowledge of his profession, the field officer can exercise profound influence in matters of training on the drill and tactical fields.

Again one hears the junior officer regret that he had not encountered more hours of tactical field training at his last post. One has even heard him state that tactical exercises seemed to be the exception rather than the general rule; that the initiation of tactical exercises seemed to involve such ponderous detail that they were approached with reluctance. Should this state of affairs be true, the junior officer is indeed unfortunate to find himself in those surroundings. All drill should be formulated upon its future application to a specified tactical end. Drill is but a means to a definite end. To avoid that consideration is but the wastage of time, energy and invaluable manpower.

AGRIPPA.


# The United States Cavalry Association

**Organized November 9, 1885**

*The aim and purpose of the Association shall be to disseminate knowledge of the military art and science, to promote the professional improvement of its members, and to preserve and foster the spirit, the traditions, and the solidarity of the Cavalry of the Army of the United States.—Article III of the Constitution.*



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## Contents

During the past several months a large portion of The CAVALRY JOURNAL has been devoted to articles dealing with the higher aspects of war and with the larger picture of cavalry in the national defense.

Lieutenant Colonel Schwien in the past year has discussed cavalry operations in the days of 1914. He has attempted in his studies to focus analytical reasoning toward those channels in which the cavalry masses available at that time might have been used to better advantage. Colonel Schwien continues his research drawing attention to a situation in which the inherent mobility of cavalry was not utilized. The cavalry leader, as well as the army commander, must be capable of visualizing the situation on a large scale. His horizon must not be dwarfed by vascillation and hesitation. It is the old story of the frequent necessity of fighting to gain vital information and lift the fog of war.

With the exception of the foregoing article on "Neglected Mobility" the current issue is devoted more to basic technique and administrative matters. The careful reader will find much data for reflection in the comments of General Hawkins on musketry and combat firing. Those interested in supply and logistics will find interest in Major Perry's comments on supplying a mechanized brigade. While Captain Yale's remarks on organization will appeal more to those in the higher echelons of command, others may find value in subjects discussed under "Special Activities."

* * *

## Memberships

Interest in and support of cavalry affairs through the Cavalry Association is registered in these figures:

Regular Cavalry Officers—98% are members.

National Guard—103rd Cavalry, 100% membership.
104th Cavalry, 100% membership.
112th Cavalry, 100% membership.
113th Cavalry, 100% membership.
114th Cavalry, 100% membership,

Cavalry Reserve—308th Cavalry, 61% membership.
(Highest in that component.)

Forty per cent of the commissioned cavalrymen in the country are carrying the load. Subscription dues alone maintain and support The JOURNAL. May the above roll of honor continue to grow until the majority of our 57 regiments of cavalry (14 Regular, 19 National Guard, 24 Reserve) appear on this list.

## Horsemanship

One has heard a successful high ranking cavalry officer remark, "He is an excellent officer, but I am uncertain about his horsemanship. Only infrequently have I seen him on a horse engaged in that type of riding which a cavalry action will demand."

Cavalry is led from the saddle. There may be merit in the statement of this "old-timer."

# IN MEMORIAM

Headquarters, Seventh Cavalry
Fort Bliss, Texas

The Regimental Commander regrets to announce the death of Colonel Selah R. H. Tompkins, Retired, on February 5th in San Antonio, Texas.

Besides having been an integral and vital part of Seventh Cavalry history, Colonel Tompkins, affectionately known as "Tommy," was one of the most picturesque and widely known figures of his time in the U. S. Army. A man of magnetic personality and outstanding character, brusque but kind, Colonel Tompkins was known either personally or by reputation wherever an army post exists.

The funeral services of Colonel Tompkins will be held at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, at 10:00 A.M., C.S.T., on Thursday, February 9, 1939.

As a tribute to his memory, all members of the Seventh Cavalry at 9:00 A.M., M.S.T., Thursday, February 9th (Fort Bliss time corresponding to the time of the funeral services), will cease performance of all duties, except as noted below, and remain silent for a period of one minute.

The Band and Buglers, 7th Cavalry, will assemble at Headquarters at 8:55 A.M., same date. Promptly at 9:00 A.M., the buglers will blow the Seventh Cavalry call followed immediately by Taps. Upon the completion of Taps, after a suitable pause, the Band will play "Garry Owen," which will typify the spirit of our beloved "Tommy" carrying on in the regiment forever.

W. W. WEST,
*Colonel, 7th Cavalry, Commanding.*

***May "Old Tommy" fall in with the gallant Custer as the intrepid host of Garry Owens gallops forever over the Elysian Fields.***

# NOTES from the CHIEF of CAVALRY




## What Would You Do?

DEAR "ED":

Thank you for your letter and the $200.00 check for my last treatise. However, being a famous writer like Pete Kyne and Tommy Wadleton has its drawbacks. Only last week I received a short note from one of my friends stating that if my last article was caused by New Year's Eve, he was in favor of my discontinuing its observance completely.

Therefore I shall have to ask you to treat the following episode as confidential.

Yours,
"SLINKOVITCH."

P. S. The following dream happened while I was having my teeth extracted by Capt. Ivan K. M. Outte, M.C.

* * *

You will recall in the last episode, that I was a lieutenant in Troop A, 901st Cavalry (Mecz), the Reconnaissance Troop. At 12:00 noon our troop had arrived at "Rileyville College of Applied Aids" and had just received the following message from the regimental commander:

"Several motorized infantry regiments, some horse cavalry with mechanized elements and truck-drawn artillery are reported in the PINE GROVE area. At 11:00 AM these forces had not yet moved.

The 901st Cavalry (Mecz) will advance at 2:00 PM via RILEYVILLE and FEAGANSBURG against the enemy concentration reported near PINE GROVE.

Troop A, marching at 1:30 PM, will reconnoiter the zone as shown on attached map.

First objective to be reached not later than 2:45 PM. That line will not be crossed until further orders.

Missions:

(1) Report the location, strength, composition and movements of any enemy forces encountered in your reconnaissance zone.

(2) Determine the suitability of the road net for the advance of the regiment to the east or northeast.

(Signed) PRESTONE, Colonel, 901st Cavalry."

Upon receipt of the foregoing orders, Captain R. Moore Carr assembled us platoon commanders and gave us the dope. He assigned each platoon a zone as shown on the above map and he, with troop headquarters and the 4th Platoon (reserve), planned to march via Highway 57 which was the axis of the 2d Platoon.

This time I was in command of the 2d Platoon. We moved out via Highway No. 57 and reconnoitered the assigned zone without incident until my leading car turned east four miles west of Blight. As it turned the corner it encountered a defended road block. It was surprised and disabled by this hostile fire but was still able to fire.

(At this point everything went blank. Probably the dentist's hand slipped and poked the forceps in my ear.)

The scene changed and we moved east along Highway 57. About two miles west of Blight, I perceived a hostile armored vehicle move on to the highway from a field about 500 yards to the east and move rapidly toward Blight. Apparently at least two of my cars were observed by the hostile car.

(At this point I was rudely awakened by the following spoken words, to wit: "I have extracted four of your teeth and they are all healthy. So that is not what caused your headache New Year's morning. Maybe you have fallen arches. Come in again. Good morning.")

Well, there I was. I didn't mind losing my teeth, but what in Sam Hill should I have done in the foregoing situations? I walked out of the hospital a beaten man with head bowed low. The CAVALRY JOURNAL ruined. I thought. Two situations without a solution. Editor chewing his cigar and presses silenced, waiting for my copy. Then it came to me like a flash on my pan. But before I divulge the solution, tell me

WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

*(For solution, see below)*

☆ ☆ ☆

Motorized forces are now an integral part of armies. However, the proposal that motors replace all animals is an extreme view not warranted by experiences in China and Spain and certainly not in the terrain surrounding this CPX. At the same time, we must realize the practicability of transporting animals by motors. This is being done in commercial life daily. We can retain our speed by motor transportation and our capabilities of operating off highways or in difficult terrain by transporting animals as well as men by motors. We should develop the possibilities of animal transport by motors, particularly for field artillery and infantry commands.

—MAJOR GENERAL HUGH A. DRUM, U.S.A.
Comments on Second Army CPX.

☆ ☆ ☆

## A Solution

FIRST SITUATION

I sent a report to the troop commander at once and then supported the first car by opening fire with the command car while maneuvering the second section around the flank in order to gain a position from which road block might be reduced by fire attack from flank.

SECOND SITUATION

I attempted rapid limited pursuit and endeavored to cripple this vehicle by fire without permitting myself to be drawn into a trap. This entailed stopping the platoon before getting within effective range of the town. We split the platoon just west of the town and attempted observation of it from two directions.

If observation produced nothing, I intended then to enter town in such formations that all sections would be mutually supporting.

If something should be seen in the town, I intended to remain in observation from such a position that the east and north exits of the town could be observed, and report to troop headquarters.

# General Hawkins' Notes

# The Support of Cavalry by Motorized Infantry

The support rendered to cavalry by motorized infantry has sometimes given splendid results. But some persons have let the idea of motorized infantry run away with them. They visualize whole Army Corps tearing along the roads towards the enemy, preceded by mechanized cavalry as a covering force. But they are going to do nothing of the sort. Huge columns of infantry may use trucks for transportation just so far, as they might use railroads when railroads lead in the right direction. Just so far and no farther! Even though the roads are ample and lead in the right direction, though there is no menace from hostile air force or cavalry, and though there are no difficulties presented to movement at night, nevertheless, there is a limit beyond which infantry in trucks cannot go, just as there is a limit beyond which infantry in railroad trains cannot go. A large body of infantry cannot move in trucks in tactical formation toward the enemy: it must detruck at a safe distance sufficient to permit ease of deployment unmolested by the enemy. Beyond this limit, large infantry forces must be developed into tactical columns. And these columns must be covered by forces of cavalry.

Strategical movement may be another matter. Railroads, however, can also be used for strategical concentration, and can carry artillery and cavalry as well as infantry.

It will do no good to try to use motor trucks for transportation and mechanized cavalry to cover the motorized columns. In the first place, mechanized cavalry is unfit for covering force duty unless backed up by stronger forces of horse cavalry. This will be discussed later.

So now, we come to our subject, the support of cavalry, horse and mechanized cavalry, by comparatively small columns of infantry in trucks, or special organizations of motorized infantry.

Infantry in trucks cannot be depended upon to support cavalry in all missions. Most of the important cavalry missions will require it to move across country. Trucks cannot do that. Even if trucks are specially made with tractors or caterpillar means of locomotion, they cannot carry thickly packed soldiers at speed across country without unduly fatiguing or injuring the men. Furthermore, such machines are very expensive and require unbelievable quantities of gas and oil.

There might be occasions when roads lead in convenient directions and the nature of the mission does not indicate that the force concerned is in much danger of being outflanked or surrounded by superior forces of enemy mobile troops. In that case, this would justify the use of infantry in trucks to back up the cavalry. If such an occasion arises, then, by all means, send infantry in trucks for this purpose. But those occasions will not be frequent. A cavalry force, sent around the enemy flanks or in rear to hold up and delay the withdrawal of enemy forces, will often find itself in a tight situation. It may be surrounded or threatened with complete envelopment by constantly increasing forces of the enemy. In order to avoid a very serious defeat or destruction, the cavalry would have to extricate itself by moving quickly and rapidly in a certain direction whether roads lead in that direction or not. If the force has been engaged, the infantry will have detrucked and left their trucks parked at a safe distance in rear. If threatened by envelopment the infantry will have to make a run for their trucks, entruck their men, get their trucks turned in the right direction and move off in a crowded truck column unable to defend itself from possible attack by enemy cavalry or aircraft or both. Then too, the only possible direction of retreat might and probably would be such that no road leads in the right direction, and cross-country movement is the only way that a withdrawal may be possible.

Horse cavalry possesses qualities that fit it specially well for such emergencies. It can mount quickly and withdraw rapidly in any direction. And during withdrawal, it is always able to fight instantly; whereas, infantry in trucks must halt on or near roads, detruck and deploy across-country, before it can fight even a defensive battle.

Although, with convenient roads, infantry in trucks can often support horse cavalry, and has done so, it is an entirely different matter when we attempt to support mechanized cavalry. The infantry in support of horse cavalry would be placed and used in a different way. It would be used in reserve or as a rally point, and if actually engaged in the first line of attack or defense, it would be supported by the cavalry. Its flanks would be guarded and defended. In case of a delaying action, so often required of cavalry, the infantry support could withdraw in time while the cavalry protects its flanks and fights defensively to ease the pressure on the infantry.

When the horse cavalry is sent to perform a mission in rear of the enemy, where it takes the risks of finding itself opposed by important enemy forces both in front and in rear, it would usually have no infantry support.

But mechanized cavalry must always have support—either of infantry or horse cavalry. Infantry in trucks,

supporting mechanized cavalry, must detruck to go into action, leaving its trucks parked on or near roads. If the mechanized cavalry attacks, the infantry must follow it up closely, thus committing itself to an advanced and exposed position. And if the mechanized cavalry is repulsed, or is fighting a delaying action, it can only turn and move off the field, leaving the infantry unsupported. The mechanized cavalry is not good at fighting defensive actions, and its cross-country mobility may not be sufficient on the terrain in question to guard and defend the infantry flanks during retreat. The roads leading to the rear will be partially occupied by carrier cars and other motor vehicles pertaining to the mechanized cavalry. They may not be entirely free for the use of the infantry trucks. And also, they may not lead in the proper direction for withdrawal; and then, indeed, the combination of mechanized cavalry with infantry in trucks is a sorry affair. There will be *some* cross-country whereon mechanized cavalry might withdraw slowly from a delaying action. But there never will be found a terrain on which trucks could move cross-country for more than a few hundred yards in any one direction.

Even at the very start of the operation, mechanized cavalry might have to go where the infantry could not follow.

And even though the infantry has been able to follow the mechanized cavalry, the light tanks, in making an attack, depend partially upon speed to render them less vulnerable. But the infantry, having detrucked and deployed, cannot begin to keep up with the tanks. And thus the value of their support is very much reduced.

In delaying actions, mechanized cavalry must rely largely upon their machine guns, which, during movement, are carried in the carrier vehicles which are very vulnerable to hostile fire action. When these machine guns are withdrawn, they must be loaded into the carriers. The carriers must have very favorable ground in order to move with sufficient speed across country. They will, therefore, seek roads for that purpose. The infantry trucks will find their roads very much blocked by these machines. The get-away from delaying actions will be exceedingly confused and interrupted.

When a large force of horse cavalry is acting as a covering force for a large force of infantry, the cavalry is not called upon to move around enemy flanks and rear as it is in some other missions. In that case, it is safe enough to support the cavalry by infantry in trucks, especially if the roads lead in the right directions, or the trucks are constructed for cross-country movement, like the Panzer brigades in the German Army. But movements on the flanks or rear of the enemy are not safe for infantry in trucks, especially if the enemy has important forces of cavalry and knows how to use them. When a distant point is to be seized and held at all costs or for a reasonable time, infantry in trucks, preceded by mechanized cavalry, can be sent for this mission under favorable circumstances. Mechanized cavalry is suitable for attack. Attack against small enemy forces may be necessary in order to reach the desired point. The point may be held by the enemy, and attack only be necessary in order to seize it. Upon the successful seizing of the point, the infantry prepares to hold it. The mechanized cavalry assists by lending its machine guns to the defense. The combat cars could be placed in rear to be used for counter-attack if necessary.

There are exceptions to every rule, but this matter may be summed up as a guide as follows:

Infantry in trucks should not be sent to support cavalry when the latter has a mission which takes it far around the enemy flanks or rear.

Infantry in trucks may support cavalry when the latter is acting as a covering force. But, in that case, the infantry should be kept on or near the axis of movement of the main force.

Infantry in trucks is not a suitable support for mechanized cavalry unless the mission requires the seizing of a distant point and holding it at all costs.

The allotment of the Regular Army to overseas garrisons, harbor defenses, antiaircraft and air force has already been considered, and totals 103,700. To this must be added . . . four cavalry divisions at 5,000 each, totalling 20,000. . . .

—Page 300, *The Ramparts We Watch*, by GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT.

FOR SALE: Officer's Field Saddle, Saumur type, manufactured by Perkins and Campbell. Good condition. Price $50.00, stripped. Please respond through Editorial Office, The CAVALRY JOURNAL.

# At the Cavalry School

The Regular Noncommissioned Officers' Class, The Cavalry School, completed their six months' course of instruction and graduated March 11, 1939. Those completing the course were:

Sergeant John Augustine, Machine Gun Troop, 2d Cavalry
Sergeant Roger L. Billings, Headquarters Troop, 14th Cavalry
Corporal Lonnie M. Black, Machine Gun Troop, 8th Cavalry
Corporal Joseph A. Burney, Troop A, 9th Cavalry
Corporal Kenneth Carver, Troop F, 6th Cavalry
Corporal Vernon T. Davis, Headquarters Troop, 2d Cavalry
Corporal Clifford R. Goman, Troop B, 4th Cavalry
Sergeant Vernon T. Hanlon, Machine Gun Troop, 2d Cavalry
Private 1st Class John E. Holmes, Troop C, 9th Cavalry
Corporal LaVern V. Ives, Troop B, 14th Cavalry
Private 1st Class Calvin Johnson, Troop B, 9th Cavalry
Corporal James E. Jolley, Troop A, 2d Cavalry
Corporal Richard E. Kirkpatrick, Troop E, 2d Cavalry
Corporal Rudolph Knapp, Troop B, 12th Cavalry
Sergeant Raymond Lovesee, Troop B, 2d Cavalry
Sergeant Raymond L. McBrayer, Troop F, 12th Cavalry
Corporal Homer Pitts, Battery B, 84th Field Artillery
Sergeant Clint H. Putman, Battery D, 3d Field Artillery
Corporal Robert L. Robertson, Machine Gun Troop, 8th Cavalry
Corporal Fred Running, Troop F, 2d Cavalry
Corporal William Schnicke, Troop F, 2d Cavalry
Corporal Robert B. Seney, Troop F, 11th Cavalry
Corporal Alonzo E. Shearer, Troop A, 9th Cavalry
Private 1st Class Frank L. Strasheim, Quartermaster Corps
Sergeant Sam W. Truett, Battery C, 84th Field Artillery
Sergeant Curtis E. Watkins, Troop B, 10th Cavalry
Corporal Charles Wilson, Machine Gun Troop, 10th Cavalry
Corporal Preston K. Wise, Troop E, 7th Cavalry

The following members of the above class were selected for detail as students in the Noncommissioned Officers' Advanced Equitation Class, from March 13th to June 16th, 1939:

Corporal Lonnie M. Black, Machine Gun Troop, 8th Cavalry
Corporal Clifford R. Goman, Troop B, 4th Cavalry
Private 1st Class John E. Holmes, Troop C, 9th Cavalry
Corporal LaVern V. Ives, Troop B, 14th Cavalry
Corporal James E. Jolley, Troop A, 2d Cavalry
Sergeant Clint H. Putman, Battery D, 3d Field Artillery
Corporal Robert L. Robertson, Machine Gun Troop, 8th Cavalry
Corporal Fred Running, Troop F, 2d Cavalry
Corporal William Schnicke, Troop F, 2d Cavalry
Corporal Robert B. Seney, Troop F, 11th Cavalry
Private 1st Class Frank L. Strasheim, Quartermaster Corps
Sergeant Curtis E. Watkins, Troop B, 10th Cavalry

A week of competition in the Graduation Events of the course decided the winners in the following events:

### Remount Competition, Schooling Phase

Won by—Corporal Fred Running, Troop F, 2d Cavalry
2d—Corporal Clifford R. Goman, Troop B, 4th Cavalry
3d—Corporal Kenneth Carver, Troop F, 6th Cavalry
4th—Corporal Robert B. Seney, Troop F, 11th Cavalry

### Remount Competition, Jumping Phase

Won by—Corporal LaVern V. Ives, Troop B, 14th Cavalry
2d—Corporal Kenneth Carver, Troop F, 6th Cavalry
3d—Corporal Richard E. Kirkpatrick, Troop E, 2d Cavalry
4th—Corporal Homer Pitts, Battery E, 84th Field Artillery

### For the Best Remount

Won by—Corporal Kenneth Carver, Troop F, 6th Cavalry
2d—Corporal Clifford R. Goman, Troop B, 4th Cavalry
3d—Corporal Fred Running, Troop F, 2d Cavalry
4th—Corporal LaVern V. Ives, Troop B, 14th Cavalry

### Troopers Mount, Jumping Competition

Won by—Corporal James E. Jolley, Troop A, 2d Cavalry
2d—Sergeant John Augustine, Machine Gun Troop, 2d Cavalry
3d—Private 1st Class John E. Holmes, Troop C, 9th Cavalry

(Continued on page 175)

# CAVALRY BOARD

*"The Cavalry Board invites any individual, whether or not a cavalryman, to submit for consideration constructive suggestions or ideas relating to new equipment, improvement of standard equipment, or to any problem or project under study by the Board. The Board will also welcome suggestions as to new problems that may properly be considered. Communications should be addressed to the Director, Cavalry Board, Fort Riley, Kansas."*

*Cavalry Field Manual:* The Cavalry Board is engaged in preparing changes for the Cavalry Field Manual, Volume I and Volume III, to make it conform to the present revised Tables of Organization for Cavalry, which have recently been received.

*Basic Field Manuals:* A new Basic Field Manual pertaining to each of the following weapons is being prepared: U. S. Pistol Caliber .45, Machine Gun, Caliber .50 (HB) Ground, and the Light Machine Gun, Ground. These manuals when completed will contain all material necessary for training with these weapons.

*Revision of Manuals:* The War Department is planning to make a revision of the Staff Officers' Field Manual and, possibly, to replace the present Field Service Regulations and Manual for Commanders of Large Units with a new Field Service Regulations. Comments and recommendations concerning the general and detailed features of these proposed revisions, as they pertain to Cavalry, are now being prepared.

Due to recent changes in Cavalry organization, and the development of mechanization in the Cavalry, it has been found necessary to revise and bring up to date practically all of the subject matter of the manuals referred to which pertains to the Cavalry arm.

*81 mm. Mortar:* Hangars to pack the 81-mm. mortar on the Cavalry pack saddle have been fabricated at Fort Riley, Kansas, under the supervision of the Cavalry Board. These hangars together with a mortar will be employed in a field test to determine the feasibility of carrying this weapon in pack. The test is in connection with a current study of supporting weapons for the Cavalry.

*Browning Automatic Rifle, Caliber .30, Modified:* A Browning Automatic Rifle, Caliber .30, Modified has been received, equipped with a bipod, butt rest, and a device for reducing the cyclic rate. Another similar weapon with a heavier barrel has been shipped to the Board. These two weapons will be employed in a test in the near future in connection with a study of the Cavalry light machine gun.

*Cover Latch, Group Assemblies:* Four modified cover latches for various types of machine guns, caliber .30, have been received for test to determine whether or not they are suitable to replace the present latches which frequently allow the cover to open during firing.

*Rust Resisting Material:* Four rifles, M1, have been received, which have been finished with a rust resisting material known as "Penetrate." These rifles will be subjected to an extended service test to determine the suitability of this finish.

*Horseshoes Treated with Borium:* The Cavalry Board is experimenting with horseshoes treated with Borium. It took this work under study during the summer of 1938 but results were not particularly good as on the spring march of the Cavalry School the shoes treated with Borium wore nearly as much as untreated shoes. Tests at other stations have apparently been more favorable towards the use of Borium and test by the Cavalry Board is continuing.

*Watering Troughs:* The watering troughs of the 2d Cavalry are being modified so as to replace the rope lacing by metal rings, web straps or leather straps, in order to obtain a more satisfactory method of fixing the canvas to the metal standard.

*Small Arms Armament for Motorcycles:* Scabbards are being made for the Thompson submachine gun and also for the semiautomatic rifle, M1, to provide a satisfactory method of carrying each of these weapons on the motorcycle. When the scabbards are completed, tests will be made to determine which weapon is more suitable for use by motorcyclists.

*Neck Strap Hobble:* A combination neck strap hobble submitted to the Cavalry Board by Major Rinaldo L. Cox, Cavalry, is being tested in the 2d Cavalry. This article is normally used as a neck strap in place of the issue halter. By means of a special type ring, it can also be used to hobble the horse's forefeet.

*Marking of Individual Equipment:* Efforts are being made to obtain rubber or metal stamps which will produce more lasting and legible markings on individual equipment and clothing.

*Horse Gas Masks:* The Cavalry Board has tested a German gas mask for horses. This mask was well made but did not supply an adequate amount of air for horses undergoing exertion. It was heavy, bulky and could not be packed in a manner suitable for service use by Cavalry.

*Light Reconnaissance Vehicle:* Using the chassis of a commercial 4 x 4 Marmon-Herrington (Ford) ½-ton cargo truck, the Board is now engaged in improvising and fabricating a so-called light reconnaissance vehicle for test to determine its possibilities, if any, for use in horse cavalry.

This vehicle will be unarmed. Its gross weight (including crew, armament, ammunition, etc.), will be approximately 4,500 pounds. It will carry a crew of 4 men to include driver, car commander, gunner, and radio operator.

Its armament will consist of one or possibly two .30 caliber M1919A4 guns, mounted on pedestal mounts for fire from the vehicle. Guns will be quickly detachable for ground fire when needed. Two M1 rifles will be carried as crew equipment.

The body of the vehicle will consist of a plain sheet steel platform upon which will be erected four bucket seats to accommodate the crew. A small box or "pick-up" body on the rear of the platform will carry ammunition and equipment.

The objective in the construction of this vehicle is to produce a type car which will be lighter, more mobile, and with a lower silhouette than anything we have had heretofore. Another aim in this experiment is to develop a vehicle which, if found to possess desirable tactical features, will lend itself readily to commercial quantity production.

It is expected that the model referred to will be completed and ready for test during the Cavalry School maneuvers to be held in May. After this experiment it is anticipated that it will be sent to the First Cavalry Division for further tests.

*Bullet-Seal and Sealed Air Tubes:* Experimentation is now being conducted in the service to develop a suitable type of puncture or bullet proof tube for use in the pneumatic tires of military motor vehicles of both combat and cargo type. If successful this type of tube would:

*a.* Eliminate the necessity of carrying a spare tire.

*b.* Eliminate the delays and dangers incident to punctures, blowouts, etc.

*c.* Replace tires with sponge rubber fillers which sometimes blow out when subjected to extreme heat.

Several of the commercial rubber companies have developed tubes which show promise of meeting the needs of the service. The Cavalry Board will, in the near future, start a test of so-called Bullet Proof and Air-Sealed tubes produced by the Seiberling Rubber Company. These tubes will be installed on Indiana 1½-ton, 4 x 4, cargo trucks and will be subjected to a service test extending over a period of about one year.

*Audible Signal Devices:* The board has been conducting a test of audible signal devices over the period of the past eight months, with a view to selection of a device for use on motor vehicles for the following purposes:

*a.* As a traffic signal.

*b.* As a means of "alerting" a command to attacks by aircraft or mechanization.

*c.* As a means of communication.

Various commercial types such as sirens, exhaust whistles, air horns, and electric horns have been tried, but none have been found entirely satisfactory, and none have been recommended for adoption. An attempt is now being made to secure a special type of electric horn for continuation of the test.

*Airplane Liaison:* Efforts are being made to obtain a method by which ground troops may signal to a friendly observation plane at night if radio communication fails or is not available. Position lights are considered unsuitable because they cannot be quickly extinguished, can transmit only a few signals, and their colors are difficult to discern. Flashlights or spotlights directed toward the plane, then upon displayed panels may prove satisfactory, but the air-traffic-control signaling lamp is considered to be the most suitable means. This lamp throws a red, green, or yellow beam which may be broken into dots or dashes by means of a trigger in the handle.

## At The Cavalry School

*(Continued from page 173)*

4th—Corporal Richard E. Kirkpatrick, Troop E, 2d Cavalry

Corporal William Schnicke, Troop F, 2d Cavalry, won the trophy as the noncommissioned officer who had demonstrated the highest efficiency in the duties of a cavalry noncommissioned officer, based on his individual work in all departments of the school.

Graduation exercises were held at the West Riding Hall, starting at 10:00 AM, March 11th. The events consisted of exhibitions of the winning remounts in the Schooling Phase and in the Jumping Phase, and the finals in the Jumping Competition in which troopers' mounts were ridden.

Upon completion of the events, the class was formed mounted and all winners were awarded suitable trophies and ribbons by the Assistant Commandant of the Cavalry School, Colonel Clarence Lininger, Cavalry.

The class was then dismounted and Brigadier General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., U. S. Army, Commandant, The Cavalry School, addressed the class, stressing the value of the training received at the School to noncommissioned officers and the importance of passing on to other enlisted men of the cavalry regiments the lessons learned. He extended the best wishes of the Cavalry School to all members of the graduating class.

The Assistant Commandant then announced the names of the noncommissioned officers selected for the Noncommissioned Officers' Advanced Equitation Class, and the exercises terminated with the National Anthem, which was played by the Ninth Cavalry Band.




AMERICAN RACE HORSES, 1938. By John Hervey (Salvator). Foreword by Alfred Gwynne Vanderbilt. The Sagimore Press, New York, 1939. $5.00.

*Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel John F. Wall, Retired.*

In "American Race Horses 1938" Mr. A. G. Vanderbilt, who writes its foreword, gives the *raison d'etre* of this publication. One cannot but agree that this work which has appeared annually three times, fills a great gap in turf history. In it is found the summary of racing for a twelve-month, giving a reasonably complete history of racing.

It is true that "American Race Horses" differs from the spectacular and often inaccurate accounts of the daily press, from the cold facts disclosed in a racing chart, or the drab records in the stud book which relates the breeding of the animal. In "American Race Horses" John L. Hervey, better known as "Salvator," seems to have assembled the most select of all that he has written of the best horses during the year and has arranged the material in a logical manner making it easy to learn just what took place on the race-course.

The inimitable style, the charm, the accuracy and knowledge well recognized as belonging to "Salvator" are again in evidence in this volume for 1938.

Along with Mr. Hervey, Mr. Bert Thayer, one of our leading horse photographers, has contributed to the value of the work. The credit for the general arrangement, it is understood, must go to Mr. Vaughn Flannery and to Mr. Peter Vischer who should be accredited with a most excellent accomplishment.

Those who are interested in the horse are particularly concerned with the Thoroughbred because from him come all light-breeds. And horsemen know too that the race-course is the means of keeping up the standard. The text with accompanying photographs and pedigrees makes it apparent that good bloodlines, good performance and good conformation usually go hand in hand.

Racing survives because of differences in opinions. It may be that some facts and some opinions advanced also will be cause for controversy, but the style, the arrangement, and the stimulation to the memory of the performances of 1938 make "American Race Horses" well worthwhile. In years to come these volumes published from year to year will prove of greater value. This book can properly find a place in the library of the Cavalryman as well as in those of the breeder and trainer.

"HEALTH, HYGIENE AND HOOEY." By W. W. Bauer, M.D. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, New York, 1938. 309 pages. $2.50.

*Reviewed by Colonel M. C. Stayer, Medical Corps, The Cavalry School, Fort Riley, Kansas.*

This book, written for the layman, is different. The author calls attention to the fact that so much interest has been aroused in health that there is a vast amount of both information and misinformation (entirely too much of the latter) peddled by all sorts and kinds of people. It is important to be able to distinguish between authentic sources and those that are not; therefore, instead of naming names, as he expresses it, he devotes his efforts to general principles. He says, "The best safeguard against exploitation is a knowledge of principles. Individual exploiters come and go; nostrums rise, flourish, and vanish: quackery is different every day and yet, fundamentally, the same. A person who understands the characteristics of charlatanism will not be fooled by the individual exploiter." The general argument is summed up in his last chapter, "Common Sense, Preferred," and his last words warn the health seeker that his best security will be found in "Common Sense, Preferred, and Skepticism. Unlimited."

The author has a gift for striking titles, such as "Swivel-Chair Hygiene," "Dispelling Dietary Dilemmas," "A Fake for Every Ache," "Soft Soap and Skin Games," etc. We particularly recommend Chapter XIV. "Who Pays the Piper." In addition to formulating striking titles, he also has a humorously impressive way of putting facts. For example, in speaking of mascara, he says, "Making up the eyelashes is a safe procedure if only mascara is employed. This formerly put the lady at a disadvantage, because tears played havoc with it. Now all that is changed with the advent of waterproof mascara, which allows a lady to weep and still be lovely." The ordinary materials of everyday make-up are called "war paint" ". . . hope springs eternal in the baldest heads, and the shining pink cranium is always good for a rub of something or other which raises hope if not hair." The author does not believe that a book list should be given in a work of this kind since books come and go and such lists should be kept up-to-date to be of real value. However, he gives 22 books now on the market which may be consulted, and 5 health magazines.

The book is interestingly written and will hold the attention of readers. It goes well with "The Traffic in Health" and "Poison, Potions, Profits." It is accurate and can be recommended without any reservation.

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MEIN KAMPF. By Adolph Hitler. Complete and Unabridged, fully annotated. Published by Reynal and Hitchcock, 1939. New York. 993 pages. $3.00.

*Mein Kampf* is essentially the political, social and economic philosophy of Adolph Hitler. At the same time, it serves to develop the basic doctrines of the National Socialist German Workers Party known to the world as the Nazi Party.

The book covers very briefly Hitler's youth and early environment. His family background is given little space.

On the other hand his years of young manhood prior to the World War, spent in Vienna, is given considerable attention. There he developed his predominating spirit of anti-Semitism, based largely, according to his words, on his observations of the Jewish intellectuals.

His service in the World War evidently aroused his admiration for the organization of the German arms, but more importantly aroused his fundamental respect for and belief in the value of discipline in any mass movement.

Discharge from the army found him in Munich much disturbed over existing conditions in Germany at that time, these conditions he accredited to subversive elements that, also, had played a part in the subjection of the nation and the attending disorganization and confusion. Joining the German Workers Party he set forth with intensity in formulating it into a national entity. The struggle of those days emphasized in his mind the power and force of oratory over the written word. His views on the need of an interior force to guarantee a well policed meeting gave birth to the now famous Storm Troopers. He believed that any movement whose operations exist only through outside police protection could not succeed. As a party needs the vital energy of determined leadership so also does a nation in order to reap the full benefit of its inherent resources. He therefore advocated a government through highly centralized authority in order that the national leadership might be held personally accountable. He visualized the power of propaganda and the necessity for its organization in these words, "The greater and the more revolutionary, essentially, an idea is, the more active will its members become, since for its supporters the revolutionary force of the doctrine involves a danger; which appears suitable for keeping off small and cowardly petty bourgeois. . . . Through this, however, the organization of a truly revolutionary idea receives as members only the most active followers, won by propaganda."

Basically, Nazi policy has been one of constant and bitter antagonism to Communism. As Hitler wrote in respect to any possible future alliance between Germany and Russia: "Thus the fact of the conclusion of a treaty with Russia embodies the declaration of the next war. Its outcome would be the end of Germany. . . . The present rulers of Russia do not at all think of entering an alliance sincerely or of keeping one."

Nazi national policy is expressed in these words. "The National Socialists must guarantee the German nation the soil and territory to which it is entitled on this earth."

The complete and unabridged edition of *Mein Kampf*, published by Reynal and Hitchcock, appears to be carefully and scrupulously translated. An appreciable portion of the book is devoted to editorial annotation, which is of assistance in appreciating many of Hitler's dissertations that the reader, unfamiliar with German background, might otherwise misinterpret.

* * *

MY BATTLE. By Adolph Hitler. Houghton and Mifflin Company. $2.50.

This version of Hitler's original *Mein Kampf* is translated in more general fashion than the current unabridged edition. It appears, however, that the essence of Nazi doctrine, though in modified terms, has been substantially and adequately covered. The outstanding aims of Der Fuhrer have been treated in a manner to give the reader a satisfactory draft of Nazi aims and philosophy. The unreserved and vicious attack, couched in the language of an intense and passionate leader such as Hitler, is not found in this edition to the extent one encounters in the unabridged document. For one, however, who is more interested in calm presentation of the Nazi movement this volume will serve every purpose.

* * *

ALONE. By Rear Admiral Richard E. Byrd. Published by G. P. Putnam's Sons. $2.50.

This is Admiral Byrd's own story of his experiences during that four month period in 1934 that he spent alone in an ice buried shack—15 feet long, 11 wide and 8 deep—at 80° 8' South.

In this book the author departs from his usual scientific exposition and tells an enthralling story of his intimate reactions, not only to the elements of an Antarctic night, but the psychological effect on a human being isolated from all other humanity.

In the early part of the book telling of the preparations for the experiment and the transportation of supplies, the reader is given much insight into the explorer's understanding and consequent handling of men, his orderly manner of preparation, and his attention to the minutest details.

As the cold became more intense strange things were found to happen. At 50° below zero a flashlight dies. At −55° kerosene freezes. "Below −60°," he writes, "cold will find the last microscopic touch of oil in an instrument and stop it dead." Even the protection of silk gloves did not keep his fingers from freezing and the flesh stuffing off. Later, as the fumes from the kerosene stove exhausted his physical reserve, the aloneness became more acute, and the battle for physical survival became a matter largely of moral fortitude.

Admiral Byrd tells this story with evident reserve. For that reason it looms even larger as a masterful account of fortitude, moral stamina, and man's humility in the presence of the raw elements of the Universe.

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

# ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

## 1st Cavalry—Fort Knox, Ky.

COLONEL HENRY W. BAIRD, *Commanding*

Since the 1st of January the efforts of the regiment have been concentrated on preparing officers and men for the Spring Training Season. The Brigade Motor School and the Motor and Radio Schools for enlisted men are approaching the completion of their courses. The regiment has continued its combat firing and its testing and development work in coöperation with the Mechanized Cavalry Board. On January 21st the regiment was inspected by the Commanding General who expressed himself as well pleased with the condition of the command.

Early in February, the Regimental Commander, Colonel Henry W. Baird, paid a visit to Kansas City and to the Cavalry School.

A detachment from the Regiment, together with other elements of the brigade, under command of Captain R. B. Evans, 1st Cavalry, marched to Cincinnati on February 17th, where they participated in Defense Week ceremonies. The mayor of Cincinnati and Colonel Sherril the city manager inspected the display and were highly complimentary in their remarks.

The First Cavalry pistol team won first place in the Cavalry Small bore Championships. The team consisted of:

Captain R. B. Evans, Instructor
St. Sgt. McGannon, Machine Gun Troop
Sgt. Kellerman, Troop "A"
Cpl. Mitchell, Troop "A"
Pvt. Cornwell, Headquarters Troop
Pvt. Miller, Service Troop.

The Fort Knox basketball team has been undefeated in Corps Area competition this season. The First Cavalry is well represented on this team.

In spite of bad weather and muddy terrain, the regiment has continued its weekly tactical exercises throughout the winter.

Master Sergeant Ben H. Harris retired February 28th after completion of 30 years service. Sgt. Harris was the only Cavalryman ever to win the National Individual Pistol Championship. The Machine Gun Troop gave a dinner in honor of Master Sergeant Harris where he was presented with a wrist watch and a framed guidon of his old troop. Brigadier General Adna R. Chaffee was the speaker of the occasion.

On March 2d the Regiment celebrated its 106th birthday. In the morning, a review was held. This review was a final ceremony in honor of Master Sergeant Harris, a commemoration of Organization day, and the occasion for the decoration of the Regimental Standard with the Streamer "Luzon—1902." The streamer was the 61st battle honor to be awarded the 1st Cavalry. Brigadier General Chaffee and Master Sergeant Harris received the review. The standard was decorated by General Chaffee. After review the troops were released. Special dinners were served in organization messes and a most successful supper dance for the men was held in the post dance pavilion, in the evening.

* * *

## 1st Squadron—3d Cavalry
## Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont

LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS H. REES, JR., *Commanding*

Aside from the usual winter training, interest has been running high concerning the Cavalry Regimental Team Matches. Troop "A" had the high score in the Rifle Match with 8,310 and also high score in the Pistol Match with 5,741.

The individual high shots were as follows:

First Sergeant Blazejevski, Troop "A"—high score "old" rifle shot, and high score "old" pistol shot.

Corporal Fay, Troop "B"—high score "new" pistol shot.

The rifle and pistol teams of Troop "A" have also participated in a number of local matches. On January 20, they defeated a team at Vergennes by a score of 1,334 to 1,187. On February 6, the team was again victorious in a 25-foot match defeating the Ledgemere Team of Burlington by a score of 1,317 to 1,269. On February 13th in a 50-foot match with four other teams, Troop A's Team won with a score of 1,366. Second place was won by the Burlington Police Dept. Team with a score of 1,301. The Ledgemere Team of Burlington was third with a score of 1,298. The Capitol A Team of Montpelier was fourth with a score of 1,266.

On February 10th the Squadron presented the second Gymkhana of the winter season. Despite the inclement weather and icy highways there were over nine hundred spectators in the audience.

The program and winners are given below:

*Event No. 1. Relay Race:*
Won by Team from Troop "A," composed of Pvts. Horan, Tibbets, Kimball and Goodspeed.

*Event No. 2. Bareback Polo:*
Won by Team from Troop "A" composed of Sgt. Wood, Corp. Yurza and Pvt. Fekety.

*Event No. 3. Privates Jumping:*
1st—Pvt. J. F. Ross Troop "A" on *Frankie.*
2nd—Pvt. Short, Troop "B" on *Peanuts.*
3rd—Pvt. Pfeffeckuch, Troop "A" on *Reckless.*
4th—Pvt. J. N. Ross, Troop "A" on *Mary Mary.*

*Event No. 4. Tandem Ride:*
This was a demonstration by members of Troop "B" who rode one horse and drove another in front, using tandem hitch.

*Event No. 5. Mule Race:*
1st—Pvt. Chicoine, Troop "B."
2nd—Pvt. Noye, Troop "A."

*Event No. 6 Officers' Jumping:*
The course for this was once and a half around over a hedge, stone wall, barber pole and barrels, and down the center over a single jump consisting of a chicken coop hedge and rail. The same system of handicapping horses three and six inches was used as in previous Gymkhana, which led to a spectacular jump off with the winner having to top five feet to get the blue ribbon.
1st—Lt. Col. Rees on *High Time* (6-in. handicap)
2nd—Lt. Townsley on *Greta* (no handicap)
3rd—Capt. Jadwin on *Black Beauty* (6-in. handicap)
4th—Capt. Wenzlaff on *Milly Russell* (6-in. handicap)

*Event No. 7. Rodeo Ride:*
This was an exhibition of trick riding by members of Troop "A" who showed the "spread eagle" "tail drag" "air plane" and other stunts of the "Wild West." The ride finished by all members going through a fire jump. Cowboy songs were sung by Pvt. Parsons, Troop "A," accompanied by Privates Daniels, Cebula, Larsen and Boscombe.

* * *

## 4th Cavalry—Fort Meade, South Dakota

COLONEL R. C. ROGERS, *Commanding*

A series of Indoor Horse Shows for the winter months have been inaugurated with the purpose of developing green horses and riders and raising the general standard of horsemanship. The results of the first show, held in the Riding Hall on Friday afternoon, January 27, 1939, are as follows:

*Class I. Green Jumpers—E.M.:*
1st—Pvt. 1st Cl. Merow, Troop E, on *Soak.*
2nd—Pvt. 1st Cl. Wudel, Troop B, on *Droopy.*
3rd—Sergeant Hatty, Troop A, on *Frisky.*

*Class II. Officers' Chargers:*
1st—Lieut. Culp, on *Brown Cat* (Private Mount)
2nd—Captain Hine, on *Ute.*
3rd—Captain Robinson, on *Mink.*

*Class III. Troopers' Mounts:*
1st—Pvt. 1st Cl. Jezek, Troop B, on *Blatz.*
2nd—Pvt. Gillis, Troop B, on *Nigger.*
3rd—Pvt. Collins, Troop E, on *Chester.*

*Class IV. Novice Jumpers—Enlisted Men:*
1st—Pvt. Pierce, V. C., Troop B, on *Snapp.*
2nd—Sgt. Rice, Hq. Troop, on *Chico.*
3rd—Corp. Mabry, MG Troop, on *Spot.*

At the close of the Christmas holidays the post had the pleasure of welcoming two brides, Mrs. F. T. Turner, formerly of New Orleans, La., wife of Captain Turner, and Mrs. Neil Van Sickle, formerly of the Dalles, Oregon, wife of 2nd Lt. Van Sickle. Other new arrivals are 2nd Lt. and Mrs. J. H. Swenson, who joined the regiment in December from Randolph Field, Texas.

Competition is keen throughout the regiment in the preliminaries for the Cavalry Rifle and Pistol Team Tryouts. A number of excellent young shooters are being developed. The post is in the midst of an inter-organization basketball tournament; much interest is being shown in both the officers' and enlisted men's bowling leagues; monthly boxing matches, with many civilian fighters providing color, have furnished excellent cards, and have brought large numbers of fight fans from throughout the Black Hills to the post. Under the supervision of Captain M. A. Giddens, Post Athletic officer, a team from Fort Meade competed at Fort Lincoln, North Dakota from January 26th-28th, with results as follows:

BASKETBALL

Jan. 26—Mandan 19—Fort Meade 32.
Jan. 27—Fort Lincoln 14—Fort Meade 28.
Jan. 28—Bank of N. Dak. 23—Fort Meade 41.

BOWLING

Jan. 27—Fort Lincoln 2,213—Fort Meade 2,166.
Jan. 28—Fort Lincoln 2,368—Fort Meade 2,631.

BOXING

Jan. 28—
Fort Lincoln was the winner of seven of the eight bouts. Van Slyke of Fort Meade being the lone winner in the 127 pound class. A return engagement of the teams from Fort Lincoln will be held here early in March.

* * *

## 5th Cavalry—Fort Clark, Texas

COLONEL CUTHBERT P. STEARNS, *Commanding*

The Inter-troop Basketball season came to a close on February 16th when Machine Gun Troop beat Brigade Headquarters Troop in three straight games of the play-off series—Brigade Headquarters Troop having won the first half of the season's games, Machine Gun Troop the second half. The Post Basketball team finished its season in fine style on February 26th, by defeating Brooks Field 54—38. It lost only once during the season—to Fort McIntosh in a return game by a score of 43—19.

By the middle of March baseball should be well under way. An Inter-Troop league will be run for the following

two months, after which a Post team will be organized to play games throughout the summer.

On Washington's Birthday, the Fifth Cavalry held a track and field meet combined with elimination boxing bouts. Machine Gun Troop came out on top with the highest aggregate score. After the fights, General Wainwright presented the winning troop handsome awards for both the basketball Championship and the track, field and boxing championship.

The Regiment celebrated its anniversary on March 3rd. At 11:00 AM, of that day the troops were formed in Las Moras Park where they heard in brief the history of the Regiment delivered by its junior officer, 2nd Lieut. John J. Carusone, and an address by Colonel Stearns. A picnic lunch was served in the Park followed by competitions among the men which required various and humorous types of mental and physical agility. A tea dance was held at the Post Officers' Mess later in the afternoon.

There has been no change in officer personnel of the Regiment since the last issue.

## 6th Cavalry—Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia

COLONEL GEORGE DILLMAN, *Commanding*

Training of the regiment during the period January-March, 1939 consisted mainly of field training. Troop, Squadron and Regimental Field Exercises being held throughout this period, with a view to bringing the regiment to a high state of proficiency just prior to its participation in the Fourth Corps Area Maneuvers to be held at Fort Benning, Georgia, during the month of May, 1939. Regimental Field Exercises covered dismounted attack, combined attack and delaying action. Troops and Squadrons held similar problems prior to the regimental exercises.

Troops of the regiment are now undergoing instruction in antiaircraft firing with the sub-caliber rifles. Part of the instruction being held on the Post proper and later on at the Catoosa Target Range.

During the months of February and March, 1939, fourteen Cavalry Reserve Officers were ordered to active duty training with the 6th Cavalry. These Reserve officers were attached to various troops of the regiment and underwent the actual training being given troops at the particular time they were on active duty.

An inter-troop small bore rifle match was held during the month of January. This match consisted of five shoulder to shoulder matches, with Troop F winning the team trophy.

Upon completion of the inter-troop firing a regimental small bore rifle and pistol team was organized and competed against all other Cavalry regiments of the regular Army.

### RECREATION

Troop F won the regimental basketball tournament after a very close and exciting race.

Troop B was declared the winner of the Fort Oglethorpe Bowling Tournament which was completed in February.

### HUNT

The pack seemed to understand their obligations since we were recognized by the Master of Foxhounds Association in November and have given us some great runs.

The Hunt has enjoyed a very active season. Up to the beginning of the rainy season (latter part of January) the new country west of the Park was hunted regularly. The open country, varied terrain and many fences have added greatly to the sport and enjoyment of hunting here. It is a welcome change from constant hunting in the Park. The last hunt in the outside country (Washington's Birthday) was probably the fastest hunt of the season. Hounds ran so fast that at times even the hunt staff could barely stay in sight of hounds. The Commanding Officer of the Regiment, Colonel Dillman, was the first one of the field over every fence and set a great pace for the rest of the field.

On December 31st we killed our first fox in the Catfish section. So far that is also the only one killed, although on the live hunts conducted early on week days hounds have given good fast runs, marking their fox to the ground 5 times and losing him 3 times.

On February 21st, the Hunt had its first annual hunt ball at the Officers' Club. It was well attended and greatly enjoyed by everybody.

The annual Point to Point ride on April 8th will be combined with a party for the farmers and land owners. It will be held west of the Park through the farming country over a distance of 4 miles and about 14 fences. The last official hunt of the season will take place on April 2nd.

### PERSONNEL

Major Candler A. Wilkinson and Captain Gordon Rogers have been ordered to the Regiment, effective upon completion of their tour at the Command and General Staff School.

## 7th Cavalry—Fort Bliss, Texas

COLONEL WILLIAM W. WEST, *Commanding*

The Seventh Cavalry Polo team defeated the team of the New Mexico Military Institute at Roswell, New Mexico, on Sunday, March 5th, in an extra period game by the score of 8 to 7.

A regimental horseshow was held on February 18th. Great interest was shown by everyone and similar shows will be scheduled in the near future.

Work is being done on Garry Owen Field to get the diamond in shape for the troop baseball league which will start soon. The regimental basketball team finished in the cellar in the inter-regimental league, but gave a good account of itself with all teams from the champions down, losing most games by very few points.

The regiment was saddened by the death on February 5, 1939, of our old regimental commander, Colonel Selah

R. H. Tompkins at San Antonio, Texas. Besides having been an integral and vital part of the Seventh Cavalry, Colonel Tompkins was one of the most picturesque and widely known figures in the United States Army. A man of magnetic personality, and outstanding character, brusque but kind, "Tommy" was known either personally or by reputation wherever an Army Post existed. Private First Class Chavez, Colonel Tompkins' old orderly, was sent to San Antonio to blow taps over this Old Soldier's grave as expressly requested by him some time before his death. On the date and at the time that the funeral services were being held in San Antonio the whole Seventh Cavalry observed a period of one minute's silence, during which taps was blown followed by Garry Owen to represent Tommy's spirit carrying on forever in his old regiment.

Regimental training during February and March has generally looked forward to the Division Commander's tactical inspection the last week in March and the Corps Area Commander's tactical inspection scheduled for April.

Field exercises have included a regimental problem the first Thursday of each month in addition to monthly brigade and division exercises. Combat and known distance firing has been conducted monthly at Dona Ana Target Range. The regiment has also participated in one regimental and one division ceremony each month.

Losses since last notes:

Major Strawn to detail in Quartermaster Corps.

Promotions to Lieutenant Colonel:

Edmund M. Barnum and Edward F. Shaifer.

* * *

## 8th Cavalry—Fort Bliss, Texas

COLONEL INNIS P. SWIFT, *Commanding*

On January 21 the regiment was paraded, mounted, in honor of First Sergeant Mack N. Wolfe, Headquarters and Service Troop, on the occasion of his retirement after thirty years of service. The regimental commander expressed to Sergeant Wolfe the congratulations of the regiment for a long and distinguished career in the military service and extended to him the regiment's best wishes for an equally long and happy retirement.

The regiment participated, during the week of February 6-11 in the making of news reel pictures. A mounted review was filmed and the regiment also furnished a war-strength troop (Troop B) which staged a mounted attack through smoke.

On February 16 a very interesting exercise was held involving a movement by rail. Actual railway equipment was available for one Standard train. The 2d Squadron with one platoon heavy machine guns and one section of scout cars attached, was designated as the loading unit. All personnel, animals, equipment and wheeled transportation was loaded. All transportation was blocked and secured as for an actual movement. Kitchen cars with field ranges were provided. A noon meal was served from the kitchens as if en route.

During February the regimental commander announced that Troop "A" commanded by Captain William J. Reardon, had won the famous Slocum Trophy for the year 1938. This is the second year in succession that Troop "A" has won this honor.

The Slocum Trophy award has become a popular tradition in the 8th Cavalry. In 1928, Lieut. Colonel Stephen L'H Slocum, Cavalry-retired, who served 23 years in the 8th Cavalry, presented the trophy to the regiment. The trophy is a beautifully wrought statuette by the well known sculptor A. P. Proctor, showing an Indian warrior in full mounted flight. This subject is considered very appropriate in that the 8th Cavalry spent all of its early years pursuing the Indians of the Southwest.

Lieut. Colonel Slocum, having spent all of his 23 years service in the 8th as a troop officer, desired that no special competition be held, but the prize be given to the troop judged by the regimental commander to be the most generally efficient in its work throughout the year.

The award was based upon rifle marksmanship, machine gun marksmanship, pistol marksmanship and the number of desertions. The board made many frequent and informal inspections throughout the year to rate the troops on paper and property administration, appearance of barracks, stables, and personnel, and also the condition of animals and equipment. The efficiency of the troops in field training was also judged. It can thus be seen that the award was not merely for a specific competition, but for the efficiency displayed by a troop throughout the year.

All ranks are glad to see this triumph for their First Sergeant, Van C. White, who retires this summer. Sergeant White's ability and his devotion to Troop "A" have kept the black horsemen on top for years. He attributes the troop's success this year to the discipline and the coöperation of his fine troopers.

On February 24 the regiment was again paraded in honor of Master Sergeant George E. Stone who retires in the near future after thirty years of service. The Regimental Commander expressed to Sergeant Stone the distinct loss to the service of so fine a soldier and assured him of the best wishes of the regiment in his retirement.

On February 25 the regiment participated in a Division Review.

During this hunting season the Master of Fox Hounds of the First Cavalry Division Hunt has arranged for a number of hunts for the troops. Much interest and enthusiasm has been shown and these troop hunts are expected to continue as a valuable and enjoyable part of the hunt program.

For the seventh time in the last eight years the 8th Cavalry Regimental Basketball Team won the Championship of the Fort Bliss Post Basketball League.

Three rounds of play were held between the 7th Cavalry, 82d Field Artillery, Special Troops, Wm. Beaumont General Hospital and the 8th Cavalry. Of the twelve games played the 8th lost only one game, and that to the

52d Field Artillery by a two point margin in an extra five minute period. The Field Artillery won second place with eight wins and four losses.

The long string of league victories in the past years proved the incentive to this year's team. Four of the last five games of the schedule were played with seven of the seven-man squad ill with influenza or suffering from bad colds. Hard luck hit the squad early in the season when Ed Kelly, Team Captain, and outstanding player of the league suffered a fractured jaw. Marvin Wheeler, formerly of the Texas Tech Squad was called home on an emergency furlough, thereby depriving the team of two of their best players.

Despite sickness and the loss of two excellent players, the team handily won their eighth Post Trophy since 1930.

The entire first team placed on the All-Star Team of ten men that is picked by the officers and the Physical Director of the Army YMCA of El Paso. James Nunn (F), Arthur Doyle (C), and Ben Simpson (G), were selected on the first team, while Raymond Meyer (G) and Ernest Nunn (F), received berths on the second team.

The roster of the entire squad is as follows:

Sergeant Jack Mann, Troop A, Guard
Sergeant Raymond Meyer, Headquarters and Service Troop, Guard
Corporal Ed Kelly, Troop A, Guard
Corporal Paul Hester, Troop F, Forward.
Corporal Waymon Snelgrove, MG Troop, Forward
Private First Class David Gragg, Troop F, Forward
Private First Class Marvin Wheeler, Headquarters and Service Troop, Forward
Private First Class Arthur Doyle, Headquarters and Service Troop, Center
Private James Nunn, Headquarters and Service Troop, Forward
Private Ernest Nunn, Headquarters and Service Troop, Forward
Private Calvin Maxwell, Troop F, Center
Private Francis Dorsey, Headquarters and Service Troop, Forward
Private Ben Simpson, MG Troop, Guard
Private Jack Williams, MG Troop, Forward
Sergeant Gilbert H. Appler, Headquarters and Service Troop, Manager
Sergeant John Dugger, Headquarters and Service Troop, Equipment Manager
First Lieutenant William V. Martz, 8th Cavalry, Coach

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## 10th Cavalry—(less 2d Squadron and Machine-Gun Troop)—Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

LIEUTENANT COLONEL W. H. W. YOUNGS, *Commanding*

During the winter, the three troops here are each holding a Gymkhana in the riding hall. The first one held January 27th was sponsored by Troop A. The events and results of this show are:

*CLASS I—Potato Race.*
1st—Private First Class Lambkins, "A" Troop
2nd—Private First Class Britton, "A" Troop.
3rd—Private Ginn, "A" Troop.
4th—Private Dale, "A" Troop.

*CLASS II—Hack Class.*
1st—Corporal Oliver, "A" Troop.
2nd—Private First Class McKinney, "A" Troop.
3rd—Private Holmes, "B" Troop.
4th—Private Early, "Hq." Troop.

*CLASS III—Pony Express.*
Private First Class Oliver and team, "Hq." Troop.

*CLASS IV—Mounted Wrestling.*
1st—Private Taylor, E., "A" Troop.
2nd—Private Young, "A" Troop.
3rd—Private Holland, "A" Troop.
4th—Private Thomas, "A" Troop.

*CLASS V—Enlisted Men Jumping.*
1st—Corporal Marks, "A" Troop.
2nd—Private Taylor, "A" Troop.
3rd—Private First Class Pickinpack, "B" Troop.
4th—Private First Class Ellis, "Hq." Troop.

*CLASS VI—Dismounted Tug O'War.*
"Hq." Troop Team.

*CLASS VII—Musical Chairs.*
1st—Private Webb, "Hq." Troop.
2nd—Private Ginn, "A" Troop.
3rd—Private First Class Young, "A" Troop.
4th—Private First Class Oliver, "Hq." Troop.

*CLASS VIII—Needle and Thread Race.*
1st—Private First Class Pickinpack, "B" Troop.
2nd—Private First Class Thomas, L., "A" Troop.
3rd—Private First Class Oliver, "Hq." Troop.
4th—Private Summers, "Hq." Troop.

The second Gymkhana, sponsored by Troop B, was held on February 16th.

*RESULTS:*

*CLASS I—Potato Race.*
1st—Private First Class Pickinpack, "B" Troop.
2nd—Private Young, "B" Troop.
3rd—Private Dunbar, "A" Troop.
4th—Private Webb, Hq." Troop.

*CLASS II—Egg and Spoon Race.*
1st—Private Hudgins, "B" Troop.
2nd—Private First Class Young, "A" Troop.
3rd—Private Webb, "Hq." Troop.
4th—Private Holland, "A" Troop.

*CLASS III—Pony Express.*
Private Belcher, "B" Troop.

*CLASS IV—Musical Chairs.*
1st—Private Beasley, H., "B" Troop.
2nd—Private Dunbar, "A" Troop.

3rd—Private First Class Young, "A" Troop.
4th—Private Ginn, "A" Troop.

*CLASS V—Mounted Wrestling.*
1st—Private First Class Green, "B" Troop.
2nd—Private Williams, A., "B" Troop.
3rd—Private Collins, "B" Troop.
4th—Private Tate, "B" Troop.

*CLASS VI—Enlisted Men Jumping.*
1st—Private Webb, "Hq." Troop.
2nd—Private Beasley, H., "B" Troop.
3rd—Corporal Marks, "A" Troop.
4th—Private First Class Hand, "A" Troop.

Both of these shows have been well attended and all are looking forward to the last one to be held March 30th and sponsored by Headquarters Troop.

In the recent Golden Gloves Tournament held in Kansas City, Missouri, Private Robert Sessions, Troop B, 10th Cavalry, won the Novice Championship at 175 pounds and Private Leroy Green, Troop B, 10th Cavalry won the 160 pound Novice Championship. Private Guthrie McKinney, Troop A, reached the finals in the 147 pound class of the Open, only to lose by a close decision to the defending champion. The regiment is justly proud of the achievement of these men who were the only members of the Post Boxing Team to win a championship.

The regimental small bore team has been working under the guidance of Captain R. D. Palmer, 10th Cavalry and has fired in many local and interunit matches.

The indoor polo season closes the week ending March 18th. A local tournament is now in progress between teams of officers on duty at Fort Leavenworth.

There is much interest in the coming baseball season. The regiment has a team in the Post League and also plays many games during the season with outside teams. Weather permitting it is hoped to start practice in the near future. Practically all of last year's team will be out and there is some fine material among the men who have joined since last year.

Master Sergeant William F. Brown retired on February 28th and states that he plans to go to California. We are all sorry to see him leave and wish him every success and happiness in his new home.

Orders have been received assigning Captain Donald H. Nelson to the 10th Cavalry from duty in the Philippines.

## 11th Cavalry—Presidio of Monterey, California

COLONEL HOMER M. GRONINGER, *Commanding*

In the Chief of Cavalry Matches, the Rifle Team shot well on the first and third weeks' firing but dropped off nearly 100 points from the average on the second week's firing. We tied for fourth place on points, but on final standing dropped to sixth place.

The Pistol Team shot average scores on all their weeks' firing and ended up in sixth place also.

At least three of our best shooters were on furloughs or could not fire.

Rifle Matches with Infantry Regiments: Fired nine matches and lost to all by close scores. Again best men did not fire.

Men who fired: Sergeant Farrell, E Troop; Sergeant Gayne, F Troop; Sergeant Foster, MG Troop; Private Tyler, MG Troop; Sergeant Gibson, Hq. Troop; Sergeant Black, E Troop; Private O'Neill, A Troop; Sergeant Hettrick, B Troop; Sergeant Nash, F Troop; Sergeant Clark, Hq. Troop; P.F.C. Knoles, E Troop; Sergeant Shantz, B Troop; Corporal Kan, E Troop; Sergeant McKinley, F Troop.

A Post Horse Show was held March 4, 1939. The competition in the various classes was keen and there were several excellent performances in jumping and schooling.

The results of the classes were:

Class I, Field Artillery Teams.
1st—Battery E.
2nd—Battery D.
3rd—Hq. Battery.
4th—Hq. Battery.

Class II, Enlisted Men—Open Jumping.
1st—Corp. Weeks, Battery E.
2nd—Corp. Kullick, Troop B.
3rd—Corp. Grossman, Troop A.
4th—Pvt. Frevele, Troop F.

Class III, Remount Jumping.
1st—Sgt. Pusel, M.G. Troop.
2nd—Pfc. Wilcox, Troop F.
3rd—Sgt. Hettrick, Troop B.
4th—Pfc. Ross, Troop E.

Class IV, Officers' Schooling and Jumping.
1st—Captain Callicutt, on *Octavia*.
2nd—Captain Callicutt, on *Bay Bridge*.
3rd—Captain George, on *Billy D*.
4th—Lieut. Thackeray, on *Colleen*.

Class V, Officers' Jumping.
1st—Captain Callicutt, on *Octavia*.
2nd—Lieut. Thackeray, on *Colleen*.
3rd—Captain George, on *Jimmy*.
4th—Lieut. Edwards on *Betsy*.

Preparations are under way for the Seventh Annual Presidio of Monterey Horse Show. The classes will be shown on Soldier Field and the Del Monte Hunt Course. Interest is high and everything indicates it will be a highly successful show. Hunters, jumpers, dressage and polo horses will all get a chance to show their worth.

The winter polo season at Del Monte has been very successful. Major C. H. Gerhardt, Captain L. L. Judge, Captain Alexander George, Captain F. J. Thompson and Lieut. R. G. Fergusson, have been active on the Post squad this year. Several younger officers who joined in the summer have gotten a good start at the game.

Major General Ben Lear, who commanded this re

ment and post from 1931 to 1933, was a visitor the latter part of November, en route to Panama.

Master Sergeant Michael Creighton, 11th Cavalry, for many years First Sergeant of Headquarters Troop, retired November 30, 1938, and was given an appropriate send-off by the troop. He departed on a visit to New York, after which he will return to live on the Monterey Peninsula.

The annual practice march of the regiment takes place during the period May 11th to 17th, ending at Camp Ord where field training and the annual tactical inspection will continue to June 2, 1939.

The following personnel changes affect the regiment:

2nd Lt. R. G. Fergusson has been relieved from the regiment and is now Aide-de-Camp to Brigadier General Burgin, with station at Fort Scott in the San Francisco Area.

2nd Lt. Thomas W. Chandler transferred from the Infantry and joined the regiment, from Hawaii.

Officers ordered to the regiment include Major W. B. Augur from Fort Leavenworth, 1st Lt. A. E. Harris from West Point and 1st Lt. Charles M. Iseley from The Cavalry School.

## 13th Cavalry—Fort Knox, Kentucky

COLONEL CHARLES L. SCOTT, *Commanding*

The tactical training of the regiment continues with weekly brigade and regimental exercises. All problems are drawn to include team-play with the 12th Observation Squadron and the 68th Field Artillery (Mech.). The close coöperation of the air reconnaissance units and artillery is essential to the efficient handling of mechanized cavalry and much improvement is being made along this line. Under certain conditions, cavalry officers with the reconnaissance elements may observe for attached and supporting artillery. Panels to be displayed from stationary and moving command vehicles are being developed to facilitate communication with the air.

Winter combat firing of all weapons, as indicated in a previous issue, continue. Valuable data and experience is being gathered to form a basis for the future adoption of a standardized combat qualification course for all weapons of a mechanized cavalry regiment.

Qualification course with the pistol began on March 1st, under the direction of Major Charles R. Johnson, Jr.

The final results of the Chief of Cavalry's small bore rifle and pistol matches show the standing of the 13th Cavalry and Pistol Team as follows:

*First Match*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Rifle | Score 2,674 | Sixth Place |
| Pistol | Score 1,224 | Sixth Place |

*Second Match*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Rifle | Score 2,734 | First Place |
| Pistol | Score 1,331 | Second Place |

*Third Match*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Rifle | Score 2,799 | First Place |
| Pistol | Score 1,347 | Second Place |

*Final Results*

| | |
|---|---|
| Rifle | Second Place |
| Pistol | Third Place |

The 13th Cavalry pistol team fired matches with the 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry, and 1st Infantry, with results as follows:

13th Cavalry, 1,331; 1st Battalion, 10th Inf., 1,308.
13th Cavalry, 1,331; First Infantry, 1,328.

The Thirteenth Cavalry Regimental Bowling Team is at present leading the Post League, with a standing of eleven games won and one game lost.

The Regimental Officers' Bowling Team finished the season in first place, with a total of thirty games won and eighteen lost.

The Headquarters Troop of the regiment completed the bowling season with a total of thirty games won and six lost, to win the Championship of the Red League, and then went on and defeated the Champions of the Blue League for the Post Organization Championship.

First Lieutenant Gerard C. Cowan reported for duty on February 16th and has been assigned to Troop "A."

## 26th Cavalry (P. S.)—Fort Stotsenburg, P. I.

COLONEL CLARENCE A. DOUGHERTY, *Commanding*

Intensive field training of the regiment terminated with our participation in the annual Philippine Department Maneuvers, January 9 to February 7, 1939, inclusive. The entire regiment apparently has that feeling of having participated in work well-done.

Troops are engaged in range practice, the first squadron on rifle range and the remainder on the regiment (less Troop F) firing the machine guns, light machine gun and the pistol both mounted and dismounted.

Troop F will leave Fort Stotsenburg on February 15th, for the purpose of participating in Philippine Department Military Tournament and Horse Show. Their monkey-drill and musical drill squads will be worth-while attractions in the tournament. The regiment will be well represented by entries in most of the classes in the horse show.

The Fort Stotsenburg annual Sports-week will be held March 16-23, 1939, inclusive.

Several members of the regiment and numerous friends are looking forward to a trip to Pinatubo in the near future, when they will be given an opportunity to become full-pledged members of the "Ancient and Aromatic Order of Balugas of Pinatubo" provided they stand the rigid tests of the ordeal.

By no means the least important of the regimental activities is our participation in the post softball league. The play-off is scheduled February 20-26, 1939, inclusive.

Captain Juan S. Moran, 26th Cavalry (PS), one of the

winners in the recent Department Tennis Tournament will be one of the strongest tennis contestants in the Philippine Department Military Tournament.

Lieut. Colonel Edgar W. Taulbee, Captains Paul A. Ridge and "Rufe" Land will return to the United States on the March transport.

Four cavalry officers: Major Heywood S. Dodd, and Lieuts. R. E. Arnette, Jr., Wm. G. Bartlett, and H. W. Stevenson, have been ordered to the Philippine Department. We hope to have them for duty with the 26th Cavalry.

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## 103rd Cavalry—Tyrone, Pennsylvania

COLONEL BENJAMIN C. JONES, *Commanding*

Annual federal and state armory inspections have come and gone. The federal inspection of units of the regiment was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Creed, regular army instructor stationed at Harrisburg. The state inspection was conducted by Major Maurice Rose, regular army instructor stationed at Tyrone. The units of the regiment performed quite creditably and definite progress was noted in many phases of training activities.

The annual meeting of officers of the regiment was held in late February at Philadelphia. The conferences and discussions presented were most instructive. And a highly enjoyable feature of the week end was a Saturday evening program of polo and exhibition mounted drill.

It is with regret that we note the transfer to the inactive list of 2nd Lieutenants Robert E. O'Brien of Troop C and Truman J. Norris, Jr., of Troop I. Lieutenant O'Brien requested transfer by reason of the removal of his residence from Philadelphia; Lieutenant Norris requested transfer because of pressure of business.

It is a pleasure to announce the appointment of Sergeant Irvin L. Basler of Troop C to be 2nd Lieutenant assigned to Troop C and of Russell K. Broscious, 2nd Lieutenant Engineer Reserve, to be 2nd Lieutenant of Cavalry assigned to Troop E.

The indoor polo season has closed. The winter months found the Philadelphia armory of the regiment a popular rendezvous for polo enthusiasts on Saturday evenings. The 103rd Cavalry Indoor Polo Association, comprising a number of teams in and about Philadelphia, had a most successful season.

All troops of the regiment are making strenuous effort to complete mounted pistol firing prior to May 1st. This is a popular phase of training in the regiment and officers and men go at it with much enthusiasm.

The regiment goes to Indiantown Gap on June 17th as part of the 52nd Cavalry Brigade for two weeks' field training. There are strenuous days planned for camp and every member of the regiment is looking forward to these two weeks with keen anticipation of pleasure.

## 106th Cavalry—(Illinois Component)

MAJOR RALPH G. GHER, *Commanding*

A scalene triangle drawn on the map of Illinois wit Chicago at the upper angle and Springfield and Urban at the lower angles would represent the relative position of the Illinois units of the 106th Cavalry.

Troop E and Band are located in Chicago, Machine Gun Troop and Troop F in Springfield, with Head quarters, Headquarters 2nd Squadron, Headquarter Troop, and Medical Detachment in Urbana.

From Chicago to Springfield is a distance of 200 miles from Springfield to Urbana 100 miles and from Urban to Chicago 150 miles.

The regimental adjutant is located in Springfield, th personnel adjutant in Urbana, the adjutant 2nd Squadron in Chicago, and the supply officer in Evanston, a suburb of Chicago.

Despite the widely separated stations, the regiment maintains a closely knit organization which function smoothly and effectively during the armory training period with the assistance of Major E. A. Franklin and Staff Sergeant Delmar L. Hughes, of the Army, who ac as instructors.

The first change in commissioned personnel of the regiment to occur in a number of years took place when 2nd Lieutenant Paul Yoggerst, Troop F, requested transfer to the inactive National Guard. Master Sergeant John T. Walker, Headquarters Troop, who was assigned to duty in the office of Captain W. A. Crookston, Regimental Adjutant, has been appointed 2nd Lieutenant of Troop F to succeed Lieutenant Yoggerst. Lieutenant Walker began his military career in the Machine Gun Troop and advanced through the various grades to Master Sergeant. In addition to being a cavalryman, Lieutenant Walker is an aviator holding an amateur pilot's license.

Machine Gun Troop and Troop F participated in the American Legion sponsored Lincoln Day pilgrimage on February 12th, Lincoln's Birthday. The two troops escorted nationally known visiting dignitaries to the tomb of Abraham Lincoln, where the annual ceremony was held in commemoration of the birth of the martyred president.

A membership committee has been named in the Band to pass on the qualifications of prospective recruits. The committee is headed by Lieutenant William F. Hewitt, commanding, and Warrant Officer Madden. A representative of each instrumental section composes the membership. The first recruit to appear before the committee was a physician, whose qualifications were judged after four rehearsals and drills.

Sponsored by Captain Mark Plaisted, Machine Gun Troop, and Captain M. G. Peter, Troop F, riding groups have been conducted through the historic and picturesque Sangamon River country. These rides are informal and civilian riding dress is worn. An extended trip is contemplated in the spring which will follow the trail covered by Abraham Lincoln between Springfield and the village of

New Salem, the early home of Lincoln. This is the trail also used by the pioneer circuit rider and Methodist minister, Peter Cartwright.

An innovation in training will follow the annual federal inspection of Troop F and Machine Gun Troop. Sound films of training at Fort Riley, the employment of machine guns in attack, and against mechanization, as well as short scenes taken of the 106th Cavalry at the summer camps in 1937 and 1938 will be shown. The federal inspection will be held on March 15th and 21st and will be conducted by Major Alton Howard, Cavalry, DOL.

Announcement has been made of the date and place of the 1939 tour of duty of the 106th. The official field training schedule names Camp Williams, Wisconsin, as the location, and July 1st to 15th as the dates. The entire regiment consisting of Regimental Headquarters, Band, Machine Gun Troop, and 2nd Squadron from Illinois, and the Commanding Officer and 1st and 3rd Squadrons from Michigan, will be together for the second time in history, the first being the 2nd Army Maneuvers in Michigan in 1936.

The 105th Cavalry, Wisconsin National Guard, will complete the brigade and this will be the first cavalry brigade encampment for the 106th.

The last Armistice Day was a reminder that the ranks of World War veterans in the regiment have been decreasing, but the 106th Cavalry can boast of a greater percentage of World War veterans than can many National Guard regiments. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Buchanan (now on duty with the War Department General Staff) heads the list. He served as a first lieutenant of field artillery in France. Major Ralph G. Gher also served in the field artillery. Captain W. A. Crookston, Adjutant, served as a first lieutenant of field artillery with the A.E.F. and as a captain of field artillery in the United States. Captain Max Flewelling, Headquarters Troop, held the rank of sergeant of field artillery in France, while Captain Mark Plaisted, Machine Gun Troop, served with the infantry in the Army of Occupation in Germany. 1st Lieutenant Charles Bean, Machine Gun Troop, was awarded the Purple Cross for his services with the 124th Field Artillery. Captain Frank C. Sleeper, Supply Officer, served in the Navy. Major Clyde D. Gulick, Medical Detachment, Captain H. P. Macnamara, Medical Detachment, and Captain S. P. McGilligan, Medical Detachment, all held commissions in the Medical Corps during the war. Captain A. E. Dickerson, V.C., served with the Veterinary Corps in France. In addition to their World War service, Captain Crookston and Captain Flewelling saw service on the Mexican Border in 1916. A number of enlisted men of the regiment are veterans of the World War.

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## 110th Cavalry—Massachusetts-Connecticut

COLONEL PHILIP L. BROWN, *Cavalry*

An exhibition of military and semi-military events, arranged, directed and staged by the enlisted men of the 110th Cavalry attracted more than 1,000 relatives and friends of troopers in the National Guard horse regiment to the Commonwealth Armory, Friday evening, Feb. 24.

The two small balconies in the armory with a capacity of 570 seats were overtaxed by the great outpouring and corners of the large drill hall overflowed with spectators who remained throughout a 2½ hour program to applaud without favoritism the efforts of the horse soldiers.

There were four military events, the best trained remount, the best turned out troopers' mount, jumping, and the best squad in full field equipment. In addition there were three highly amusing chukkers of "broom" polo in which representatives of Headquarters Troop, Troops E, F, I, and K, and the Medical Detachment competed. The annual Enlisted Men's night closed with an exhibition of pyramid and Roman riding by members of Troop E and dancing in Curtis Guild Hall followed with music by the 110th Cavalry Band orchestra.

The best trained remount class brought out the latest shipment of young horses received by the cavalry several weeks ago. The animals had been assigned for training to selected men in the regiment and those men engaged in competition to show the effect of their horsemanship efforts with the remounts. The winner was Pvt. 1cl. Robert S. Chisholm, Troop I. Other ribbon winners were Corp. Aldo Saporito, Troop E, second; Pvt. Robert N. Turner, Troop F, third; Sgt. Joseph P. Moran, Troop E, fourth.

The troopers' mount class, judged on appearance of the horse and the trooper's equipment was won by Pvt. John J. Campbell, Troop E; second, Sgt. William S. Gibson, Troop F; third, Pvt. William V. Gorski, Headquarters Troop; fourth, Pvt. Robert W. Harkins, Troop E.

Jumping brought forth a number of plain and fancy cavalry mounts each required to take eight three-foot jumps, the performance of the rider being the basis of judging. First was Staff Sgt. Harry J. McGrath, Headquarters Troop; second, Pvt. Gerald F. Hogan, Troop K; third, Sgt. Joseph P. Moran, Troop E; and fourth Sgt. Edward L. Hopkins, Troop I.

Each troop sent out a squad complete in steel helmets and full field equipment to compete for the title of best squad in the regiment. The class was won by Troop E led by Corporal William T. McQuade. Judging was based on gaits, mounting and dismounting, to fight on foot and link in couples.

The judges were all regular army Cavalry officers assigned to this area. They were Colonel Frank K. Chapin, Colonel John Millikin, and Major Thomas J. Heavey.

Master Sergeant Leroy A. Davison was chairman of the committee that included Master Sergeant Francis J. Breen; First Sergeants Walter C. Newman, Troop I; Gilbert J. Woodworth, Troop K; William L. Joyce, Troop E; Frederick R. Green, Headquarters Troop; Roscoe L. Cummings, Troop F; Staff Sergeants Frank J. Dooley, Harry J. McGrath, John T. Woodworth, Walter J. Green, Walter J. Gilbert; Technical Sergeants Henry

J. Hurley, George E. Donovan, Peter Easson, and Warren C. Gibson of Headquarters Troop.

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## 112th Cavalry—Dallas, Texas

COLONEL CLARENCE E. PARKER, *Commanding*

All units of the regiment are hard at work preparing for the Annual Federal Armory Inspection, which will be conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Rex E. Willoughby, Cavalry, during the period 12th to 19th March.

These preparations together with the squad tests and Cavalry Leadership Tests, for small units being conducted in the regiment are keeping everybody on their toes, from buck privates to the colonel. One troop commander recently remarked, "The Old Man sure is turning on the heat, this Armory Training Period."

As scheduled, the Troop Period and Dismounted Phase of the Intermediate Period, in the Platoon Leadership Test, were completed on January 15th and February 19th, respectively, and the results are most gratifying.

The scores awarded the competing platoons from each troop were very close, and as this phase only counts 98 points out of a possible 1,000 it is anybody's race to date.

The 2d Quarterly tests in the squad and individual competitions being conducted in the Medical Detachment and Band were completed on February 15th and 27th, and Colonel Parker was very much pleased at the marked improvement in initiative of non-commissioned officers shown over the last training test conducted for these two units.

On January 1st, Captain Beecherl, Lieutenants Fenley, Cowman, and Leonard, officers of the Machine Gun Troop, were hosts to all officers of the regiment at their annual New Year's party held at the troop club house at Letoe.

General Walter B. Pyron, the Brigade Commander, was the guest of honor and principle speaker of the evening.

After sufficient drinks, a barbecued venison dinner was served, and the fine buck that furnished the tender venison for this delicious repast, was drilled through the head by "Unk" Beecherl, according to his own statement, at 600 yards, which shows old Unk can shoot a rifle darn near as well as he can a machine gun.

The regiment received a shipment of 26 remounts from Fort Reno, on January 6th. These animals all arrived in excellent shape, are of suitable type, have good dispositions and show the result of excellent handling and gentling at the remount depot.

The troop commanders drew for the remounts by lot, and without exception, were tickled to death with the type of animal drawn for their respective troops. All state that they are by far the best received to date, from any remount depot.

Colonel Parker was so pleased with the excellent type of remounts furnished and with their good dispositions and tractability, which is most necessary for National Guard Cavalry, that he wrote a personal letter of thanks to the Commanding Officer of the Fort Reno Depot.

Colonel Robert M. Cheney, Senior Instructor of Cavalry, Texas National Guard, notified the regiment on February 6th, of the sad death of our Honorary Colonel, "Tommy" Tompkins, who was loved and respected by every member of the 112th.

Ever since the regiment's first field training period at Leon Springs, Texas, where Colonel Tompkins was in command and who was then elected our Honorary Colonel, "Tommy, God Bless him," has never failed to pay us a visit during our field training camp, no matter where it was held.

Only last summer, although he was a sick man at the time, he visited the regiment at Camp Bullis, where he was the guest of honor at a regimental party and renewed old acquaintances with officers and non-commissioned officers, who loved and worshipped him, like every cavalryman did, who had ever served under Colonel Tompkins.

At the assembly formation of all troops of the regiment on Sunday, February 12th, the first regimental assembly after Colonel Tompkin's death, Colonel Parker ordered taps sounded and each troop presented arms to the memory and honor of this grand old cavalryman.

The following listed non-commissioned officers and privates won first place in the troop inspection and demonstration competitions conducted by the regimental instructor, for months of January and February, 1939:

*Headquarters Troop*

Best turned out mounted trooper—Sgt. H. W. Aller. Best turned out dismounted trooper—Sgt. W. D. Sperry.

*Machine Gun Troop*

Best turned out mounted trooper—Sgt. D. E. Colley. Best turned out dismounted trooper—Sgt. R. A. Lee.

*Troop A*

Best turned out mounted trooper—Sgt. W. H. Laird. Best turned out dismounted trooper—Sgt. P. D. Hale.

*Troop B*

Best turned out mounted trooper—Sgt. C. A. McManus. Best turned out dismounted trooper—Cpl. W. B. Shaw.

*Troop E*

Best turned out mounted trooper—Sgt. E. M. Hockwald. Best turned out dismounted trooper—Cpl. J. L. Phillips.

*Troop F*

Best turned out mounted trooper—Pvt. W. Burke. Best turned out dismounted troopers—Pvts. W. Burke and D. K. Hott, tied for first place.

NOTE: This is the first instance in the regimental competition where the same man won both mounted and dismounted, and Pvt. Burke deserves great credit.

Someone has said, "Show me how you take care of your animals and I will know how efficient a cavalry organization you are." If this be the criterion of the efficiency of a cavalry unit, and we know of no better one, the 112th

Cavalry, Texas National Guard, can well make its bid for a place in the sun perforce what was accomplished by the 1st Sgt. and Stable Sgt. of Troop F, 112th Cavalry, Tyler, Texas. What these two men accomplished was beyond the ordinary call of duty, and reflects not only efficiency but real love of the horse.

*Old Abie,* Government-owned horse of this Tyler organization, is decidedly not an example of equine beauty or perfection. His twenty-two years of service hang heavy on him. With a head like a gallows-tree, he certainly wouldn't win any prizes in a horse show, and it would be straining a point to say that he had a commercial value in excess of fifteen dollars. But with all that, he possesses a heart of gold and a spirit of loyalty that could belong only to an old trooper, and besides he had been the stable sergeant's horse for years. So when old *Abie* failed to answer present on Sunday evening, October 16, 1938, as Stable Sergeant Forrest S. Norman, was feeding the troop horses, this unheard of dereliction of duty on part of this old troop horse brought about an immediate search. Finally he was found lying down in a corner of the pasture, in a dazed condition and very weak. First Sergeant Charles B. Toliver, Sergeant Norman, and some troopers of Troop F after considerable effort, finally got old *Abie* to his feet and practically carried him to the corral. Dr. J. T. Hawkins, a local veterinarian, was called. Upon examination of the horse he pronounced what was taken to be old *Abie's* death sentence, for the veterinarian said, "This horse has sleeping sickness." For all practical purposes it was a death sentence, because, the veterinarians tell us over ninety-six per cent of sleeping sickness cases, where the horse goes down, are fatal. Dr. Hawkins administered a shot of serum although he believed *Abie's* case was hopeless.

But Sergeants Toliver and Norman (see cut) did not give up; they decided that although the chances were nearly one hundred to one against recovery they were going to do their utmost to swing the balance in favor of the infinitesimally short odds. They established a day and night roster over the horse, and one or both of these sergeants was with *Abie* day and night, for ninety-six hours.

A frame work was built of lumber, constructed to hold the horse upright on its feet and padded to prevent injury, as no sling was available. A canvas cover was put over this framework to give him as much protection as possible from the weather. Due to his condition the horse refused to drink, and water had to be administered to him by means of a rubber tube through the nostrils, and enemas given every four hours.

The horse was fed a hot bran mash, whenever it could be forced down, mixed with a medicine Dr. Hawkins prescribed. After four days of constant attention a few minutes daily exercise was then given the horse and gradually increased until the exercise was given three times each day. At the end of a week the condition of the horse was improved sufficiently to remove it from the frame. A six weeks' isolation period followed, and needless to say



*First Sergeant Toliver, "Abie," and Sergeant Norman.*

these two sergeants continued to give old *Abie* special care and attention. In two months the horse was completely recovered and was "on the line" for the regular drills of the organization.

Troop F still has old *Abie* with his heart of gold, and the 112th Cavalry is justly proud of this organization and its 1st Sergeant and Stable Sergeant who have demonstrated that they have that "greater love" for an old but faithful servant.

## 124th Cavalry—Houston, Texas

COLONEL CALVIN B. GARWOOD, *Commanding*

On February 5th the Regimental Staff and Headquarters Troop participated in a Command Post exercise, which was held at Headquarters Troop, 124th Cavalry. The problem was prepared by Lt. Col. R. E. Willoughby, Unit Instructor, and Captain Jules R. Smith, Regimental S-3. The forward echelon and the Commander's group were located in different parts of the city and the rear echelon was at the armory. The problem included the orders from the 56th Cavalry Brigade, who was represented by Brigadier General Walter B. Pyron, and Captain John Mettenheimer, Brigade S-3.

Officers and men in the Regiment were shocked to hear of the death of that fine old cavalryman, Colonel S. R. H. (Tommy) Tompkins. He was in command of Camp Stanley when our Brigade used to have their annual encampment there and he was an honorary Colonel in this Brigade. We all will miss the annual visits from this fine old character who has passed to his reward.

## 305th Cavalry—Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

COLONEL VINCENT A. CARROLL, Cavalry-Reserve, *Commanding*

Interest in the winter training program and correlated activities of the regiment as evidenced by attendance is better this year than ever before. The Wednesday luncheons have recently been devoted to conferences on last year's Cavalry School problems. The riding on Wednesday evening has generally covered troop drill with some equitation and jumping. Pistol practice has been discontinued due to lack of ammunition. We are in hopes

that hidden away in the appropriation bill now before Congress there are several chests of caliber .45 ammunition for next year's pistol training.

Our ritzy luncheon place, the Arcadia International Cafe has folded up, therefore the noon luncheons are now being held at "The Sansom House." While not quite as classy, it appears to be solvent and likely to continue in business for some time to come.

Early in January, Colonel T. J. Johnston, Chief of the Remount Service, favored us with a talk on horses, stallions, breeding and the remount service. Colonel Johnston knows horses and his talk was very interesting as well as instructive.

The regiment was also very fortunate in having Captain Peter A. Nolan, late of the British Cavalry, as guest speaker. Captain Nolan gave a vivid and thorough description of the cavalry engagement at Nery during the World War. His talk gave new meaning to the words "MOBILITY—FIRE POWER and SHOCK."

On February 1st, the officers entertained the Chief of Cavalry at a dinner at the Rittenhouse Club. General Herr gave an excellent talk on the "Future of Horse Cavalry" which helped allay some of the fears raised by the proponents of mechanization. We welcomed this opportunity of meeting the Chief of our Arm. The arrangements were perfect down to the last detail, due to the untiring efforts of Lt. Sam Naftzinger.

Almost before he had a breathing space, Sam was drafted to run a Cabaret Dance on St. Patrick's Day, March 17th, at the Germantown Cricket Club. The members of the regiment and their guests are looking forward to a gala evening.

Captain Fred Streicher, who, incidentally, is to be promoted to Major soon, gave a talk at noon on Mechanized Cavalry. He covered the topic so thoroughly and in such a manner, that he was asked to repeat the talk for the officers of the 315th Infantry. His success with the Infantry was even greater than his performance for the home team.

Captain Streicher aided by Captain "Doug" Morrow put on a Mobilization Test on February 18th. The orders were received on the 17th—Report by person, wire, telephone, special delivery mail, radio, or messenger to Regimental Headquarters on February 18th. By noon eighty per cent of the officers had reported and over ninety per cent of the enlisted men rang the bell. The general opinion has been that the test was very successful and that the regiment is far from a moribund outfit.

Lt. Riordan has announced that the Mechanized Night Ride will be held on Friday evening, March 31st. Enthusiasm for this competitive event is high and we hope to announce the names of our expert map readers and road finders in this column in the next issue.

Lt. Gentle has promised, as Chairman of the Horse Show Committee, to put on a show in May that will be the talk of the town.

## 306th Cavalry—Baltimore, Maryland

COLONEL MATTHEW F. JAMES, *Commanding*

Members of the regiment in both Baltimore and Washington are now well along in their preparations fo CMTC this summer. All conferences from February on will be part of a refresher course for our active duty a Fort Belvoir.

On January 5th, the Baltimore officers attended a luncheon sponsored by the Department of Maryland R. O. A. in honor of Colonel John C. F. Tillson, Jr. Senior Unit Instructor of the Baltimore Reserve Units This affair was well attended by all the Arms and Services.

At the first conference in January, Colonel J. L. Collins, FA, lectured to the Baltimore units on "The Rôle of the Field Artillery." At this same conference Colonel Bruce Palmer showed movies of the march of the Seventh Mechanized Brigade from Fort Knox to Fort Riley and the maneuver of October, 1938. At the next conference a Training Field of "Cavalry in Dismounted Action" was shown. This was followed by a problem on the same subject given by Major V. J. Blondell and Captain Carroll Wright. Colonel Palmer held a joint conference of Cavalry and Engineers at the first conference in February and the subject was "Engineers with Cavalry." This conference covered the use of Engineers by both Horse and Mechanized Cavalry. At the second conference in February a Training Film on "Map Reading" was shown followed by "Pistol Marksmanship" by Major V. J. Blondell and "Rifle Marksmanship" by Major W. C. Warner.

Features on the schedule of the Washington units for this period were lectures by Brigadier General H. S. Hawkins, U.S.A. retired, and Colonel John F. C. Tillson, Jr., Senior Unit Instructor of the Regiment. Both of these speakers gave many practical suggestions which are and will be very helpful to those officers who heard them. Officers of the Reserve who addressed conferences during the past two months include Major William Yetton; Captains E. H. Daniel, William I. Irby, Jesse T. Nicholson, Edward Perkins, and Walter W. Woodruff; Lieutenants Robert Curtis and Thomas Rogers.

Rides have been held at Fort Myer twice a month and the officers of the Regiment have shown their enthusiasm in the fine program that is being conducted by the large attendance at every ride.

The birthday of the Regiment was celebrated again this year by a ride at Fort Myer in the morning followed by a Dinner Party at the Army-Navy Country Club. Sixty-one officers of the Regiment attended the ride and dinner. Guests of honor at the dinner were Major General John K. Herr, Chief of Cavalry, and Colonel Bruce Palmer, Chief of Staff, 62nd Cavalry Division. The Regimental Commander, Colonel Matthew F. James was Toastmaster of the occasion. Expressions of regret at not being able to attend were received from His Excellency, Herbert R. O'Connor, Governor of Maryland; Colonel George S. Patton, Commanding Officer of the Third Cavalry, and

Lieutenant Colonel John C. Mullenix, former Unit Instructor of the Regiment. Speakers of the occasion were Major General Herr, who made the principal address; Colonel Palmer, Colonel Tillson, Lieutenant Colonels William H. Skinner, Regimental Executive; Joseph L. Philips, Unit Instructor; Adolphus W. Roffe, 3rd Cavalry; and Edward B. Harry, former Commanding Officer of the Second Squadron. One officer spoke for each rank, and the "Case of the Second Lieutenants" was very ably presented by Lieutenant Ford E. Young, Jr. The Regiment is indebted to Major Edward A. Kane and his committee for a most enjoyable celebration.

Although regretting his absence at the Birthday Celebration the Washington officers were delighted by a prior visit from Lieutenant Colonel Mullenix at the conference held on January 19th.

Recent assignments to the Regiment by Division Orders were: First Lieutenant Lawrence B. Wilson, and Second Lieutenants William S. Covington and Robert C. Tetro. Second Lieutenants Robert W. Brown and Walter L. McCaddon were transferred to the 462nd Armored Car Squadron, and First Lieutenant Howard Baker was relieved from assignment to the Regiment.

## 307th Cavalry—Richmond, Virginia

LIEUTENANT COLONEL R. B. H. BEGG, Cavalry-Reserve
*Commanding*

The annual activity in home work, to qualify for active duty, started with a bang in February. Our old friend Major John P. Dean, 154th Cavalry Brigade, is keeping the instructor busy marking his 50 series lessons at the rate of about one per day. He is boning for the spring session at Leavenworth.

The regiment regrets the loss of 2nd Lieut. Mark L. Robinson, due to his change of residence to 4716½ Franklin Avenue, Hollywood, California, and of 2nd Lieutenant John L. Grimes, to the AGD-Reserves, February 7, 1939.

Captain Robert S. Cochran, 1717 Hanover Avenue, Richmond, Va., was assigned to the Regiment, January 1, 1939, from the 462nd Armored Car Squadron.

Lieutenant Grayson R. Headley, is now wearing his first lieutenants bars having been promoted February 7, 1939.

Lieutenant Colonel Glass, unit instructor, has received orders detailing him on a mission to Guatemala. The 307th will miss him.

## 308th Cavalry—Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

COLONEL GEORGE H. CHERRINGTON, Cavalry-Reserve.
*Commanding*

As usual, the midwinter period has cut into the outdoor activities of the regiment. Although a few hardy individuals have ridden almost every Sunday, the weather has discouraged most of the officers. The indoor activities, however, have increased over each of the past three years, the attendance at conferences being especially gratifying. All conferences are conducted by officers of the regiment and have been more than satisfactory in every way.

This year the regiment did not stage its annual military ball during National Defense Week, this feature having been adopted by the Reserve Officers Association, the National Guard and the Naval Reserve. Instead of the ball, the regiment held a private dance at the Webster Hall Hotel on Saturday, February 25th, with about twenty-five members of the regiment and their ladies attending.

On February 13th the regiment lost one of its original members, when Major James M. Graham decided to decline reappointment. Major Graham attended Officers Training Camp in 1917, was commissioned Provisional Second Lieutenant of Infantry, soon transferred to Cavalry and served in Panama with the 12th Cavalry. After the war he resigned and completed his college course and law school. He was commissioned a Captain, Cavalry Reserve, immediately after resigning and was one of the most active officers of the regiment for many years. All members of the regiment regret that Major Graham decided to retire from military service. They are happy, however, to welcome Major John P. Dean, Cavalry Reserve, of Chambersburg, Pa., who has been assigned to the vacancy created by Major Graham's separation from the service.

Colonel Cherrington, regimental commander, is now absent in Arizona on his regular winter holiday of several weeks. He is the guest of Mr. Bliss Flaccus, a former member of the regiment, at the latter's beautiful ranch, Rancho del Lago, near Vail. Colonel Cherrington always returns from these visits greatly refreshed and in good condition to tackle the various strenuous duties of a Pittsburgh business man.

The regiment feels very fortunate in being permitted to send two of its members to schools this spring. Captain Jean T. Ross has been ordered to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, and Lieutenant J. Roy Degenhardt has ben ordered to Fort Riley. Both are outstanding members of the regiment and much is expected of them at school and upon their return.

## Reserve Affairs—Kansas City, Missouri

The 14th annual banquet of the Cavalry Reserve Officers of Greater Kansas City was held on February 4, 1939, to commemorate the organization on February 2, 1901, of the 15th U. S. Cavalry.

Regular cavalry officers attending were Colonel Hugh H. Broadhurst, coördinator for Reserve affairs in Kansas City; Colonel Henry W. Baird, CO, First Cavalry (Mecz); Lieutenant Colonel D. G. Richart, instructor, Iowa N.G., who was principal speaker; Lieutenant Colonel H. Thompson, Unit Instructor for Cavalry, Kansas City; Captain Gordon Rogers, student, C&GSS, Fort Leavenworth; General (Major General) E. M. Stayton,